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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
LIVESTOCK AND MEATPACKING INDUSTRIES 
Concentration and consolidation have become important concerns in the 
meatpacking industry over past decades.  This growing trend has continued, as more 
meatpacking firms consolidate or exit the industry.  In recent years, these conditions have 
caused livestock producers, policy makers, and the public to question the efficiency of 
the market.  Concerns have arisen from the potential market power that meatpacking 
firms could use to influence the market.  With these claims of oligopsonistic behavior in 
the industry, some research has shown that any losses due to market power are 
outweighed by increased processing efficiency (Azzam and Schroeter, Paul). 
 
Changes in Livestock Production 
 Geographic location of livestock production and slaughter has been changing.  
The beef industry has seen this trend over the last half of the twentieth century.  Prior to 
this time, livestock production in general and more specifically beef production occurred 
close to terminal markets and major population centers.  With the development and 
improvement of farming techniques, irrigation practices, and available land, beef 
producers began to take advantage of the conditions in the Plains states.  Producers also 
found that if local feed grain supplies were not adequate, it was more feasible to import 
grain from the Corn Belt than moving finished cattle to slaughter plants in the Plains.   
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 Since 1980, fed cattle production has been shifting away from the Corn Belt.  The 
level of production in the Plains states, compared to the rest of the United States, has 
been increasing.  In 1980, the top four states in cattle marketings were Texas, Kansas, 
Nebraska, and Iowa (in order).  These four states marketed 38.9% of all fed cattle that 
year.  Over the next twenty years, fewer cattle were fed and marketed in the Corn Belt, 
while cattle feeding increased in the Plains states.  By 2000, the leading states in cattle 
marketings included (in order), Texas, Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado.  These states 
marketed 46.7% of all fed cattle during that year (USDA-National Agricultural Statistical 
Service).   
 Packers have realized that to ensure a steady and adequate supply of cattle, it is 
advantageous for them to be located close to cattle feeding.  Thus, meatpacking firms 
have been slaughtering more cattle in the Plains than the Corn Belt.  The top four states 
(in order) in commercial cattle slaughter in 1980 were Texas, Nebraska, Iowa, and 
Kansas.  These states processed 51.4% of all cattle.  In twenty years, the top four states 
were Kansas, Nebraska, Texas, and Colorado.  These states slaughtered 69.2% of all 
commercial cattle (NASS). 
 Hog production and slaughter has continued its strong presence in the Corn Belt, 
with some shifting to other regions.  Over the last two decades, pork producers have 
continued to raise hogs close to sources of feed grains.  Some production has been 
shifting to the Plains states with looser restrictions on environmental considerations, 
available land, and irrigated sources for grains.  While some production has shifted to the 
Plains states, the majority of the change away from the Corn Belt has been to the Mid-
Atlantic states.  In 1980, Iowa was the top hog producing state, followed by (in order) 
 3 
Illinois, Minnesota, and Missouri.  The four states marketed 49.5% of all hogs during that 
year.  By 2000, North Carolina emerged as one of the top states in hog marketings.  Iowa 
was once again the leading state, followed (in order) by North Carolina, Minnesota, and 
Illinois.  These four states combined to market 54.3% of all hogs, during 2000 (NASS). 
 Hog processing has followed trends similar to hog marketings.  Slaughter plants 
have located close to sources of hogs.  In 1980, the top four states in hog slaughter (in 
order) were Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, and Ohio.  These states processed 45.7% of all 
hogs during that year.  By 2000, some slaughter had shifted to the Mid-Atlantic region.  
Iowa was the leading state in hog slaughter, followed by (in order) North Carolina, 
Illinois, and Minnesota.  These states combined to process 56.2% of all hogs during that 
year (NASS).  Over the past two decades hog slaughter and marketings have followed 
similar trends.  Processing and production have intensified in the Corn Belt and Mid-
Atlantic region.   
 The Canadian hog industry has had extreme changes in recent decades.  In 1980, 
hog production (pig crop) was at 14.5 million head.  The country slaughtered 13.9 million 
head and exported 238 thousand head of hogs that year.  Over the course of the next 
twenty years the industry has seen rapid growth.  In 2000, Canada’s hog production was 
at 25.9 million head, processed 19.7 million head, and exported 4.4 million head of hogs 
(USDA-Foreign Agriculture Service).   
Part of the production expansion has occurred in the central provinces of Canada.  
Recently, these provinces have started competing heavily with the hog markets in the 
U.S. Corn Belt.  In 1984 Ontario marketed 4.9 million head, and by 2000 the province 
marketed 6.1 million head of hogs.  The number of marketed hogs in Saskatchewan more 
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than doubled from 1984 to 2000, from 0.8 to 1.7 million head.  However, some of the 
largest growth during this time period occurred in Manitoba.  The province marketed 1.6 
million head in 1984; by 2000 this number had climbed to 5.1 million hogs (Canadian 
Pork Council).  While hog production and marketing has rapidly increased, the industry 
has relied on increased exports.   
Canadian exports from hog production include live hogs and pork products.  Live 
hog exports from Canada consist mainly of feeder pigs and market hogs.  Some breeding 
stock is exported; however, this is a small proportion of total exports.  In 1988 Canada 
exported 146 thousand feeder pigs and 716 thousand market hogs.  Twelve years later 
(2000) the country exported 2.3 million feeder pigs and 2 million market hogs (Canadian 
Pork Council).  This is a substantial amount of live hog exports.  In 2000, Canada was the 
number one exporter of live hogs, with 61.6% of the world market.  Canada is also a 
major exporter of pork products.  Canada was the second largest pork exporter at 658 
thousand metric tons of pork, in 2000.  Exports at this level have given them 19.3% of the 
World pork market (USDA-FAS).  The Canadian hog and pork industry has seen 
expansion and is expected to continue this pattern into the future. 
The recent growth in Canadian hog production has allowed the industry to 
compete on the world pork market and supply the U.S. hog industry.  The U.S. is the 
third largest pork exporter at 584 thousand metric tons, or 17.1% of the world market, in 
2000.  Canada is the second largest pork exporter.  Thus, the two countries compete on 
the pork export market.  However the U.S. also imports a large quantity of pork, unlike 
Canada.  The U.S. imported 439 thousand metric tons and Canada imported 68 thousand 
tons in that same year (USDA-FAS).   
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With the enactment of the Canadian and United States Trade Agreement 
(CUSTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the late eighties 
and early nineties, the Canadian and U.S. markets have become more open to one 
another.  This fact has become evident in the hog market.  Both countries trade live hogs 
and pork, however, most of the trade is flowing into the U.S.  In 2001, the U.S. bought 
approximately 51% of Canadian pork exports (Statistics Canada).  These exports from 
Canada account for most of the U.S. pork imports.  Also, almost all of the live hog 
exports from Canada enter the U.S.  In 2000, only 2 thousand head of Canadian live hog 
exports did not enter the U.S.  About 59% of feeder hog exports went to Iowa, Kansas, 
Missouri, and Nebraska to be finished.  The majority of Canadian slaughter hog exports, 
43 percent, went to Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and 
Wyoming (Livestock Marketing and Information Center).  The U.S. and Canadian hog 
industries have a definite relationship.  The apparent flow of trade between the two 
markets requires that any analysis of the hog industry needs to consider this relationship 
and the impacts that may occur.   
 
Changes in Meatpacking 
 Concentration and consolidation have become an accepted fact.  However, the 
presence of concentration may not have a negative impact and the market may be 
encouraging this trend.  Meatpacking has long been known as a low margin business, 
with high volume.  Most packers pay similar amounts for their slaughter cattle and hogs.  
They also receive about the same about for the meat and byproducts they produce.  If this 
holds true, every packer would have close to the same margin.  The best way for a packer 
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to increase their net margin would be to lower their operating costs.  Lowering costs is 
the best approach, because they have limited influence over livestock and meat prices.  
The lower cost firms have become more efficient and are more likely to stay in the 
industry. 
The apparent advantage of being a low cost processor emphasizes the fact that 
economies of size are present in meatpacking.  Economies of size relate to the presence 
of decreasing long-run average cost of a firm.  Thus, a firm with lower costs and revenues 
that are competitive with the rest of the industry would have economies of size.  Research 
done by McDonald et al. (2000) has shown that economies of size have been present in 
meatpacking.   
 Steer and heifer slaughter plant size has been shifting to larger plants, 
slaughtering more cattle (USDA Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards 
Administration).  In 1980, there were 520 plants that slaughtered 50,000 head or less per 
year.  These plants processed 3.446 million head of steers and heifers that year.  Plants 
with sizes ranging from 50,000 to 500,000 head per year, numbered 98.  These mid-sized 
plants slaughtered 15.156 million head of fed cattle.  The eight larger plants (over 
500,000 head per year) processed 5.877 million head of fed cattle in 1980.  By 2000, 
there were only 103 small plants (less than 50,000 head/yr) that slaughtered 0.427 million 
head of cattle.  The eighteen plants that processed between 50,000 to 500,000 head/yr, 
slaughtered 4.183 million head of cattle that year.  The larger plants increased their 
numbers to 22 and processed 24.78 million head in 2000.   
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 Over the past two decades, the number of beefpacking plants has been reduced by 
almost half.  In 1980, there were 1,411 federally inspected plants that processed cattle.  
After twenty years this number has decreased to 738 plants.   
Porkpacking has seen similar changes in plant size over the past two decades.  In 
1980, the 333 small plants (processing less than 25,000 hogs) slaughtered 1.679 million 
hogs.  There were 91 small plants that slaughtered 0.567 million hogs in 2000.  Plants 
that processed between 25,000 and 300,000 decreased slaughter from 8.744 to 4.829 
million hogs between 1980 and 2000.  The number of these plants also decreased from 93 
to 59.  The number of plants that slaughtered more than 300,000 hogs per year, decreased 
from 83 to 37 by 2000.  However, they slaughtered more hogs, from 82.5 to 88.5 million 
hogs, over the same period (GIPSA).  These industries have been changing over the past 
two decades.  Mainly due to economies of size, they are shifting from large numbers and 
small size to fewer numbers and larger plants.   
Porkpacking plant numbers have followed a similar trend.  There were 1,235 
federally inspected hog slaughtering plants in 1980.  Federally inspected hog plants 
decreased to 721 by 2000 (GIPSA).   
 Beefpacking has seen large changes in the level of concentration.  In 1980 the top 
four firms processed 35.7 percent of all steer and heifer slaughter.  This level of 
concentration had increased to 81.7 percent by 2000 (GIPSA).  A majority of this change 
came in the 80’s.  From 1980 to 1990, the level of concentration of the top four firms 
processing fed steers and heifers increased by almost 36 percentage points.  Boxed beef 
production has also become a trend in the beefpacking industry.  With the increasing 
demand for boxed beef, many packing plants produce boxed beef to add value to their 
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output.  In 1980, the top four firms produced 52.9 percent of boxed beef.  By 2000, the 
top four firms produced 84.7 percent of boxed beef (GIPSA).   
 The porkpacking industry has similar, but less dramatic increases, than the 
beefpacking industry.  The concentration level of the top four firms that process slaughter 
hogs was at 33.6 percent, in 1980.  By 2000, the top four firms processed 57.1 percent of 
all slaughter hogs (GIPSA).   
 
ConAgra Plant Closing 
On December 25, 2000, the ConAgra beef processing facility in Garden City, 
Kansas, caught fire.  At first ConAgra believed the damage was repairable, but after 
further consideration they decided to close the 4,400-head/day processing plant.  This 
abrupt change had an effect on market conditions, not only for ConAgra, but also for 
other packers and producers.  The ConAgra plant closing was located in an area of 
concentrated beef production (western Kansas), which makes this situation unique, 
compared to previous plant closings studied previously.   
 
Cattle Slaughter Capacity 
 Excess slaughter capacity in the beef industry was believed to exist prior to the 
closing.  There is no known media coverage of a potential capacity problem in the cattle 
slaughtering industry.  Discussions with industry analysts confirm that excess capacity 
was not a problem at the time.  Thus, it is assumed that during 2000 there was adequate 
excess capacity in the industry.   
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 The closing of a large plant, such as this one, would have a direct and immediate 
impact on capacity.  The actual slaughter capacity of the industry is difficult to measure.  
There are no known published sources of estimated U.S. slaughter capacity in 2000 or 
2001.  However, there was a change in slaughter after the plant closed.  During the 55 
weeks prior to the closure (mostly 2000), the average weekly slaughter in Kansas, Texas, 
Nebraska, Colorado, Iowa, and Minnesota was 461.16 thousand head.  Over the next 55 
weeks (mostly 2001) the average weekly slaughter in the same area was about 439.85 
thousand head.  This was a drop of 21.31 thousand head.  If it is assumed the ConAgra 
plant was operating at 4,400 head per day and working 5.5 days per week, its weekly 
slaughter would be 24.2 thousand head.  This value is almost equivalent to the drop in the 
average weekly slaughter in the market.  After the plant closing, the slaughter capacity 
along with the actual slaughter dropped.   
 
Maple Leaf Plant Opening 
Maple Leaf Foods opened a 45,000-head/week hog processing facility on August 
30, 1999, in Brandon, Manitoba.  This plant was opened during a time of expansion in the 
Canadian hog industry.  At the same time there was little to no excess capacity in the hog 
slaughter industry, in the U.S. or Canada.  Few large plant openings, like Maple Leaf 
Foods, have not occurred since previous studies were completed.  Also, few studies have 
examined a large plant opening in an expanding production area.  The Maple Leaf Foods 
opening should have an impact on market conditions in an area of concentrated and 
expanding production and on a slaughtering industry with little excess capacity.   
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U.S. Hog Slaughter Capacity 
 Slaughter capacity was an issue at the time of the plant opening.  In the second 
half of 1998, hog prices reached extremely low levels.  In fact, prices reached a 35 year 
low of $13.92 in December of 1998 (Luby).  This was caused and intensified by a 
backlog of hogs ready for processing.  An article by an anonymous writer with Successful 
Farming helps to explain the situation.  It states that the hog processing industry lost 
numerous plants and that the lack of capacity drove down prices.  Luby goes into a more 
detailed explanation of the industry’s problems in 1998.  He points out the low market 
prices were a result of numerous factors occurring at the same time.  The mid-nineties 
saw high market prices.  With the high prices, producers began a rapid expansion of their 
operations.  At the same time porkpackers were decreasing their operations because of 
low profits from the high hog prices.  In fact, over 10% of the hog slaughter capacity 
closed in 1997 and 1998 (Luby).  The abnormally low prices in 1998 were a result of the 
combination of rapidly increasing hog production and decreasing porkpacking.  These 
situations forced a large number of hogs on the market with inadequate room to process 
and distribute the product.   
 The maximum slaughter capacity in the Canadian and U.S. hog industries has 
been estimated.  Grier, Martin, and Mayer conducted a study on the Manitoba hog 
industry.  Their report estimated the daily slaughter capacity in the U.S during 1999 and 
2000.  If it is assumed that U.S. plants were operating on 5.5 days/week, the maximum 
weekly slaughter capacity nation-wide would be 2137.4 thousand head.  The average 
weekly slaughter in just the Iowa, Minnesota, and South Dakota markets was 792.03 
thousand head during the 55 weeks prior to the plant opening.  During the next 55 weeks, 
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the average weekly slaughter dropped to 757.85 thousand head.  The decrease in 
slaughter is the result of several factors.  The opening of the Maple Leaf plant decreased 
the number of finished hogs entering the U.S. for processing.  The decrease in slaughter 
was also the market returning to its normal state from the high levels of slaughter levels 
in 1999 when the industry was working through an unusually high backlog of finished 
hogs.   
 
Canadian Hog Slaughter Capacity 
 The same study also estimated the Canadian slaughter capacity.  In 2000, it was 
estimated to be 410 thousand head per week.  During the 55 weeks prior to the opening, 
the average weekly hog slaughter in Manitoba, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta was 
157.1 thousand head.  In the 55 weeks after the average weekly slaughter in this area was 
175.5 thousand head.  As would be expected, the opening of the plant increase slaughter 
capacity in the region.  Actual slaughter in the provinces also increased, as fewer hogs 
were shipped to the U.S. to be processed.   
 
Importance 
Market efficiency in the livestock industry has long been questioned.  With 
consolidation and concentration, there is a rare opportunity to study the effects of a plant 
opening and closing under the present market structure.  These two cases allow the study 
of the price discovery process in the cattle and hog markets with the opening and closing 
of slaughtering plants.  The loss of a large processing plant in an area of concentrated 
cattle production may have an effect on the market.  Theoretically, when the plant closed 
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the market would have lost one competitor in the market.  With the loss of a competitor 
the other buyers may not be as aggressive in their bidding.  If this is the case, the price of 
fed cattle in that market would go down.  The addition of a packing plant in southern 
Manitoba should increase the competition in that market.  This may cause the firms to bid 
more competitively to meet their required volume.  This would cause the price of 
slaughter hogs to increase in that market.  Realistically, the effects from the two events 
may be more complex.   
The actual effects will partially depend upon the reaction by the remaining firms 
in the market.  With few firms in the meatpacking business the reaction would be more 
subtle.  It must be realized that the ConAgra closure was a sudden impact to the market.  
This rapid market shift may determine the reaction from competing firms.  The cattle that 
were ready for slaughter would have to be diverted to other plants or held until kill slots 
could become available.  In the case of the Maple Leaf opening, the market would have 
time to prepare before it came online.  The plant would probably not be operating at its 
ideal capacity during the first months of operation.  Reaching an optimal slaughter rate 
would be a process that evolved slowly.  This would allow the employees to become 
familiar with procedures and equipment.  The combination of these effects may cause the 
market impacts to be more dispersed.   
 Consolidation and concentration in the porkpacking and beefpacking industries 
are important concerns.  The results of this study will help to understand the market 
dynamics and adjustments under the current conditions.  The industry is ever changing 
and the conditions my present a different picture than previous studies.  If any different 
results are present, they should stem from the current competitive nature of the packing 
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industry.  This study will answer the following questions:  What are the fed cattle market 
impacts from the closing of the ConAgra plant in Garden City, Kansas?  What are the 
hog market impacts from the opening of the Maple Leaf Foods plant in Brandon, 
Manitoba?   
 
Objectives 
 The main objective of this study is to increase the understanding of the market 
impacts from the entry and exit of meatpackers, given the current industry structure.   
Specific Objectives are 
 
1. Determine if a beefpacking plant closing in western Kansas and a porkpacking 
plant opening in Manitoba had an effect on slaughter livestock prices (cattle and 
hogs) in that region compared to surrounding markets. 
 
2. Determine (if a price effect occurred from the event) how much time it took 
relative prices to return to levels prior to the opening or closing. 
 
3. Determine fed cattle producers’ perceived market effects from the closure of a 
beefpacking plant in Garden City, Kansas. 
 
4. Determine slaughter hog producers’ perceived market effects from the opening of 
a porkpacking plant in Brandon, Manitoba.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The underlying factors that influence a market will determine the effects from a 
plant opening and closing.  Specific impacts on prices will depend upon how supply and 
demand for slaughter livestock react to the change.  To understand how the changes in 
supply affect price, one must consider how prices are reached in the livestock industry.  
Effects from the plant closing and opening on supply and demand, and the aspects of the 
spatial market will be examined.  Spatial price relationships are important in the livestock 
industry, because the majority of production and processing activities are located in the 
same geographical area.  The opening of the Brandon plant and closing of the Garden 
City plant are good cases for event study analysis.  The results and theories, and how they 
apply to this study will be discussed.  While most event study analysis has occurred in the 
Finance field, studies that involved the meatpacking industry will be considered.  These 
factors will give the theoretical background to formulate hypotheses of the impacts from 
the plant closing and opening. 
 
Price Determination 
 Price is commonly determined at the intersection of supply and demand.  How the 
supply and demand of a good interacts with one another is dependent upon the type of 
market structure.  Market structure relates to the number of buyers and sellers, ability to 
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enter the market, product differentiation, and the size of firms (Tomek and Robinson).  
As discussed previously, the market structure of the meatpacking industry has been in 
question in recent years.  Fed cattle and hog producers have inquired if the industry is 
acting under perfect competition.  Theoretically, livestock price and quantity slaughtered 
would be determined at the intersection of supply and demand.  However, this will not 
always be the exact price level.  The process of price discovery must also be considered.    
 
Livestock Supply and Demand 
 
 The price and quantity slaughtered in a market, is set by the packer demand for 
slaughter cattle and hogs, and the supply ready for slaughter.  Firms that buy slaughter 
livestock for processing affect packer demand.  Producers of slaughter livestock influence 
aggregate supply.   
 
Aggregate Supply 
The number of plants and/or firms would not immediately affect the market 
supply of livestock that is ready for slaughter.  Three factors must be considered when 
determining if the supply of slaughter livestock shifts: production cycle, presence of 
outside influences, and type of commodity.  Livestock available for slaughter cannot 
easily be changed on short notice, because production decisions have to be made months 
in advance due to the biological life cycle of livestock.  Cattle production would take 
more time to make adjustments because of longer gestation period and longer time to 
reach market weight than hogs.  Hog producers would be able to adjust production more 
rapidly to benefit from a current market.  This is an important concern because slaughter 
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livestock is a non-storable commodity and cannot be held on a long-term basis to 
speculate on future prices.   
 There is no evidence that the aggregate supply of livestock shifted dramatically at 
the same time period as the opening and closing of the plants.  Thus, it is assumed that 
the aggregate supply of slaughter livestock did not change or only changed in diminutive 
amounts during the plant opening and plant closing.   
 
Market Demand 
 Packer demand for fed cattle and slaughter hogs is the same as the market demand 
for these livestock.  Market demand, as defined by Nicholson, is the summation of each 
firm’s demand curve.  The market demand for fed cattle and slaughter hogs would be 
determined by the demand of the firms in the market.   
Market demand is a summation of each firm’s demand; therefore the number of 
firms would have a direct impact.  If a new consumer entered the market, the market 
demand would shift to the right (Pindyck and Rubinfeld).  The addition of the Maple Leaf 
Foods plant should shift the market demand outward to the right.  Aggregate demand 
shifting to the right would cause the price and quantity of fed cattle and slaughter hogs to 
increase.  This assumes that aggregate supply would not change and that other factors 
remain constant.  The opposite of this case would hold true if a packer exited the market.  
The loss of a firm would cause the market demand to shift to the left.  Market demand 
shifting leftward would cause the market price and the quantity to decrease.  These 
assumptions would have to be based upon ceteris paribus.   
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Considering the effect on price from the changing of aggregate supply and 
demand from the opening and closing of a meatpacking plant is simple.  The loss of the 
ConAgra plant would cause the market demand to shift to the left, because one fewer 
plant would lower the summation of total demand.  Less market demand would mean that 
the market price and quantity would be lower.  In the Maple Leaf Foods case, opening a 
plant would cause the market demand to shift to the right.  The summation of market 
demand would increase because of the new plant.  Additional market demand would lead 
to a higher market price and quantity slaughtered.   
 
Elasticity of Demand 
 Shifting the market demand for slaughter livestock will change the price and 
quantity in the market.  However, the amount of this change will depend upon the price 
elasticity of demand for fed cattle and slaughter hogs.  Elasticity of demand is a measure 
of the percentage change in quantity of a good, when the price of that good changes by a 
certain percentage (Nicholson).   
 The elasticity of demand for slaughter livestock is important to consider when 
measuring the market impacts if market demand shifts.  Elasticity of demand for 
slaughter livestock is inelastic (MacDonald et.al., 2000).  This means that as the market 
price for slaughter livestock changes there is little to no change in quantity demanded.  
As described previously, when the ConAgra plant closed the market demand decreased.  
The exact impact on price and quantity would depend upon the elasticity of that demand.  
With the case of inelastic demand, shifting the market demand to the left would cause a 
greater decrease in price than quantity of slaughter livestock.  With the Maple Leaf plant 
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opening, the increase in price would be more drastic than the increase in quantity of 
slaughter livestock.  Of course, this would have to assume that the supply of livestock 
available for slaughter does not change.  Elasticity of demand is not the only factor that 
would influence the market impacts from plant openings and closings.  However, the 
level of elasticity of demand for slaughter livestock may explain how slaughter and prices 
change in relation to each other.   
 
Price Discovery 
Price discovery is the actual transaction price that is agreed upon by buyers and 
sellers, for a given quantity and quality, and a given time and place.  The discovery of 
prices will be influenced by the market structure, available information, purchase 
methods, and futures market (Ward and Schroeder).  The influence of these factors will 
cause slaughter livestock prices to fluctuate around the level set by the supply and 
demand curves.  The variation between levels of price discovery and price determination 
would vary between markets and days.  While available information, purchase methods, 
and futures markets are crucial in price discovery, this study is mainly concerned with 
market structure and its relationship with prices.   
 
Market Structure 
 Market structure in the beefpacking and porkpacking industries has been under 
debate for some time.  Under current conditions it could not be considered a market with 
perfect competition.  Tomek and Robinson describe a purely competitive market as one 
with many buyers and sellers, products from each competitor are homogeneous, no 
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government intervention, and free exit and entry into the market.  Following this 
definition, the meatpacking industry is not a perfectly competitive market.  The lack of 
many buyers is the most limiting factor for a purely competitive market.  Previous 
research has classified the U.S. meat packing industry as an oligopsony (Azzam and 
Schroeter; Azzam and Pagoulatos; Koontz and Garcia).  The results from studies on 
market power fail to agree on the degree of oligopsonistic behavior in the meatpacking 
industry.  However, they do confirm that the current market structure is oligopsonistic.   
 Koontz and Garcia developed a noncooperative game-theoretic model of the 
conduct of meatpacking firms.  This study covered the Plains and Midwest using regional 
data from the mid-80’s.  They found some evidence of oligopsony power in these 
geographic markets.  However, it was not shown to be consistent across all time periods.  
A study by Azzam and Schroeter yielded similar results.  They modeled the trade-off 
between oligopsony power and the cost efficiency from consolidating the beefpacking 
industry.  Specifically, they found that the industry would have to have a cost savings of 
2.4% to offset the effects of a 50% increase in concentration.  This shows that the 
increasing concentration of the beefpacking industry has enhanced welfare.  These 
studies have used different methods and time periods to reach a conclusion.  However, 
they have both concluded that the beefpacking industry is acting under an oligopsony 
structure.   
 
Capacity Utilization 
 Another factor that needs to be considered when examining the market impacts 
from the two events is capacity utilization.  Capacity utilization is a comparison of the 
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actual amount of slaughter and the maximum amount that could be slaughtered.  Another 
common way to measure this is excess capacity.  Excess capacity is the number of 
additional head of livestock that could be slaughtered, if plants were operating at a 
maximum.  Throughput utilization is an important factor for consideration for firms that 
process or produce some types of goods.  High utilization means that firms are producing 
near the maximum capacity of their plant.  Low utilization would allow a plant to handle 
future demands.  However, low capacity utilization could cause some plants to leave the 
market.  Kovenock and Phillips found that high capacity utilization is positively related to 
plant openings and negatively related to plant closings.  This could help to explain why 
Maple Leaf Foods decided to open a plant.  Due to the uncontrollable nature of the 
ConAgra plant closing this could not be applied to the beefpacking situation.   
 Utilization has a direct impact on plant costs.  Every plant has a given level of 
fixed costs.  If more head are being processed, fixed costs per head will decrease because 
these costs will be spread over more animals.  The inverse is true for fewer head being 
processed.  The level of slaughter also impacts variable costs.  Each plant has a volume 
quantity level or range with the least cost per head to process.  At lower and higher levels 
of processing the variable costs will be higher than an optimal level.  Processing costs 
directly affect the price a packer can pay for livestock.  As processing costs increase the 
amount a packer is willing to pay will decrease.   
 
Excess Capacity during Events   
As discussed previously, at the time of the time of the Maple Leaf plant opening 
there was minimal excess capacity in the hog slaughter industry.  The opening of the 
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large plant in Brandon was expected to take some of the pressure off the capacity 
constraint problem.  This event may not have caused a large change in market demand.  
With little excess capacity the market demand would already be considered tight, with 
little to no fluctuation between periods.  The plant opening may have taken some of the 
market demand away from other plants, and possibly only changed the market demand 
minimally.  Minimal change in demand would mean that price and quantity would only 
change slightly.  This situation, as well as the fact the announced opening gave the 
market time to anticipate future events, may explain if little or no changes from the event 
are found in the market. 
At the time of the ConAgra plant closing there was sufficient excess capacity in 
the cattle slaughter industry.  The closing of a large plant in Garden City would reduce 
the available excess capacity that was available in the market.  Losing the plant would 
force cattle to other plants for slaughter, thus increasing plant utilization and tightening 
the capacity in those plants as a group.  Cattle would have to move to ConAgra plants in 
Dumas, Texas, and Grand Island, Nebraska, or to other packing firms.  The excess 
capacity that was available in the market may also help reduce the impacts of the plant 
closing.  Market demand may only decrease slightly with the plant closing; because other 
participants were able to process the available supply by increasing their individual 
demand.   
Capacity utilization in the cattle and hog markets will influence the amount of 
impact the specified events will have.  However, the impacts or lack of impact cannot be 
attributed entirely to this one factor.  The presence of little excess capacity in the 
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porkpacking industry during 1999 and adequate excess capacity in the beefpacking 
industry during 2000, may limit the market impacts.   
 
Spatial Aspects 
 Prices received for a given commodity or good, often vary by region.  How local 
markets interact with one another to set prices is commonly referred to as spatial 
competition.  The competition between firms determines the price relationship among the 
spatial markets (Greenhut and Ohta).  Spatial markets determine prices and quantities 
among firms over some geographical area.   
 
Spatial Competition 
 Spatial competition among the beefpacking plants and porkpacking plants would 
influence the markets’ reactions to the plant opening or closing.  How the packing plants 
in Texas, Colorado, and Nebraska reacted to the loss of the Garden City plant could 
influence the overall market impacts.  Similarly, how packing plants in Manitoba and the 
northern United States adjusted to the opening of the Maple Leaf plant could influence 
the outcome of its impacts.  This influence would be dependent upon whether or not 
spatial competition existed, and if so, how strong the competition was.  Capozza and Van 
Order describe two conditions that need to be present in markets for spatial competition 
to exist.  The first condition required is the presence of transportation costs.  This is 
necessary because without transportation costs, firms could produce in any location and 
ship the product to any location and not incur any additional costs.  In this case, every 
producer would be competitive with everyone, without any consideration of location.  
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This is not applicable in the fed cattle or slaughter hog industry.  Studies conducted by 
Clary, Dietrich, and Farris, and Faminow and Sarhan have developed models that 
measured transportation costs in the beefpacking industry.  These models have proven 
that costs influence the decision makers.  Transporting livestock does have a cost, so this 
condition is satisfied for spatial competition. 
 Secondly, for spatial competition to exist, the average cost curves must be 
downward sloping.  If economies of scale were not present over some range, firms would 
not have any incentive to concentrate production in some locations.  Thus, consumers 
could produce their required quantity as cheaply as the firms.  The meatpacking industry 
exhibits downward sloping average cost curves.  MacDonald et al. (2000) studied the 
consolidation of meatpacking in the United States.  Using a cost function, they proved 
that economies of scale existed in both hog and cattle processing.  They found that scale 
economies were small but important.  Specifically, they found that larger firms had a 
lower average cost than the smaller processors.  This means that the average cost curves 
would be downward sloping over a range.   
Beefpacking and porkpacking display the two conditions necessary for spatial 
competition.  Spatial competition needs to be considered in this study.  The reaction from 
the rival plants in Texas, Nebraska, and Colorado, to the closing of the ConAgra plant, 
and its effect on cattle prices in Kansas is a relevant issue.  Also, how the competing 
plants in Saskatchewan, Ontario, and northern United States adjust will in part determine 
the overall effects on hog prices in Manitoba.   
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Spatial Price Differences 
 Livestock prices between two regions can be expected to differ.  This raises the 
question of how much should these prices differ.  According to Tomek and Robinson 
price differences between two regions should be less than or equal to the transfer costs.  
This is to say that the price of fed cattle in Kansas and Colorado should only differ by the 
cost of transportation.  If this theory is correct in practice, price impacts from a plant 
opening or closing could be measured by observing any sudden changes in transportation 
costs.  This would have to assume that transportation rates themselves did not change, 
and the variation in transportation costs could be attributed to the event.  There is no 
evidence found that would indicate that transportation costs changed at the time of the 
plant closing or opening.  This makes it unlikely that any change in the difference 
between livestock prices in two regions could be linked to changes in transportation costs 
that occurred at the same time.   
Spatial markets are important in the slaughtering industry because many firms 
locate in areas of high livestock concentration to insure adequate supplies and to hold 
down transportation costs (Clary, Dietrich, and Farris).  Clary, Dietrich, and Farris found 
that the southern and central plains have a comparative advantage in cattle production.  
Thus, changes in slaughter livestock demand in concentrated production areas could have 
a noticeable effect on prices.  Faminow and Benson observed the effects of many 
institutional changes (marketing boards, formula pricing system, and introduction of 
electronic exchanges) in the Canadian hog market.  Selected Canadian provinces adopted 
the institutional changes to increase the efficiency of the market and create more 
competitive bidding from packers.  While the Faminow and Benson study found volatile 
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prices existed across much of Canada after the events, the study by Clary, Dietrich, and 
Farris used simulated events to determine price effects.  By analyzing spatial markets, 
both found that a shock changed prices over a geographic area. 
 
Event Studies 
Event study analysis has developed into a widely used method of examining the 
reaction of prices to some known or unknown event.  The use of event study analysis has 
been successful with corporate finance issues, and most have determined the impact on a 
firm’s value from a specified event (MacKinlay).  This methodology can either test the 
market’s efficiency from increased information, or if an efficient market is assumed, the 
effects of a firm’s financial position from the occurrence of some event (Binder; 
MacKinlay).  MacKinlay’s review of event study literature determined that in a normal 
market, prices would respond to new information.  This is similar to a study by Tsetsekos 
and Gombola that was intended to determine the impacts from the closing of domestic 
and foreign plants.  They found that the announcement of a plant closing had a negative 
impact on the market.  However, this research dealt with the impacts on stock price 
instead of the impacts on input prices.  Input prices for packers would include fed cattle 
and market hogs, which are the interests of this study.  While, event study methodology 
was developed for finance and accounting research with multiple events, some of the 
principles can be applied to the economic analysis of meatpacking plant closings and 
openings.   
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Plant Entry and Exit Studies 
Binder’s review focused mainly on the behavior of security prices.  Several event 
studies have analyzed the exit and entry of meat slaughtering plants.  Love and Shuffett 
completed a notable hog slaughtering plant exit study in 1965, on the terminal market 
price impacts from a change in the Louisville market structure.  Local hogpackers merged 
and/or closed, leaving one packer to purchase eighty percent of the hogs sold at the 
terminal market.  They compared weekly price differences between the Louisville market 
and similar markets in Chicago and Indianapolis.  This was done for sixty-nine weeks 
prior and eighty-seven weeks after the structural change.  Love and Shuffett found that 
the structural change lowered the price $0.22/cwt. in Louisville compared with the 
Indianapolis market, and $0.26/cwt. compared with the Chicago market.  They concluded 
that the increased market power for the remaining firm caused a decrease in market 
competitiveness and a lower price.    
Ward completed a similar study on the price impacts from closing a hog 
slaughtering plant in Oklahoma, in 1981.  The plant that closed had a considerable market 
share; it processed eighty percent of all slaughtered hogs in Oklahoma.  Weekly 
Oklahoma City terminal market hog prices were compared to Omaha, Kansas City, and 
interior-Iowa-southern Minnesota hog prices for the year prior and after the plant closing.  
Ward found that after the plant closed prices were lower for the first 2 ½ quarters.  For 3 
½ quarters, Oklahoma City prices were the same as Omaha prices, but lower than Kansas 
City and interior-Iowa-southern Minnesota prices.   
 Hayenga, Deiter, and Montoya attempted to determine what happened to market 
prices for hogs when slaughtering plants closed and then reopened.  They examined six 
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plants that closed from 1978 to 1981 in Iowa, Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri, and 
Oklahoma.  Two of these plants later reopened.  They found that in four of the six 
markets, there was at least a two-week period of significantly lower prices.  The lower 
price was observed shortly after the plant closing and the effects tapered-off as more time 
elapsed.  Reopening the plants caused prices in one market to gradually increase to above 
normal levels.  Hayenga, Deiter, and Montoya found that the closing of processing plants 
could depress prices.  However, they point out that the numerous closings would have 
more of an effect than a single closing.  Hayenga, Deiter, and Montoya observed that the 
reopening of one of the plants decreased market power, pushed up prices, and increased 
excess capacity for four months.   This effect would only be temporary and the market 
would be able to absorb the structural change.   
All three studies compared prices relative to terminal market prices.  This would 
not be as effective in the proposed study.  The consolidation of the hog industry during 
the last twenty years (MacDonald and Ollinger) and the decrease in volume of hog trade 
on terminal markets makes the comparison of market prices to terminal prices less 
appropriate.   
Anderson et al. found that plants in concentrated markets and ones on the outer 
edges of production are more likely to exit.  A similar study by Muth et al. on the exit of 
meat packing plants from the implementation of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Points (HACCP) found comparable results.  Their model determined that the entry of 
new slaughter plants would raise input prices; this includes slaughter livestock.  
According to the model, if a new plant is opened in the market, the price of cattle or hogs 
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is expected to increase.  If higher input prices exist in a particular market, the plants in 
the other markets would have a cost advantage (Anderson et al.). 
 
Expected Results 
The entry and exit of plants changes the livestock slaughter demand in a market.  
Market demand can be explained as the summation of individual demand by each plant, 
thus the number of plants affects demand.  The exit of one plant would lower demand, 
ceteris paribus.  With fewer buyers attempting to bid on cattle in the market, the price 
would be lower. ConAgra closing a large plant (4,000 head/day) would lower the 
immediate local demand.  The other ConAgra plants and competing firms’ plants in the 
area did have some excess capacity.  However, it is assumed it would take time for them 
to adjust to processing the cattle that ConAgra could not handle.   
The opposite would hold true for a plant opening.  The market demand would 
increase from the addition of the Brandon plant, and the hog price would be higher.  
Opening a large plant (45,000 head/week) would increase the immediate demand for 
slaughter hogs and raise price.  The change in fed cattle and slaughter hog prices can be 
attributed to the change in market demand under an oligopsonistic market structure.  
Transportation costs and aggregate supply changed only modestly, causing only small 
price changes.  The inelastic demand for slaughter livestock would cause a greater change 
in price opposed to changes in quantity.  This reasoning supports the following 
hypothesis 
1. Fed-cattle prices in western Kansas will decrease and slaughter hog prices in 
Manitoba will increase, immediately after the change in demand for slaughter 
livestock in each respective region.   
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 While price impacts will occur, the loss of one plant will not cause the effects to 
be permanent.  The competitive nature of the meat slaughter industry will cause bidders 
to adjust their prices, in relation to surrounding markets to remain in business.  With the 
closing of the ConAgra plant, the price of fed cattle will slowly return to levels 
comparable to surrounding markets.  If the price in the ConAgra market drops, the higher 
priced surrounding markets will then increase their market share by procuring more of 
the available supply.  Producers will sell their cattle in another market, if they can get a 
higher price and if transportation costs are not too high.  Transportation costs would be 
less of a factor in the borders of the two market areas.  The local packers in the Garden 
City area will eventually raise their prices, as they are able to adjust and absorb more 
slaughter capacity.  Eventually, due to spatial competition, price differences between 
regions (KS, CO, TX/OK, and NE) will return to previously comparable levels.   
 The Maple Leaf hog slaughtering plant opening would increase the price for hogs 
in that area.  However, the higher prices compared to other markets would not be 
sustained.  Higher prices would attract more producers and expand the procurement area 
that the plant services.  Hog producers in western Canada may send their hogs to the new 
plant in Manitoba because of a higher price.  Surrounding packers would attempt to stay 
competitive by raising their prices to recapture their market share.  The Maple Leaf plant 
would then gradually decrease their price until all the markets return to previous 
comparable price levels.  This reasoning supports the following hypothesis. 
2. After the initial shock of the opening in Manitoba and closing in Western 
Kansas, the price for slaughter hogs and fed cattle will adjust back to the 
relative levels observed in the surrounding markets in a matter of weeks. 
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 Market participants should be in a good position to observe impacts.  Their 
involvement on a daily basis would allow them to notice changes that aggregated USDA 
data may not account for.  Producers are concerned about the concentration of packers 
and its effects on price transparency.  The loss of a plant should increase this 
concentration, thereby increasing the chance for unfair markets.  Adding a plant should 
decrease the concentration of packers in a market.  When a majority of producers are 
dissatisfied with the number of packers in the slaughtering industry, they would welcome 
a new plant and despise the loss of one.  However, trying to predict producers’ 
perceptions is something that is difficult to do.  With that said, the expected reactions are: 
3. Fed cattle producers will think the loss of the ConAgra plant in Garden City, 
caused prices to decrease, and allowed the remaining packers to gain more 
control of the market. 
 
4. Hog producers will think the opening of the Maple Leaf plant in Brandon, 
Manitoba, caused prices to increase, and decreased packer control of the 
market.   
 
 Market structure changes in the meat slaughtering industry can have dramatic 
effects because of the high concentration.  The expansion and consolidation of the 
industry changes the price competition among firms.  Previous research has studied such 
changes, and found that a change in the market affects prices.  This could be beneficial 
because the available data may not allow the accurate measurement of price changes.  
The use of event study methodology and the consideration of spatial markets are needed 
to determine the competitive conditions in an industry.  The continuing changes in the 
hog and cattle industries have created a new opportunity to determine the price effects 
from market changes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SECONDARY DATA PROCEDURES 
 
 
The objectives of this research are to study the effects from the closing of the 
ConAgra plant and the opening of the Maple Leaf plant.  This was completed by using 
modified models developed from comparable studies.  In the course of this section the 
two models are discussed.  These models use prices and quantity estimates that have been 
collected by United States and Canadian government agencies and entities.  These data 
study the impacts from the events at a market level.  The first model used in the analysis 
is a price differences model.  This model was used in the analysis by Love and Shuffett; 
Hayenga, Deiter, and Montoya; and Ward.  The second model discussed in this chapter is 
a partial adjustment model.  This type of model has not been used in previous studies to 
test the market impacts from the opening and closing of meatpacking plants.  However, 
the model was modified from other uses in agricultural studies.  Both models will help to 
measure if there was any effect, and the duration of the impact, on the market from the 
events. 
 
Data 
The data set for the beefpacking plant closing study was gathered from several 
sources.  Table 1 presents the variables and data sources.  The data discussed in this 
chapter are all secondary data.  In Chapters 5 and 6, the uses of primary data were 
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considered.  Weekly prices for freight on board (FOB) live basis, 1100-1300 lb. fed 
steers, grading 35-65% choice, sold in western Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska, and Texas, 
were obtained from the Livestock Marketing Information Center (LMIC).  Weekly 
quantities of combined steer and heifer federally inspected slaughter for the four 
mentioned states and weekly slaughter for Iowa/Minnesota were obtained from NASS.  
Previous studies have found that price changes normally last a few weeks to a few 
months.  The ConAgra plant closed on December 25, 2000.  To have an adequate time 
period to detect any market change, data from December 11, 1999 to January 12, 2002 
was used (110 weeks).  Data covered the 55 weeks prior to the plant closing and 55 
weeks after.  This time frame is similar to the ones used in previous studies.  Love and 
Shuffett compared prices in three markets for 69 weeks prior and 87 weeks after the 
structural change.  Most of the analysis done by Hayenga, Deiter, and Montoya compared 
prices for 6 months prior and 6 months after the plant closings and openings.  The study 
conducted by Ward used data covering one year before and one year after the plant 
closing.  
Data for the Maple Leaf Foods plant opening were obtained from similar sources.  
This plant opened on August 30, 1999.  Weekly data from August 15, 1998 to September 
16, 2000 were used for the study (110 weeks).  The study compared prices 55 weeks 
before and 55 weeks after the plant opening; this is comparable to previous studies.  
Weekly prices used in this study are for two different types of hogs.  The classification 
system used by USDA changed during the period used in the study.  Prices used from 
August 30, 1998 to March 6, 1999 are U.S. 1-3 hogs weighing 230-250 lbs.  Weekly 
prices used from March 13, 1999 to September 16, 2000, are live 49-52% lean slaughter 
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hogs, weighing 240 to 280 lb.  Prices were collected for the following markets: 
Iowa/southern Minnesota direct, Sioux Falls, and south St. Paul markets.  These series 
were available from USDA.  Weekly prices for dressed slaughter hogs for the Manitoba, 
Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta markets were obtained from several sources.  (Refer 
to table 1 for a description of all the variables and sources.)  Prices for U.S. hogs, 
byproducts, and cutout value are converted from U.S. dollars per 100 lbs to Canadian 
dollars per 100 kg1.  Weekly federally inspected barrow and gilt slaughter for hogs from 
the above mentioned Canadian provinces are from AgriCanada.  Weekly barrow and gilt 
slaughter for Iowa, Minnesota, and South Dakota are collected by NASS.  The Sioux 
Falls price was compared with the South Dakota slaughter, the St. Paul price with the 
Minnesota slaughter, and the Iowa/southern Minnesota direct price with hog slaughter in 
Iowa.   
The partial adjustment required some additional data.  Weekly prices used for this 
model are the same as the prices used in the price differences model.  NASS provides 
weekly quantities of combined steer and heifer slaughter in the appropriate states.  Boxed 
beef prices for 600-750 pound select carcasses are available from LMIC.  This is the 
cutout value of the primal cuts.  An average weight of fed steers and heifers in the five 
state region (including Kansas) was taken from LMIC.  This weight was used as the 
variable in all the models.   
 The model for the hog plant opening used a weekly average live weight from the 
National (U.S.) daily direct hog report for the weight variable.  This variable is in pounds 
and was converted to kilograms to keep all variables in comparable units.2  This model w 
                                               
1
 To convert from US$ per 100 lb to CAN$ per 100 kg,, (exchange rate*Price)/ *.45359237 
2
 To convert from pounds to kilograms, weight in pounds*.45359237 
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used 110 weeks of data for both the ConAgra plant closing and the Maple Leaf plant 
opening.  This is the same as the price differences model.   
Table 1. Data Descriptions and Sources 
Variable Description Units Source 
Cattle KS, TX, CO, NE, IA   
   Price, KS, TX, CO, 
Omaha 
FOB live, 1100-1300 lb 
fed steers, 35-65% choice 
$US/100 lbs AMS* 
   Slaughter, KS, TX, 
CO, NE, IA, MN 
Federally inspected steer 
and heifer slaughter 
1000’s head NASS 
   Boxed Beef Value Reported value for 600-
700 lb carcasses 
$US/100 lbs AMS* 
   Weight Average weight for 35-
65% choice steers from 
TX/OK, KS, CO, NE, 
IA/MN 
lbs AMS* 
   ByProduct Value Average total steer 
byproduct value 
$US/100 lbs AMS* 
Hogs    
   Manitoba Price Dressed barrow and gilts $CAN/100 kg Manitoba 
government 
   Alberta Price Dressed barrow and gilts $CAN/100 kg  
   Ontario Price Dressed barrow and gilts $CAN/100 kg AgriCanada 
   Saskatchewan Price Dressed barrow and gilts $CAN/100 kg Saskatchewan 
government 
   US Prices Live, 240-280 lbs, 49-
52% lean 
$US/100 lbs AMS 
   US Slaughter Federally inspected 
barrow and gilt slaughter 
1000’s head NASS 
   Canadian Slaughter Federally inspected 
barrow and gilt slaughter 
1000’s head AgriCanada 
   Cutout Value Average price for pork 
cutout 
$US/100 lbs AMS* 
   Weight Average live weight for 
Negotiated hogs 
lbs AMS* 
   ByProduct Value Average total hog 
byproduct value 
$US/100 lbs AMS* 
*Data gathered and compiled by the Livestock Marketing Information Center (LMIC) 
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Price Difference Model 
Price changes resulting from plant closings have previously been estimated by 
measuring the change in price differences between two markets (Love and Shuffett; 
Hayenga, Deiter, and Montoya; Ward).  Regression analysis was then used to estimate 
the relationship between weekly average prices in the market where the plant 
closed/opened and comparable weekly prices in adjacent markets.  Similar procedures 
were used in this study to estimate the price impacts from the plant opening in southern 
Manitoba and the plant closing in western Kansas.  The developed model answered the 
first objective, whether or not the plant closing/opening affected local market prices, and 
if so, how long the effect existed.   
 Price differences were developed for each case (opening and closing), in order to 
determine how prices in the shocked market changed in relation to surrounding markets 
(Love and Shuffett; Hayenga, Deiter, and Montoya; Ward).  Differences between the 
weekly market price in the affected market and a comparison market are calculated by  
(1)  jiij PPPD −=  
where PDij is the price difference between markets i and j, Pi is the appropriate slaughter 
livestock price in the shocked market (plant closing or opening), and Pj is the appropriate 
slaughter livestock price in comparable markets.  For the ConAgra closing study, i 
denotes the western Kansas weekly fed steer price, and the Manitoba weekly slaughter 
hog price for the Maple Leaf opening.  The ConAgra study required j to denote the 
weekly fed steer price in Colorado, Nebraska, and Texas panhandle.  Not only was the 
Nebraska price to be used for the Kansas-Nebraska comparison, it was used for the 
Kansas-Iowa comparison as well.  There is no complete price series for fed cattle in 
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Iowa.  The Nebraska price is the most comparable, thus it was used.  Four models were 
estimated for the ConAgra study.  For the Maple Leaf opening, j is the weekly Alberta, 
Ontario, Saskatchewan, Sioux Falls, south St. Paul, and Iowa/southern Minnesota direct 
slaughter hog price.  A total of six models were estimated for the Maple Leaf study. 
 Slaughter differences were created to consider the relationship between slaughter 
in the shocked market and comparable markets (Love and Shuffett; Hayenga, Deiter, and 
Montoya; Ward).  Differences between the weekly market slaughter in the affected 
market and a comparison market are calculated by 
(2)  jiij SSSD −=   
where SDij is the slaughter difference between markets i and j, Si is the appropriate 
livestock slaughter volume in the shocked market i (plant closing or opening), Sj is the 
appropriate livestock slaughter volume in comparable market j.  For the Maple Leaf 
opening, i will denote the weekly hog slaughter in Manitoba, and the weekly cattle 
slaughter in western Kansas for the ConAgra study.  The hogpacking study required j to 
denote hog slaughter in the comparison markets: Alberta, Ontario, Saskatchewan, South 
Dakota, Minnesota, and Iowa.  For the ConAgra closing, j indicates steer and heifer 
slaughter in the comparison markets; Colorado, Nebraska, Texas, and Iowa/Minnesota.   
 
Model Specification 
 The price difference between the shocked market and comparison market (PDij) 
was analyzed using regression to determine which variables influence the difference.  
The model used is a combination of the model used in the studies by Love and Shuffett, 
Hayenga, Deiter, and Montoya, and Ward.  The developed model is 
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(3)  
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where SDij is a slaughter difference as calculated in equation (2), PlantOpnClst equals one 
for any week after the plant closing/opening date t and zero otherwise, and Weekt=56…67 
are a set of six, two week periods after the plant closing/opening.  This dummy variable 
will equal one for appropriate two weeks after the closing/opening and zero for all other 
weeks.  The intercept term for the model is α.  An estimation of the effect on the price 
difference from any change in the slaughter difference is shown by β1.  The long-term 
effect that the plant closing/opening had on the price difference is denoted by β2.  If this 
parameter is significant then the closing/opening did have an effect on the price 
difference.  The sign of this parameter is important to determine if prices increased or 
decreased.  The effects of the six lagged variables for two-week periods after the 
closing/opening on the relative price difference are expressed by β3…8.  If these dummy 
variables are significant, then the closing had an effect on the price difference for that 
two-week period.  As with the plant closing dummy variable, the sign of the parameter is 
important to determine the change in the difference.  If it is determined that all six are 
significant, additional periods will be added, until the parameters are no longer 
significant.  Based on the time period required for markets to adjust to plant closings in 
previous studies (Love and Shuffett; Hayenga, Deiter, and Montoya; Ward), six two-
week periods were chosen.   
 
Expected Signs for ConAgra Study 
 The expected signs for the price differences model (table 2) differ between the 
ConAgra and Maple Leaf studies.  For the ConAgra study, the slaughter difference 
 38 
variable should be negative.  For example, if the Kansas slaughter goes down, due to the 
plant closing, the price in Kansas is expected to increase.  If the Colorado slaughter goes 
up, due to the closing the plant in Kansas, the price is expected to decline.  While this is 
the expected sign, it is possible for a positive sign.  Using a price difference the sign will 
depend upon the changes in the opposing market as well as the Kansas market.  One 
market could increase, while the other decreases, this would cause some confusion of 
what the expected sign would be.  The slaughter difference variable was intended to 
capture the supply effect of the market.  This is the main reason to expect a negative sign.  
The intention of the plant close dummy is to capture the price changes.  The plant close 
dummy variable should be negative.  With the loss of a packer in the fed cattle market, 
lowered competition would decrease the price paid for cattle.  This should have the 
greatest impact on the Kansas price, which is the area of production.  If the Kansas price 
goes down, relative to the other markets, the price difference will decrease.  The expected 
signs of the variables representing the two-week dummies are unknown.  This will 
depend how fast the market reacted to the event.  A negative sign can be expected for the 
first few weeks, while the loss of a competitive bidder is still driving down prices.  
However, after some time the market should adjust back to normal price levels.  This 
would mean that the signs of these parameters would be positive. 
 
Expected Signs for the Maple Leaf Study 
 Expected signs for the Maple Leaf study can be found in table 2.  Slaughter 
difference should be negative.  The more slaughter in a market the lower the price would 
be.  The plant close variable should be positive.  When the Maple Leaf plant came online, 
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the market would experience the addition of new competitor.  This should cause more 
competition between packers with more aggressive and higher bids for hogs.  Similar to 
the ConAgra model, the expected signs of the two-week dummy variables is unknown.  
During the first weeks, the sign may be positive as the packers compete for the hogs in 
the market.  After some time the market may adjust to this change and price would 
slowly decrease to previous levels.  These would mean that the ending variables would be 
negative.   
Table 2. Price Differences Model Variable Definitions and Expected Signs 
Dependant 
Variable 
Variable Definition  
 
 
PDij,t Price difference between markets 
i and j 
  
Independent 
Variable 
Variable Definition ConAgra Study 
Expected Sign 
Maple Leaf 
Study Expected 
Sign 
SDij,t Slaughter difference between 
markets i and j 
- - 
PlantOpnClst Zero-one dummy variable for 
event date, 1 for weeks after, 0 
for weeks prior 
- + 
Weekt Zero-one dummy variable for 6 
two week periods after event 
-/+ -/+ 
 
 
Partial Adjustment Model 
 The second model used to measure the impacts from secondary data is the partial 
adjustment model.  The form of this distributed lag model that is most commonly used 
today was developed by Nerlove to measure demand and supply elasticities.  Dahlgran 
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and Fairchild used a similar procedure to estimate demand impacts in the chicken market 
from negative publicity.  The partial adjustment coefficient that is calculated is the 
marginal effect after the market adjustment.  This will allow the study and measurement 
of a market when it is believed that the recovery from an event was slowly distributed 
over many time periods.  Carlberg and Ward applied a partial adjustment model to the fed 
cattle industry to discuss two approaches to price discovery.   
 
Model Specification 
Using a partial adjustment model, the effect of the plant closing and plant opening 
on slaughter livestock price was determined.  The model was estimated for the markets 
where the events occurred (Kansas and Manitoba) and also the surrounding markets 
(Colorado, Nebraska, Texas, Iowa, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, St. Paul, Sioux Falls, 
and Iowa/Minnesota).  This will help determine the market impacts in their specific area 
and the adjacent areas.  The desired price under the current market conditions would be 
found using  
(4) 
tttt
tt
ttttt
eSeasonSeasonSeason
sPlantOpnClByPrPrice
WeightNumberMeatValueice
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++
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where Price*t is the actual weekly price of slaughter livestock under the current 
conditions, MeatValuet is the average weekly reported price of boxed beef for the cattle 
study and average pork cutout value in the hog study, Numbert is the number of slaughter 
livestock processed in market t, Weightt is the weekly average slaughter weight for either 
hogs or cattle.  The value of byproducts will also be considered, ByPrPricet is the average 
weekly price of cattle or hog byproducts for there respective studies.  The PlantOpnClst 
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variable has a value of one for any week after the closing and a value of zero for weeks 
prior.  Seasonality is a concern, thus dummy variables will be created, Season2, Season3, 
and Season4.  The first seasonal dummy variable was dropped to avoid multicollinearity 
issues.  Seasonal influences on prices are different in the hog and cattle industries.  The 
average monthly price for hogs and cattle over the two years of data for this study are 
graphed in figure 38 and figure 39 (Appendix I).  For the ConAgra study Season2 covers 
February, March, and April.  The next variable, Season3, is May, June, and July.  Finally, 
Season4, is August, September, and October.  For the Maple Leaf study, Season2 covers 
April, May, and June.  July, August, and September will represent Season3.  The last one, 
Season4, is October, November, and December. 
 The desired weekly price, or the price without the plant events, cannot be 
obtained, so a partial adjustment model was used.  The relationship between the desired 
price and the actual price can be found with the following function 
(5) )*( 11 −− −=− tttt PricePricePricePrice γ   
where Pricet is the actual price in the market, and Price*t is the desired price under the 
current market conditions.  The value of γ is the partial adjustment coefficient, which is a 
measure of the long-term effect on the market.   
 Combining equations (4) and (5) and rearranging the model so that Pricet is the 
dependent variable, allowed the model to be estimated.  The relationship between the 
livestock price and the independent variables will be analyzed using ordinary least 
squares estimation.  The model is 
(6) 
tttt
ttt
ttttt
eSeasonSeasonSeason
sPlantOpnClByPrPriceLagPrice
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+++
+++=
432 987
654
321
βββ
βββ
βββα
 
 42 
where the variables are previously defined (table 3).  LagPricet is the weekly price of 
slaughter livestock in the previous period.  The error term is expressed by et.   
 
Expected Signs 
 The expected signs for this model are in table 3.  It is expected that the meat value 
parameter (boxed beef value or pork cutout value) will be positive in both cases.  As 
price of the output goes up, the price of fed steers or slaughter hogs should also increase.  
The parameter for weekly slaughter should be negative.  As supply (slaughter livestock) 
increases, the price paid for that input should decrease.  Average slaughter weight 
coefficient is expected to be negative for both studies.  Fed cattle and slaughter hog 
weight is important to packers.  The size of cattle or hogs coming into their plants will 
affect the quality of beef or pork they process.  If the weight of cattle or hogs increases 
the price would go down.  The expected sign for the seasonal dummy variables varies 
between the ConAgra and Maple Leaf.  For the ConAgra study, Season2 the sign is 
unknown.  The expected sign for Season3 is expected to be negative (figure 38).  It is 
unknown what the sign of Season4 should be.  With the Maple Leaf study, Season2 
expected sign is unknown.  A negative sign is expected to be negative for both Season3 
and Season4 (figure 39).   
 
Duration of Effects 
 The lag variable coefficient can be used to estimate how long it took for the 
market to adjust to the plant events.  The partial adjustment coefficient can be found with 
the following formula (Dahlgran and Fairchild)  
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(7) tLagPrice−= 1δ  
where δ is the partial adjustment coefficient and LagPricet is previously defined.  The δ is 
the percent of adjustment that has taken place during one period of time ( n ).  However, 
this study needs to determine the duration of the effects of the plant event.  The 
proportion of adjustment remaining in the market can be found using 
(8) n)1,...()1(),1( 2 δδδ −−−  
where all variables are as previously defined.  This study will determine how long it takes 
for the market to adjust for 95% of the effect of the plant events.  This would leave 0.05 
for the proportion of adjustment remaining in time period n.  Thus, to find the time period 
n the following formula can be used 
(9) )1log(
05.0log
δ−=n  
where n and 1-δ are previously defined. 
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Table 3. Partial Adjustment Model Variable Definitions and Expected Signs 
Dependant 
Variable 
Variable Definition   
Pricet Price of slaughter livestock in 
market t 
  
Independent 
Variable 
Variable Definition ConAgra Study 
Expected Sign 
Maple Leaf Study 
Expected Sign 
MeatValuet Value of meat sold + + 
Numbert Number of livestock slaughtered 
in market t 
- - 
Weightt Average slaughter weight for 
livestock 
- - 
LagPricet Price of slaughter livestock in 
previous period in market t 
+ + 
ByPrPricet Value of byproducts sold + + 
PlantOpnClst Zero-one dummy variable for 
event date, 1 for weeks after, 0 
for weeks prior 
- + 
Season2 Zero-one dummy variable for 
appropriate months, 1 for 
months in that season, 0 
otherwise 
-/+ -/+ 
Season3 Zero-one dummy variable for 
appropriate months, 1 for 
months in that season, 0 
otherwise 
- - 
Season4 Zero-one dummy variable for 
appropriate months, 1 for 
months in that season, 0 
otherwise 
-/+ - 
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Chow tests 
 Chow tests were conducted on the partial adjustment models to determine if 
there was a change in price between the two periods.  Each partial adjustment model of 
the ConAgra study (Kansas, Texas, Nebraska, Colorado, Iowa) and all the partial 
adjustment models in the Maple Leaf study (Manitoba, Alberta, Ontario, Saskatchewan, 
St. Paul, Iowa/Minnesota, and Sioux Falls) were analyzed.  Chow developed this method 
to test if additional observations should be used in the same regression.  He used this to 
test if the demand for automobiles in the United States remained stable over time.  In this 
study the partial adjustment models are used to determine if there was a difference in 
price between the 55 weeks prior to the plant event and the 55 weeks after the plant 
event. 
 To conduct the Chow tests the data were divided into two groups for both the 
ConAgra and Maple Leaf studies.  The first group for both studies consisted of the first 
55 weeks of data.  The second is the remaining 55 weeks of data.  After the models are 
ran using the data before and after the plant event the sum of square errors (SSE) was 
pooled to get the unrestricted SSE (equation 10).  The unrestricted SSE can be found with 
the following 
(10) 21 SSESSESSEU +=  
where SSEU is the unrestricted SSE, SSE1 is the SSE for the first 55 weeks, and SSE2 is 
the SSE for the remaining weeks.  Then running the models using all 110 weeks of data 
gave the restricted SSE.  The restricted and unrestricted SSE was used to conduct an F-
test to determine if there are any changes in price between the two periods.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
SECONDARY DATA RESULTS 
 
 
 This chapter presents the results from the analysis of the secondary data.  First, 
the results from the price difference model for the ConAgra and Maple Leaf studies are 
discussed.  The results and expected signs of the partial adjustment model are compared 
for both models.  The mean of each variable before and after the plant event are 
examined.  The price difference model results for the ConAgra and Maple Leaf events 
are studied.  Proceeding from there, an explanation of the partial adjustment models is 
discussed.  This includes the estimation of the duration of the plant closing and plant 
opening effects on their specified markets.  Finally, the results of the Chow tests on the 
partial adjustment models are presented.   
 
Fed Cattle Price and Slaughter 
 Figure 1, shows prices paid for fed steers over the 110 weeks of the study.  Prices 
for comparison between markets follow the same trend, with only small variation 
between markets within a given week.  Around the time of the plant closing, prices vary 
some and seem to slow the increasing prices that were occurring at the time.  However, 
the plant did close during the holiday season.  The time of year may have contributed to 
the market slow-down over those few weeks. 
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 While no apparent changes in prices can be noticed, there are some changes in 
regional slaughter (figure 2).  During the week immediately following the plant closing, 
there was a sharp decrease in slaughter.  As mentioned, some of this can be attributed to 
the possibility of a short slaughter week due to the holidays.  Prior to the closing, weekly 
Kansas slaughter was running around 160 thousand head.  At the second week after the 
closing, slaughter had dropped to 117 thousand head.  Over the next several months, 
slaughter levels slowly returned to levels around 150 thousand head.  During this period 
of slow recovery in the Kansas market, the Nebraska and Texas markets saw much larger 
increases.  By May 12, 2001, Nebraska was processing 3 thousand head more than 
Kansas, at 148 thousand head per week.  In the following months, Kansas and Nebraska 
continued to trade places for the leader in fed cattle slaughter.  With the loss of the plant, 
a drop in fed cattle slaughter in Kansas can be expected.  The ConAgra plants in Dumas, 
Texas, and Grand Island, Nebraska, may have increased their slaughter.  The remaining 
plants in Kansas and plants belonging to other firms also may have increased their 
processing.   
 
Hog Price and Slaughter 
 The prices paid for barrow and gilts in the U.S. and Canada seem to follow the 
same pattern (figure 3).  After the plant opening, there does not appear to be any changes 
in the pattern of prices.  All prices are decreasing, but this could be caused by the cyclical 
pattern of the market rather than a plant opening.  A few months after the event the 
Manitoba prices seem to be greater than the comparison markets, when compared to the 
period before the opening.   
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 Slaughter in the U.S. and Canada did not experience any dramatic changes after 
the Maple Leaf plant opened (figure 4).  Iowa hog slaughter decreased from around 600 
thousand head to around 500 head over the period.  However, this slow decline can not be 
linked directly to the new plant in Manitoba.  This may be partly from the backlog of 
hogs that the market was trying to work through from the price crash during the end of 
1998.   
 A few months after the opening, the weekly Manitoba slaughter surpassed both 
the Ontario and South Dakota weekly slaughter.  Over the last few months of the time 
period, Manitoba slaughter was in the 70 thousand head range.   
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Figure 1. Fed Steer Prices 
Weekly FI Fed Steer and Heifer Slaughter
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Figure 2. Fed Steer and Heifer Slaughter 
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Barrow and Gilt Price 
(Canadian Prices Dressed Basis, U.S. Prices Live Basis)
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Figure 3. Barrow and Gilt Prices 
Weekly FI Barrow and Gilt Slaughter
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Figure 4. Barrow and Gilt Slaughter 
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Price Difference Model 
 The price differences models in this study were developed to determine if the 
plant events caused the price between two regions to change.  The price differences 
model, found in equation (3), was estimated with the SAS system using ordinary least 
squares.  The data used in this model were confirmed as normally distributed from the 
use of a Jarque-Bera test.  Heteroskedasticity was tested using Breusch-Pagan, Glesjer, 
Harvey-Godfrey, and White tests using a 5% confidence level.  All tests on all the 
models, for both studies, failed to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.   
 Autocorrelation was also tested using a Durbin-Watson test to detect AR (1) 
errors.  These tests concluded that autocorrelation was found in the Kansas-Colorado and 
the Kansas-Texas models.  To alleviate this problem the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure was 
used.  Cochrane and Orcutt study developed a method for correcting autocorrelation, 
while maintaining more efficiency than previous methods.  With this procedure the 
Kansas-Colorado and Kansas-Texas models were estimated using Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares (FGLS).  The models were also tested for specification with Ramsey’s 
reset test.  The price differences models for the three U.S. markets in the Maple Leaf 
study had some slight problems and the specification could be adjusted.  However, this 
was not done because changing the functional form of some models would make 
comparing the results between markets more difficult.   
 
ConAgra Study 
 Combining the data gathered for the study (table 1) and the developed price 
differences model (equation 3), the fed cattle market was analyzed.  This was done to 
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determine if the closing of the ConAgra plant would have an impact on the Kansas 
market compared to markets in surrounding states.  The results from the four models are 
inconsistent.  The results of the ConAgra study are discussed in detail below.  The mean 
values for the dependent and slaughter difference variables can be found in table 4.  The 
parameter estimates and standard errors are presented in table 5.   
 
Kansas versus Colorado Model 
 The model had a R2 of 0.057, which is considered low.  The mean price difference 
and slaughter difference can be found in table 4.  This table shows the mean variable 
value over three periods: the 55 weeks prior to the plant closing, the 55 weeks following 
the plant closing, and the entire 110 weeks.  For the 55 week period prior to the study, the 
average difference between fed cattle in Kansas and Colorado was 0.10 $US/100 lbs.  
The 55 weeks after the closing found this average difference to be only 0.01 $US/100 lbs.  
The difference in weekly slaughter between the two states also decreased over the two 
periods.  The difference changed from 105.7 to 88.7 thousand head per week.   
 The results of this model are presented in table 5.  The data and model failed to 
help explain any of the changes in the price difference.  None of the independent 
variables are significant.  The insignificant slaughter difference and plant close variables 
have negative signs.  It was expected that an increase in the slaughter difference would 
decrease the price difference.  The plant closure was also expected to decrease price. 
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Kansas versus Nebraska Model 
 This model had a much higher R2 value, 0.206.  The average price difference and 
slaughter difference between the two markets changed (table 4).  Prior to the plant 
closing, the average price difference was 0.161 $US/100 lbs.  The 55 weeks following the 
event, the average price was -0.233 $US/100 lbs.  The difference in weekly slaughter 
numbers between the two markets also decreased over the period, from 24.90 to 7.68 
thousand head.   
 The results of this model (table 5) found only two variables significant.  The plant 
closing decreased the price difference by 0.373 $US/100 lbs.  This variable was 
significant at 5% and had the expected the sign.  The fifth and sixth week after the plant 
closing, the price difference increased by 0.685 $US/100 lbs.  Slaughter difference was 
positive, but was not significant and the estimate was small, 0.007 thousand head.   
Table 4. ConAgra Price Difference Models Means 
Variable Mean before closing Mean after closing Mean 110 wks 
KS-CO price 0.103 0.012 0.065 
KS-NE price 0.161 -0.233 -0.031 
KS-TX price -0.076 0.142 0.032 
KS-IA/MN price 0.161 -0.233 -0.031 
KS-CO slaughter 105.729 88.686 97.207 
KS-NE slaughter 24.898 7.684 16.291 
KS-TX slaughter 46.562 31.860 39.211 
KS-IA/MN slighter 140.513 122.573 131.542 
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Kansas versus Texas Model 
 The total R2 for the Kansas-Texas model is 0.274.  The average price difference 
for fed steers increased between the two periods.  The weeks leading up to the plant 
closing the difference was -$0.076.  During the 55 weeks after the closing the difference 
in price was at 0.142 $US/100 lbs.  The difference in weekly slaughter decreased over the 
two periods.   
 This model has three significant variables (table 5).  It is estimated that as weekly 
slaughter difference increases by one thousand head the difference in price will increase 
0.007 $US/100 lbs.  This value is comparable to the Kansas-Nebraska model.  The 
negative sign on this parameter is not expected. The plant closing event had a positive 
impact on the price difference.  In the weeks following the closure, the price difference 
increased 0.302 $US/100 lbs.  During the first and second week after the closing, the 
price difference increased 0.39 $US/100 lbs.   
 
Kansas versus Iowa/Minnesota Model 
 This model had a R2 of 0.198.  This shows that little of the variation in price 
difference can be explained by the independent variables.  The average weekly price 
difference for this model is the same as the Kansas-Nebraska model (table 4).  This is 
because an Omaha market price was used for both models.  The average price difference 
decreased from the first period to the second.  The average weekly slaughter difference 
decreased.  During the first 55 weeks, the average was 140.51 thousand head per week.  
 55 
During the course of the 55 weeks after the closing, the average slaughter difference was 
122.57 thousand head.   
 The plant closing variable was significant and negative, as expected (table 5).  
The closing of the ConAgra plant caused the price difference to decrease 0.49 $US/100 
lbs.  During the fifth and sixth week after the closing the difference between the Kansas 
and Iowa price increased.  Over this period the price went up 0.71 $US/100 lbs.  
Slaughter difference was not significant and was positive.  The estimated value for this 
parameter was 0.00027.  
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Table 5. ConAgra Price Difference Model Results 
Independent 
Variable 
KS-CO 
Estimate 
KS-NE 
Estimate 
KS-TX 
Estimate 
KS-IA/MN 
Estimate 
Intercept 0.397 
(0.644) 
-0.003 
(0.177) 
-0.395** 
(0.139) 
0.123 
(0.771) 
SD -0.003 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
Plant Close -0.188 
(0.145) 
-0.373** 
(0.460) 
0.302** 
(0.059) 
-0.488** 
(0.138) 
Week 1-2 0.089 
(0.314) 
0.511 
(0.374) 
0.394** 
(0.162) 
0.563 
(0.384) 
Week 3-4 0.257 
(0.312) 
0.593 
(0.371) 
-0.056 
(0.167) 
0.573 
(0.375) 
Week 5-6 0.324 
(0.308) 
0.685* 
(0.371) 
-0.051 
(0.164) 
0.706* 
(0.375) 
Week 7-8 -0.207 
(0.309) 
0.104 
(0.371) 
-0.045 
(0.163) 
0.102 
(0.377) 
Week 9-10 0.192 
(0.306) 
0.388 
(0.377) 
-0.031 
(0.163) 
0.457 
(0.373) 
Week 11-12 0.163 
(0.305) 
0.112 
(0.374) 
0.087 
(0.166) 
0.160 
(0.374) 
Observations 93 107 103 107 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Significance levels are **=0.05, *=0.10. 
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Maple Leaf Study 
 The price differences model, equation (3), was used to analyze the slaughter hog 
market in Canada and the northern United States.  The purpose was to determine if the 
opening of the Maple Leaf plant in Brandon, Manitoba affected prices.  The results from 
each one of the six models are discussed below.  The Maple Leaf models are more 
consistent than the ConAgra study.  Overall, the Maple Leaf models had a higher R2 
value and all the plant open estimates are significant, except Saskatchewan.  The plant 
open estimates ranged from 4 to 10 $CAN/100 kg.  Several of the models have some of 
the two week dummy variables significant.  In a few of the cases, the 5th and 6th along 
with the 9th and 10th week dummies estimated are significant.  The inclusion of additional 
weekly dummy variables could not be justified because of inconsistency within and 
across models.  The mean values for the independent and slaughter difference variables 
can be found in table 6.  The parameter estimates and standard errors are presented in 
table 7.   
 
Manitoba versus Alberta Model 
 The R2 for this model is 0.165.  The mean price difference between Manitoba and 
Alberta increased from one period to the next (table 6).  The average slaughter difference 
also increased, from 45.5 to 60.0 thousand head.  An increase in slaughter difference can 
be expected with the opening of a plant in Manitoba.  After the opening of the plant, the 
price difference increased 4.5 $CAN/100 kg (table 7).  The estimate was positive, as 
expected, and significant.   
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Manitoba versus Saskatchewan Model 
 The average price difference between Manitoba and Saskatchewan increased 
about 3 $CAN/100 kg (table 6).  From the first 55 weeks to the remaining 55 weeks, the 
price difference went from 7.7 to 10.9 $CAN/100 kg.  The mean weekly slaughter 
difference increased about 15 thousand head, between the two periods.  This model had 
an R2 of 0.139.  The plant open dummy variable was insignificant and estimated to be 4.1 
$CAN/100 kg (table 7).  The estimate for the slaughter difference variable was small, at 
0.02, but significant.   
 
Manitoba versus Ontario Model 
 The plant closing impacted the slaughter hog prices in the Manitoba and Ontario 
markets.  In the 55 weeks prior to the closing the average Ontario price was 1.5 
$CAN/100 kg higher than the Manitoba price.  During the 55 weeks after the closing the 
average Manitoba price was 4.87 $CAN/100 kg higher than the Ontario price.  The 
average Manitoba versus Ontario slaughter difference decreased by about 10 thousand 
head per week (table 6).   
This model had a R2 of 0.198.  After the opening of the plant in Brandon, the 
price difference between the two regions increased 6.8 $CAN/100 kg.  This estimate is 
significant and had a positive sign as expected.  The slaughter difference was estimated to 
be 0.06 (table 7).  This is not the sign that was expected, but the estimate is not 
significant.   
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Table 6. Maple Leaf Price Difference Model Means 
Variable Mean before opening Mean after opening Mean 110 wks 
Man-Alb price 8.216 12.671 10.443 
Man-Sas price 7.707 10.891 9.299 
Man-Ont price -1.500 4.874 1.687 
Man-St.Paul price 17.721 28.136 22.832 
Man-SxFalls price 16.779 26.517 21.558 
Man-IAMN price 19.083 29.238 24.113 
Man-Alb slaughter 45.492 59.991 52.808 
Man-Sas slaughter 36.863 52.242 44.623 
Man-Ont slaughter -19.330 -8.972 -14.103 
Man-St.Paul slaughter -103.645 -86.019 -94.751 
Man-SxFalls slaughter -20.517 -0.853 -10.595 
Man-IAMN slaughter -502.199 -461.897 -481.863 
 
Manitoba versus St. Paul Model 
 In this model, the average price difference increased by about 10 $CAN/100 kg 
between the two periods (table 6).  The average price difference may seem large for the 
models that compare the Manitoba market and markets in the United States.  As 
mentioned before, this is because the Canadian prices are expressed as a dressed weight 
basis and the U.S. prices are on a live weight.  The average weekly slaughter difference 
also increased.  During the 55 weeks after the plant opening, Minnesota processed about 
86 thousand more hogs than Manitoba.   
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 The Manitoba-St. Paul model has a R2 value of 0.3668.  The plant open and 
slaughter difference variable are significant.  Following the opening of the plant the 
average price difference for barrows and gilts increased about 9.07 $CAN/100 kg (table 
7).  The slaughter difference variable is positive, not as expected.  For every 1,000 head 
increase in the slaughter difference the average price difference will increase 0.12 
$CAN/100 kg.   
 
Manitoba versus Sioux Falls Model 
 The average price difference between Manitoba and the Sioux Falls market also 
increased approximately 10 $CAN/100 kg.  The average weekly slaughter difference 
went up from -20.9 to -0.9 thousand head (table 6).  Weekly slaughter in Manitoba 
increased more rapidly than in the South Dakota market.   
 This model had the highest R2 value of all price difference models, 0.490.  The 
slaughter difference parameter estimate was positive and significant, at 0.34.  During the 
55 weeks following the plant opening the price difference for barrows and gilts increased 
by 4.4 $CAN/100 kg (table 7).   
 
Manitoba versus interior Iowa/southern Minnesota Model 
 The average price difference between Manitoba and Iowa/Minnesota increased 
about 10 $CAN/100 kg.  This is similar to the other models comparing the Manitoba 
market to U.S. markets.  The average weekly slaughter difference decreased over the two 
periods.  However, the difference in average weekly slaughter is still large.  During the 
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55 weeks after the opening, Iowa processed 461.9 thousand more hogs than Manitoba 
(table 6).   
 The R2 for this model was high compared to the models involving the Canadian 
provinces, 0.406.  The slaughter difference variable was significant and positive, 0.04 
(table 7).  A positive estimate was not expected, but it represents a small change in price 
difference.  After the plant opening the price difference between Manitoba and 
Iowa/Minnesota increased by 10.18 $CAN/100 kg.   
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Table 7. Maple Leaf Price Difference Model Results 
Independent 
Variable 
Alberta 
Estimate 
Saskatch. 
Estimate 
Ontario 
Estimate 
St. Paul 
Estimate 
Sx Falls 
Estimate 
IA/MN 
Estimate 
Intercept 3.630 
(6.174) 
6.490 
(4.473) 
-0.541 
(2.149) 
30.196** 
(6.461) 
23.554** 
(1.605) 
38.895** 
(9.691) 
SD 0.093 
(0.134) 
0.023* 
(0.118) 
0.062 
(0.092) 
0.123** 
(0.061) 
0.335** 
(0.063) 
0.040** 
(0.019) 
Plant Open 4.489* 
(2.339) 
4.145 
(2.459) 
6.797** 
(2.190) 
9.071** 
(2.20) 
4.419** 
(1.953) 
10.178** 
(2.004) 
Week 1-2 -8.009 
(6.303) 
-8.026 
(5.661) 
-11.903* 
(6.70) 
-6.372 
(6.099) 
-8.612* 
(5.151) 
-16.004** 
(5.952) 
Week 3-4 0.800 
(5.835) 
1.467 
(5.315) 
3.655 
(6.560) 
1.768 
(6.036) 
0.262 
(5.142) 
-1.538 
(6.152) 
Week 5-6 -10.497* 
(5.766) 
-10.051* 
(5.269) 
-8.649 
(6.502) 
-5.820 
(6.099) 
-10.003* 
(5.128) 
-11.716* 
(6.046) 
Week 7-8 -3.474 
(5.799) 
-1.837 
(5.279) 
-1.305 
(6.537) 
-1.306 
(8.582) 
-2.991 
(7.205) 
-0.010 
(8.43) 
Week 9-10 -10.071* 
(5.770) 
-9.68* 
(5.272) 
-9.895 
(6.501) 
-8.063 
(6.075) 
-10.565** 
(5.128) 
-10.777* 
(6.109) 
Week 11-12 3.772 
(5.847) 
2.652 
(5.326) 
5.422 
(6.642) 
1.906 
(6.127) 
-0.722 
(5.134) 
-0.080 
(6.055) 
Observations 109 109 109 107 107 106 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Significance levels are **=0.05, *=0.10. 
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Partial Adjustment Model 
 The partial adjustment model (equation 6) was used to determine if the plant 
closing and opening impacted price and the duration of such effects.  The SAS system 
was used to estimate this model with ordinary least squares.  The data used in this model 
were confirmed as normally distributed from the use of a Jarque-Bera test.  
Heteroskedasticity was tested using Breusch-Pagan, Glesjer, Harvey-Godfrey, and White 
tests using a 5% confidence level.  All tests on all the models, for both studies, failed to 
reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.   
 Partial adjustment models contain a lagged variable.  Thus, autocorrelation must 
be tested with a Durbin-h statistic instead of the more common Durbin-Watson test.  All 
models were tested at a 5% level and rejected the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.  
With autocorrelation in each model, the positive AR(1) was corrected using the 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.  This was accomplished by estimating each model with 
FGLS.  The partial adjustment models were tested for specification with Ramsey’s reset 
test.  The Maple Leaf models had a few problems with specification.  Specifically, the 
U.S. models, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta models had minor levels of 
misspecification.  Changing the functional form was not done, because this would make 
comparing the results between markets more difficult.  It would be difficult to compare 
market impacts with the results of different models.   
 
ConAgra Study 
 The mean values for ConAgra variables are found in table 8.  All of the markets 
saw average prices increase.  Average slaughter between the two periods remained stable, 
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except the Kansas market.  Average boxed beef value saw an increase from 108.57 to 
114.37 $US/100 lbs, between the two periods.  The average weight dropped about 8 lbs.  
The average byproduct value during the first 55 weeks was around 8 $US/100 lbs.  
During the 55 weeks after the closing the average increased to 8.5 $US/100 lbs.   
The results of the models can be found in table 9.  The results of the Texas, 
Nebraska, Colorado, and Iowa models are consistent.  The Kansas model does not follow 
the same pattern as the others.  The boxed beef, byproduct, and lag price are significant in 
all the models, except Kansas.  The duration of the market impacts are calculated from 
the partial adjustment coefficient (equation 9).  Excluding the Kansas model, the duration 
varies between 3 and 5 weeks.   
 
Kansas Model 
 The average price for fed steers in the Kansas market increased about 3 $US/100 
lbs between the two periods.  The average weekly slaughter decreased from 155 to 138 
thousand head during the two periods (table 8).  All of this decrease can not be 
contributed to the plant closing.  Some of the decrease may be related to the current cattle 
cycle.  However, the loss of the large plant should magnify the decline.  The R2 of this 
model is high, at 0.9491.  The boxed beef parameter estimate is 0.3138 (table 9).  This is 
significant and positive, as expected.   
The sign of the lag price parameter is negative, which was not expected.  This 
model does not follow others and produces a negative partial adjustment coefficient.  
This would imply that the duration of the plant closing occurred prior to the actual event.  
The actual estimate of the duration of the plant closing is -28 weeks.  The reason for this 
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estimation cannot be explained.  The data were checked for errors.  Data were also 
divided into two groups and the model run several times omitting some variables.  
However, no logical explanation could be found for a negative coefficient.   
 
Texas Model 
 The average price for fed steers in Texas in the 55 weeks prior to the plant closing 
was 69.7 $US/100 lbs (table 8).  In the 55 weeks after, the average price was 71.8 
$US/100 lbs.  Average weekly slaughter in Texas dropped about 3 thousand head 
between the periods.  The model also had a high R2, at 0.955.  The boxed beef, slaughter 
number, plant close dummy, lag price, and byproduct price parameters are significant and 
have the expected signs.  During the weeks after the plant closing the price in Texas 
decreased 0.92 $US/100 lbs.  The duration of impacts on the Texas market is calculated 
at 4.8 weeks.  This is the amount of time it took 95% of the effect on price to subside.   
 
Nebraska Model 
 As observed in the other models, the average price increased approximately 3 
$US/100 lbs between the time period before and after the plant closing.  The average 
weekly slaughter in Nebraska remained stable, around 130 thousand head (table 8).  The 
model estimated that 95.69% of the variation in price could be explained by the 
independent variables (R2 value).  The boxed beef, lag price, and byproduct value 
variables are significant at the 5% level, and the signs are as expected.   
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Colorado Model 
 The average price for fed steers in Colorado increased by about 4 $US/100 lbs 
between the two periods, while the average weekly slaughter only decreased about 0.5 
thousand head (table 8).  The Colorado model had the highest R2 of the group, at 0.959.  
The boxed beef price, lag price, byproduct value, and seasonal parameters were 
significant with the expected signs (table 9).  The plant closing estimate was positive, but 
was not significant.  The calculated duration of the effects on the Colorado fed cattle 
market was 3.7 weeks. 
 
Iowa/Minnesota Model 
 The Omaha price for fed steers was used for both the Nebraska and Iowa models.  
Thus, the change in average price for the Iowa model is the same as the Nebraska model.  
Average weekly slaughter only declined approximately 0.5 thousand head between the 
two periods (table 8).  The R2 value is at 0.957, which is comparable to the other models.  
The boxed beef price, lag price, byproduct value, and season3 parameters are significant 
at the 10% level.  They also have the expected signs.  The plant close dummy variable 
shows that the price dropped 0.13 $US/100 lbs, but it was not significant.  The duration 
of the market impacts (95% of the total) was estimated to be 5.3 weeks.   
 
 67 
 
Table 8. ConAgra Partial Adjustment Model Means 
Variable Mean before closing Mean after closing Mean 110 wks 
KS price 69.467 72.128 70.773 
TX price 69.659 71.831 70.745 
NE price 69.306 72.225 70.752 
CO price 69.365 73.469 71.093 
KS slaughter 155.773 138.131 146.952 
TX slaughter 109.211 106.271 107.741 
NE slaughter 130.875 130.447 130.661 
CO slaughter 50.044 49.445 49.745 
IA/MN slaughter 15.260 15.558 15.409 
Boxed Beef price 108.566 114.373 111.469 
Weight 1265.970 1257.790 1261.880 
Byproduct price 7.955 8.454 8.205 
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Table 9. ConAgra Partial Adjustment Model Results 
Independent 
Variable 
Kansas 
Estimate 
Texas 
Estimate 
Nebraska 
Estimate 
Colorado 
Estimate 
IA/MN 
Estimate 
Intercept 50.392** 
(18.129) 
7.187 
(15.783) 
16.933 
(15.003) 
25.731* 
(14.473) 
14.618 
(14.330) 
Meat Value 0.314** 
(0.066) 
0.252** 
(0.063) 
0.248** 
(0.061) 
0.129** 
(0.056) 
0.237** 
(0.061) 
Number 0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.028* 
(0.015) 
-0.008 
(0.012) 
-0.022 
(0.026) 
-0.074 
(0.088) 
Weight -0.009 
(0.011) 
-0.000 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
Plant Close 0.070 
(1.192) 
-0.917** 
(0.455) 
-0.147 
(0.468) 
0.099 
(0.392) 
-0.132 
(0.449) 
Lag Price -0.112 
(0.106) 
0.462** 
(0.104) 
0.398** 
(0.101) 
0.557** 
(0.102) 
0.431** 
(0.101) 
ByPr Price 0.331 
(0.818) 
0.853** 
(0.347) 
0.962** 
(0.369) 
0.985** 
(0.303) 
0.938** 
(0.355) 
Season 2 0.857 
(0.765) 
0.696 
(0.582) 
0.814 
(0.576) 
0.820* 
(0.482) 
0.788 
(0.565) 
Season 3 1.038 
(0.898) 
0.361 
(0.615) 
0.212 
(0.594) 
-0.106** 
(0.532) 
0.059 
(0.572) 
Season 4 -0.892 
(0.757) 
-0.726 
(0.518) 
-0.797 
(0.545) 
-1.347** 
(0.483) 
-0.861* 
(0.510) 
Duration 
(weeks) -28.12 4.84 5.90 3.68 5.32 
Observations 105 98 107 92 107 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Significance levels are **=0.05, *=0.10. 
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Maple Leaf Study 
 The mean values for each variable within each model are presented in table 10.  
The average price for each region (U.S. and Canada) showed large increases between the 
55 weeks prior to the closing and the 55 weeks after the closing.  Changes in average 
weekly slaughter varied depending on the market.  The specific market changes in price 
and slaughter are discussed individually below.  The same cutout value, byproduct value, 
and weight data are used in each model.  The average cutout price increased from 165.5 
to 203.4 $CAN/100 kg between the two periods.  Average weight remained fairly 
constant, only increasing about 1 kg.  Average byproduct value was also stable, 
increasing a little over 1 $CAN/100 kg.   
 The results for the models are presented in table 11.  The results for the Maple 
Leaf study show more consistency than the ConAgra study.  The cutout parameter is 
significant and carries the expected sign in all cases.  The plant opening dummy 
parameter is not significant in all models, but does have the appropriate sign.  Using the 
lagged price variable the duration of the plant opening is calculated using equation (9).  
The duration of such effects ranges from 3 to 58 weeks, depending upon the market.  
Each model is discussed in more detail in the following sections.   
 
Manitoba Model 
 Manitoba was the location of the plant opening.  The average price for slaughter 
hogs changed from 111 to 160.3 $CAN/100 kg over the course of the two periods.  The 
opening of a plant should increase slaughter in that market.  This was the case in 
Manitoba.  Average weekly slaughter increased about 14 thousand head (table 10).  The 
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R2 of the model was quite high, at 0.9664.  The meat value (cutout), plant open, and lag 
price parameters are significant with the expected signs (table 11).  Season2 was 
significant and positive, while Season4 was significant and had an expected negative 
sign.  After the plant opened the price increased 11.3 $CAN/100 kg.  The duration of the 
plant opening on the Manitoba market was 3.2 weeks.   
 
Ontario Model 
 The average price for hogs in Ontario saw a large increase between the two 
periods, 112.5 to 155.4 $CAN/100 kg (table 10).  Average weekly slaughter only saw a 
small change of 3.6 thousand head per week.  The R2 of the model was 0.985.  The cutout 
value, lag price, Season3, and Season4 are significant and have the expected signs (table 
11).  The plant open parameter shows a 2.6 $CAN/100 kg increase in price, but was not 
significant.  Using the lag price the duration of the market opening was 5.2 weeks. 
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Table 10. Maple Leaf Partial Adjustment Model Means 
Variable Mean before opening Mean after opening Mean 110 wks 
Man price 111.041 160.258 135.650 
Ont Price 112.541 155.384 133.962 
Sas price 103.335 149.367 126.351 
Alb price 102.825 147.587 125.206 
St. Paul price 93.322 133.053 112.820 
SxFalls price 94.263 134.672 114.094 
IA/MN price 92.084 131.951 111.831 
Man slaughter 55.757 69.692 62.788 
Ont slaughter 75.087 78.664 76.892 
Sas slaughter 18.893 17.450 18.165 
Alb slaughter 10.265 9.701 9.980 
St. Paul slaughter 159.116 155.711 157.414 
SxFalls slaughter 76.342 70.545 73.444 
IA/MN slaughter 556.573 531.589 544.081 
Cutout price 165.535 203.367 184.451 
Weight 117.068 118.363 117.715 
Byproduct price 33.437 34.786 34.112 
 
Saskatchewan Model 
 The average price for barrows and gilts in Saskatchewan increased about 46 
$CAN/100 kg between the two periods.  While the average weekly slaughter decrease by 
about 1 thousand head (table 10).  The R2 for the model was high, at 0.981.  The cutout 
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value, plant open, lag price, season3, and season4 are significant and have the expected 
signs.  The slaughter number, and byproduct value are significant, but don’t have the 
expected sign (table 11).  The slaughter estimate is positive, which would mean that as 
slaughter increases so does price.  Byproduct values is negative, which would mean as 
the price in byproducts increase the price of hogs would decrease.  Market forces that are 
not measured in this model must be driving these trends.  In the weeks following the 
plant opening the price of hogs increased 7.7 $CAN/100 kg.  The effect of the plant 
opening on the Saskatchewan market lasted 6.3 weeks.   
 
Alberta Model 
 The average price for hogs in Alberta also increased about 45 $CAN/100 kg, over 
the two periods.  Average weekly slaughter remained stable, only dropping 0.3 thousand 
head (table 10).  The R2 of the model was estimated at 0.983.  The cutout value, lag price, 
and season3, season 4 parameters are significant with expected signs (table 11).  The 
byproduct value was significant, but had a negative sign.  The plant open parameter was 
positive, as expected and measured 4.7.  The duration of 95% of the impacts on the 
Alberta market was 5.0 weeks. This is comparable to the Ontario model.   
 
St. Paul Model 
 Average price for hogs in this market went from 93.3 to 132.1 $CAN/100 kg.  
The average weekly hog slaughter in the St. Paul market dropped about 3.4 thousand 
head, between the two periods (table 10).  The R2 for the model was also high, at 0.970.  
The cutout value carried the expected sign and was significant (table 11).  The plant open 
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parameter shows a 6.4 $CAN/100 kg increase in price.  The duration of the plant opening 
on the St. Paul market was 58.5 weeks.  The lag price variable in the model is not 
significant.  Thus, the duration of 58.5 weeks in the St. Paul market was not reliable.   
 
Sioux Falls Model 
 The average price in the Sioux Falls market also saw a large increase, from 94.3 
to 134.7 $CAN/100 kg.  Average weekly slaughter dropped about 6 thousand head 
between the two periods (table 10).  The R2 of the model was estimated at 0.977.  The 
cutout value, plant open, lag price, season2, season3, and season4 parameters are 
significant and have the expected signs.  Weeks following the plant opening saw an 
increase of price of 8.2 $CAN/100 kg (table 11).  The duration of the plant opening on 
the Sioux Falls market was 24.3 weeks.   
 
Iowa/Minnesota Model 
 The average interior Iowa/southern Minnesota price increased from 92.1 to 132 
$CAN/100 kg over the periods.  Average weekly slaughter in Iowa saw a large decrease 
during the two 55 week periods.  During the first 55 weeks the average was at 556.6 
thousand head.  In the following 55 weeks the weekly average dropped to 531.6 thousand 
head (table 10).  The R2 of the model was high, at 0.980.  The cutout value, plant open, 
lag price, season2, and season4 parameters are significant with the expected signs.  The 
weeks after the plant opening saw a 6.6 $CAN/100 kg increase in hog prices (table 11).  
It took 10.7 weeks for 95% of the impacts on the Iowa market to subside.   
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Table 11. Maple Leaf Partial Adjustment Model Results 
Independent 
Variable 
Manitoba 
Estimate 
Ontario Estimate 
Saskatchewan 
Estimate 
Alberta Estimate St. Paul 
Estimate 
Sioux Falls 
Estimate 
IA/MN 
Estimate 
Intercept 60.316 
(131.868) 
106.142 
(81.025) 
87.191 
(98.046) 
47.699 
(90.806) 
47.536 
(122.488) 
96.269 
(109.025) 
123.704 
(92.404) 
Meat Value 0.233** 
(0.115) 
0.611** 
(0.050) 
0.641** 
(0.056) 
0.553** 
(0.051) 
0.842** 
(0.067) 
0.745** 
(0.062) 
0.669** 
(0.057) 
Number 0.113 
(0.108) 
0.043 
(0.058) 
0.531** 
(0.228) 
-0.726 
(0.559) 
-0.006 
(0.042) 
-0.043 
(0.054) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
Weight -0.041 
(1.084) 
-1.013 
(0.680) 
-0.647 
(0.800) 
-0.257 
(0.741) 
-0.702 
(1.016) 
-0.978 
(0.893) 
-1.240 
(0.771) 
Plant Open 11.259** 
(3.295) 
2.615 
(1.914) 
7.656** 
(2.483) 
4.676** 
(2.274) 
6.401** 
(3.050) 
8.172** 
(2.733) 
6.576** 
(2.254) 
Lag Price 0.613** 
(0.107) 
0.441** 
(0.047) 
0.377** 
(0.053) 
0.449** 
(0.051) 
0.050 
(0.070) 
0.116* 
(0.066) 
0.244** 
(0.061) 
ByPr Price -1.675** 
(0.809) 
-0.803 
(0.536) 
-1.807** 
(0.642) 
-1.265** 
(0.577) 
-0.420 
(0.858) 
-0.512 
(0.758) 
-0.600 
(0.579) 
Season 2 4.281* 
(2.456) 
1.811 
(1.581) 
1.208 
(1.904) 
0.767 
(1.740) 
4.840* 
(2.492) 
5.653** 
(2.163) 
6.497** 
(1.847) 
Season 3 -2.058 
(3.011) 
-5.323** 
(1.859) 
-5.435** 
(2.286) 
-4.985** 
(2.080) 
-3.610 
(2.870) 
-4.363* 
(2.501) 
-3.143 
(2.137) 
Season 4 -8.263** 
(2.639) 
-4.072** 
(1.650) 
-4.724** 
(2.027) 
-5.120** 
(1.828) 
-4.013 
(2.557) 
-4.642** 
(2.228) 
-3.079* 
(1.816) 
Duration 
(weeks) 3.155 5.154 6.329 5.026 58.524 24.274 10.705 
Observations 108 108 108 108 105 105 103 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Significance levels are **=0.05, *=0.10. 
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Chow Tests 
 Chow tests were used to determine if a difference in price existed between the 55 
weeks prior and the 55 weeks after the plant events.  These tests were conducted on the 5 
ConAgra and 7 Maple Leaf partial adjustment models.  The data were split into two 
groups, before and after the event.  The results from the model and equation (10) were 
used to get the SSE unrestricted.  Using this and the restricted SSE, F-tests at the 5% 
level were conducted.  The results of the Chow tests can be found in table 13.  Chow tests 
on all the partial adjustment models, confirm that there was a change in price.   
Table 12. Chow Test Results 
Model SSE before SSE After SSEu SSEr Price Change? 
Kansas 37.55 74.70 112.25 130.24 Yes 
Texas 35.52 66.00 101.52 107.59 Yes 
Nebraska 32.00 62.80 94.79 104.76 Yes 
Colorado 29.83 36.77 66.61 73.84 Yes 
Iowa (cattle) 31.95 63.15 95.10 104.65 Yes 
Manitoba 1758.34 1587.59 3345.93 3885.36 Yes 
Ontario 716.20 550.06 1266.26 1576.32 Yes 
Saskatchewan 909.39 783.08 1692.47 2152.56 Yes 
Alberta 865.32 612.48 1477.80 1798.10 Yes 
St. Paul 1166.94 1010.25 2177.19 2753.29 Yes 
Sioux Falls 922.39 887.62 1810.02 2114.14 Yes 
Iowa (hogs) 830.89 509.33 1340.22 1653.33 Yes 
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Summary 
 Analyzing the secondary data using price differences models and partial 
adjustment models shows the changes in market impacts.  With the ConAgra plant 
closing the price differences model presents a price decrease of $0.37 to $0.49 in the 
Kansas versus Nebraska and Iowa markets.  While the price difference in the Kansas 
versus Texas market increased by $0.30.  Using a partial adjustment model, the price in 
the Texas market decreased $0.92 after the plant closing.  The impacts from the closing 
lasted from 3 to 6 weeks.  Estimating the effects of the Maple Leaf plant opening with a 
price difference model shows a price increase of $4 to $10.  Using the partial adjustment 
model, after the plant opening the price increased from $2 to $11 in the Canadian and 
U.S. markets.  The effects of this increase only lasted from 3 to 59 weeks.   
 
 77 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
PRIMARY DATA PROCEDURES 
 
 
 In contrast to the secondary data used in previous chapters to analyze the impacts 
of the plant events, primary data were used to determine the perceived impacts.  The 
secondary data used in this study are aggregated data from the U.S. and Canadian 
governments.  Collecting and analyzing primary data may show impacts not observed in 
the other data.  This chapter discusses some of the issues with aggregated data.  It also 
reviews some previous studies on the comparison of primary and secondary data in 
economic analysis.  The development and distribution of the surveys used for this study 
(one for ConAgra plant and one for Maple Leaf plant) are explained.  Finally, an ordered 
logit model was used to analyze the primary data gathered from the surveys.  The 
methodology and model specification used for both the ConAgra and Maple Leaf studies 
are presented.   
 
Primary versus Secondary Data 
 Primary data generally refers to data that were gathered by the publisher or 
author.  Normally, secondary data are collected from an alternative source other than the 
original publisher or author (McClave, Benson, and Sincich).  Research comparing the 
results of models using primary and secondary data has been limited.  Radtke, Detering, 
and Brokken estimated the income impacts from increasing the federal grazing fee.  They 
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used data from the U.S. Forest Service as secondary data.  Business and households were 
surveyed to get primary data.  The impacts from raising the fee were analyzed with both 
data sets.  They found that the secondary data showed impacts higher than determined by 
the primary data.   
 Boster compared the use of primary and secondary data for water resource 
planning using input-output models.  The primary data came from Colorado based study 
on water resources.  For a source of secondary data he used an Arizona based study that 
used national coefficients.  The results from the two input-output models were compared.  
He found that the results were similar using either primary or secondary data.  This is 
somewhat contrary to what some may believe.  Economists tend to believe primary data 
results are superior, ceteris paribus.  However, primary data cannot always be used 
because of the high cost of obtaining the information.   
 
Secondary Data 
 The majority of the secondary data used in this study were complied and gathered 
by the USDA (some through LMIC) or the Canadian government.  The analysis of plant 
event impacts using secondary data was discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.  The author 
considers the secondary data used in this study, as the best available.  While this may be 
true, the secondary data could create concerns.  The data gathered by the U.S. and 
Canadian governments are highly aggregated.  For example, in the ConAgra study the 
Kansas price variable represents an average price paid for live fed steers, weighing 1100-
1300 lbs., and grading 35-65% choice.  On a daily basis, there are numerous transactions 
involving cattle that fit this description.  If the number of transactions for a particular type 
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of livestock is not great enough, then the USDA does not report data for confidentiality 
reasons.  Due to this aggregation, secondary data may not display all the impacts from a 
market shock.   
The ability of secondary data to show these impacts will depend upon the size of 
the event and the level of data aggregation.  Closing the ConAgra plant may only affect 
fed cattle prices for certain areas or certain individuals.  The same could be said for the 
Maple Leaf opening.  If the data are aggregated enough, these effects may not be picked 
up.  To ease some of the concerns about these impacts on the results of the study, surveys 
are used to collect primary data.  It is intended that the results from both data sources will 
confirm the market impacts.   
 
Survey Development 
 The primary data for this study were collected with the use of surveys.  Two 
surveys were developed, one for the ConAgra plant closing and another for the Maple 
Leaf study.  The purpose of the surveys is two measure the perceptions of cattle and hog 
producers.   
 
ConAgra Survey 
 Feedlot managers (fed cattle producers) in areas surrounding Garden City were 
targeted for the survey.  A copy of the survey can be found in Appendix II.  The number 
of respondents to each question is in bold type beside each question.  These results will 
be discussed further in Chapter 6.  The survey was designed to be as short as possible, 
while still allowing the collection of the necessary information about the market impacts.  
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There are six questions in the survey, some with multiple parts.  Question 1 considers the 
distance and direction of responding feedlots from Garden City.  Question 2 relates to the 
feedlot size of the responding manager.  The percentage of a feedlot’s cattle that were 
sold to each of the four major packers, the year before and the year after the plant closing 
is asked in question 3.  The fourth question asks about the percentage of a feedlot’s cattle 
that were sold on the cash market or through a contract, alliance or marketing agreement 
in the year before and the year after the plant closing.  The next question has many parts.  
This series of questions asks respondents to rate on a scale if they agree or disagree with 
a statement.  Question 5 asks specific questions about how the closing of the ConAgra 
plant affected the manager’s feedlot and the cattle industry in general.  The last question 
asks managers to explain the most noticeable effect from the plant closing.   
 In addition to the survey, a cover letter was included in the mailing to inform the 
recipient about the study and ask for their cooperation.  A copy of the letter can be found 
in Appendix II.  The materials (survey and cover letter) mailed to survey participants 
were first approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB).  A copy of IRB acceptance 
is also found in the Appendix II.   
 
Participants 
 The survey was targeted at feedlot managers that may have been affected by the 
event.  To ensure that the majority of the impacted feedlots were surveyed, feedlots 
within 200 miles of Garden City were surveyed.  It is unlikely that the contacts of every 
feedlot manager in this area could be obtained.  Every feedlot manager that was asked to 
participate in the survey was a member of the Kansas Livestock Association (KLA), the 
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Colorado Livestock Association (CLA), or the Texas Cattle Feeders Association (TCFA).  
These organizations helped to obtain the contact information of feedlot managers.  To 
ensure the confidentiality of this information, the KLA and CLA required that a sealed 
envelope, containing survey and letter, be sent to their offices and they attached the 
mailing address.   
 The ConAgra survey was sent to 186 feedlot managers throughout Colorado, 
Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas.  From the total number of feedlot 
managers that received a survey, 95 were members of KLA, 44 are members of CLA, and 
47 are members of TCFA.  The majority of these feedlots have a one time capacity of 
more than 1,000 head.  The feedlots from KLA chosen for the survey are from the 
western half of the state, this included a few from southwestern Nebraska.  The CLA 
participants came from the eastern part of the state.  The TCFA members that were 
chosen are from the panhandle of Oklahoma, panhandle of Texas, and northeastern New 
Mexico.   
 The first mailing occurred during the first week in July, 2003.  It was decided to 
conduct a second mailing, because the summer months are busy for feedlot managers so 
they may have forgotten about completing the questionnaire.  The second mailing to the 
186 feedlot managers occurred during the first week in August, 2003.   
 
Maple Leaf Study 
 The survey created for the Maple Leaf study is similar to the one used in the 
ConAgra study.  Producers that raised market hogs in western Manitoba were the target 
of the survey.  This survey consists of six questions, with multiple parts.  A copy of this 
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survey can be found in Appendix II.  The first question deals with the distance and 
direction of the finishing barns that the producer manages from Brandon.  The second 
question asked about the number of hogs that were marketed from their barns in 2000.  
This is the year following the plant opening.  Question three has two parts.  The 
percentage of their hogs that were marketed to different packers, in 1999 and 2000 was 
asked.  The four main pork processors are listed, as well as, the option of other Canadian 
packers or U.S. packers.  For the fourth question, the interest was in how producers 
marketed their hogs.  This question asked for the percentage of a manager’s hogs were 
sold on the cash market or contracted in the year prior and the year after the plant 
opening.  The next question asked managers if they agreed or disagreed with various 
statements.  The statements ranged from asking about direct impacts from the plant 
opening to effects of exports to the U.S.  The final question, number six, asked producers 
what the biggest impact was from the plant opening.   
In addition to the survey a cover letter from the survey administrators was 
included in the mailing to inform the recipient about the study and ask for their 
cooperation.  The Manitoba Pork Council assisted with conducting this survey.  They 
included a letter to inform producers of their support in this study.  A copy of both letters 
can be found in Appendix II.  The materials (survey and letters) mailed to survey 
participants was first approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB).  A copy of IRB 
acceptance is also found in Appendix II.   
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Participants 
 The survey was intended to survey producers that may have been impacted by the 
opening of the Maple Leaf plant.  The authors also wanted the results from ConAgra and 
Maple Leaf studies to be comparable.  Thus, care was taken to keep the survey structure 
and participants as comparable as possible.  Market hog producers within 400 kilometers 
(slightly over 200 miles) of Brandon, Manitoba, were targeted for the survey.  The survey 
participants were members of the 1st, 2nd, or 3rd districts of the Manitoba Pork Council.  
These districts are in the western half of Manitoba, which includes Brandon.  These 
participants had to own and market their slaughter hogs and not just own the finishing 
barns.  There are 273 hog producers that fit in the above mentioned categories.   
 This survey involved only one mailing.  The Manitoba Pork Council and the 
University of Manitoba assisted with the mailing.  The confidentiality of hog producers 
contact information was also a concern in this study.  The materials were assembled by 
the authors then sent to the University of Manitoba.  Officials at the university handled 
the necessary Canadian postage.  Then the Manitoba Pork Council handled the mailing 
addresses for the surveys.  The questionnaires were then sent out to producers during the 
beginning of November, 2003.   
 
Ordered Logit Model 
 The responses to question 5, in both surveys, have ordinal rank.  Thus, the data 
collected by the surveys can be analyzed using an ordered logit model to examine the 
relationship between managers’ perceptions and the characteristics of their operation.  
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More specifically, the managers’ perceptions of the impacts on the marketing of their 
livestock and regional market impacts are of interest.   
 Ordered logit models have been used to analyze survey data, with ranked 
dependent variables (Grunewald, Schroeder, and Ward; Misra, Huang, and Ott).  The 
model can be represented in linear form (Allison) 
(11) iii exz ++= ** βα  
where zi is linearly dependent upon xi (explanatory variables) and random error ei.  In the 
case of this survey work the value of zi cannot be observed directly.  The logit model uses 
threshold values, such that the zi can be transformed into the observed variable.  Thus, yi 
is the observed survey response that is transformed from zi based on the following 
(Allison)  
(12) y=1 if η1 < z 
 y=2 if η2 < z ≤ η1 
 
. 
 . 
 
y=9 if z ≤ η8 
where the unknown thresholds are η’s and the other variables are as previously defined.  
The values of these thresholds could be estimated, but is not necessary because they do 
not affect the coefficient estimates (Allison).   
 The ordered logit model calculates a cumulative probability of being in a defined 
category or lower.  Allison expressed cumulative probabilities as 
(13) ∑
=
=
j
m
imij PF
1
 
 85 
where Fij is the probability that i is in the jth category or lower, Pim is the probability of i 
for each level, up to category j.  With cumulative probabilities defined, the logit model 
can be expressed as (Allison) 
(14) ij
ij
ij
x
F
F βα +=⎟⎟
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where Fij is as defined, αj is an intercept term for each category, and β is a set of 
coefficients for each explanatory variable (xi) that is constant for each category.  The 
number of categories is one less than the number of rank.  In the case of this study the 
response questions are ranked from 1 to 9, thus the models will have 8 intercepts.   
 The interpretation of coefficients in a logit model is different than a linear model.  
However, probabilities can be calculated to determine how different independent 
variables affect the likelihood that an individual is in a specific category.  Transforming 
the model, the cumulative probabilities can be expressed as  
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where p’s are cumulative probabilities, α’s are intercept terms for specific categories, β’s 
are coefficient estimates for specific explanatory variables, and j is one less the number 
of categories in the response variable.   
 The probability of a certain response level can be found from the difference in 
cumulative probabilities.  For example if a person wanted to know the probability of a 
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“3”.  The answer is the difference between the cumulative probability of less than a “3” 
minus the cumulative probability of less than a “2”.  The probability of the highest 
category can be found by taking 1 minus the cumulative probability of P1+P2+…+Pj.  
This is possible because the model finds a cumulative probability which must also equal 
1.   
 Marginal probabilities can be found from the derivative of the cumulative 
probability equation.  The derivative is 
(16) 
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where Pi is the derivative below level i, xn is the independent variable for which the 
marginal probability is calculated, βn is the coefficient for that variable, xj is the mean of 
each variable j, and βj is the coefficient estimate for each independent variable.  To find 
the marginal probability for a certain response level subject to xn the difference between 
cumulative levels can be used.  For example if a person wanted to know the marginal 
probability of a “3” subject to xn.  The answer is the difference between the cumulative 
marginal probability of less than a “3” minus the cumulative marginal probability of less 
than a “2”.  The marginal probability of the highest category can be found by taking 0 
minus the cumulative marginal probability of njnn xPxPxP ∂∂+∂∂+∂∂ /....// 21 .  This 
process is similar to the one used in the cumulative probabilities.   
 
ConAgra Model 
 Two ordered logit models were developed using the survey data from fed cattle 
producers.  One method to estimate the perceived market impacts from the plant closing 
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was with an ordered logit model analyzing a feedlot manager’s level of agreement of the 
following statements: O) the plant closing had NO noticeable effect on marketing or 
pricing fed cattle from my feedlot (Opinion O), B) the loss of the ConAgra plant caused 
lower fed cattle prices in the region (Opinion B).  The use of these statements as 
dependent variables helped to answer the main objectives of the study.  Opinion O asked 
for the level of agreement that the closure had no affect on the market and prices for the 
manager’s feedlot(s).  Opinion B asked for the level of agreement that the closure 
affected the regional market and prices   
 Using an ordered logit model, similar to equation 11, the probability of each level 
of agreement of each dependent variable was explained by a series of respondent’s 
feedlot characteristics and perceptions.  The two ordered logit models for this study are 
(17) 
eOpinionMOpinionIOpinionEOpinionA
CashMKTConAgraMKTSizeDistanceOpinionO j
+++++
++++=
8765
4321
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(18) 
eOpinionMOpinionIOpinionEOpinionA
CashMKTConAgraMKTSizeDistanceOpinionB j
+++++
++++=
8765
4321
ββββ
ββββα
 
where Opinion O and Opinion B are as previously defined, αj is a set of 8 intercepts that 
are needed in an ordered logit model, e is an error term, and all others are defined in table 
13.  While the variables are defined in table 13, it should be pointed out how some were 
calculated.  The distance, size, ConAgraMKT, and CashMKT had to be altered from the 
survey data into a usable form for the ordered logit model.  The ConAgra survey asked 
respondents to indicate the range that their feedlot was operating in with respect to 
distance, size, percentage sold to ConAgra, and percentage sold on the cash market (see 
survey in Appendix II).  These variables were transformed into a continuous form such 
that they could be used in the logit model.  If a respondent marked a particular category, 
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it was assumed they were at the middle of the category.  For example, if a manager 
indicated being between 0 and 50 miles from Garden City, it was assumed the feedlot 
was 25 miles away.  This assumption is not ideal, but it has to suffice if continuous 
variables are to be used.   
 The expected sign of each coefficient is difficult to predict.  The sign of the 
parameter would explain how the natural log of the probability (see equation 14) changes 
with respect to the variable.  However, the relevance of the independent variables and 
their suspected impacts on Opinion O and Opinion B can be discussed.   
 The distance a feedlot is from Garden City should influence the amount of 
impacts experienced.  Producers on the boundaries of two markets might not have noticed 
much of an impact.  These producers would be more susceptible to changes in packers’ 
willingness and aggressiveness of bidding.  It is expected that producers that are farther 
away from Garden City will be less likely to notice or experience changes in prices.   
 The size of a feedlot might also influence how the manager felt the closure 
affected the market.  Larger feedlots might have the resources to adjust more rapidly to 
market changes than smaller producers.  Smaller producers are expected to more likely 
experience price changes because they do not have the means to adjust rapidly to a 
changing market.   
 The percentage of a manager’s cattle that were sold to ConAgra in the year 
leading up to the closing was expected to influence their perceptions.  Producers that sold 
to the Garden City plant might have had their cattle shipped to other ConAgra plants or 
had to sell them to a different company.  The producers that sold to the other ConAgra 
plants might have lost their buyer and be forced to market to a different packer.  
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Producers that sold a larger percentage of cattle to ConAgra are expected to more likely 
agree that the closing influenced the market.   
 Producers that sold a large percentage of fed cattle on the cash market during 
2000 might have been at a greater risk to market changes.  The plant closing might have 
forced them to find alternative cash markets.  Producers that had a lower percentage of 
fed cattle in the cash market might have been able to avoid some impacts with their 
marketing agreements.  Producers that sold more of their cattle on the cash market are 
expected to more likely think the closure impacted prices and the market.   
 A manager’s level of agreement with the Opinion A, E, I, and M will influence 
their response to the two dependent variables.  It is difficult to predict how producers 
think about a range of different issues.  However, the opinion variables used in the model 
describe a negative impact on the market from a producer’s point of view.  Thus, it is 
expected that producers who agree with the opinion variables will be more likely to think 
there was a market impact and that prices decreased.   
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Table 13 ConAgra. Ordered Logit Model, Variable Definitions 
Dependent 
Variables 
Variable Definition Mean 
Opinion O Response to the plant closing had NO noticeable 
effect on marketing or pricing fed cattle from my 
feedlot (1=strongly disagree to 9=strongly agree) 
4.07 
(2.88) 
Opinion B Response to the loss of the ConAgra plant caused 
lower fed cattle prices in the region (1=strongly 
disagree to 9=strongly agree) 
6.18 
(2.52) 
Independent 
Variables 
Variable Definition Mean 
Distance Number of miles the feedlot is located from 
Garden City 
119.00 
(66.85) 
Size Number of fed cattle marketed from their feedlot 
in 2001 
51700.00 
(39901) 
ConAgraMKT The % of fed cattle sold to ConAgra in 2000 25.40 
(26.79) 
CashMKT The % of fed cattle sold on the cash market in 
2000 (includes live weight and dressed weight 
sales) 
56.00 
(35.86) 
Opinion A Response to the number of buyers regularly 
bidding for cash market cattle from my feedlot 
decreased (1=strongly disagree to 9=strongly 
agree) 
4.95 
(3.13) 
Opinion E Response to the effects of captive supplies 
increased (1=strongly disagree to 9=strongly 
agree) 
6.19 
(2.65) 
Opinion I Response to fed cattle slaughter capacity in 
western Kansas became more of a problem 
(1=strongly disagree to 9=strongly agree) 
7.06 
(2.13) 
Opinion M Response to other packers gained a psychological 
advantage from having one fewer packer in the 
region (1=strongly disagree to 9=strongly agree) 
7.22 
(2.13) 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
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Maple Leaf Model 
 Similar to the ConAgra study, two ordered logit models were used to measure 
managers’ perceptions about the market impacts from the Maple Leaf plant opening.  
This was done using their level of agreement to the following statements: F) the plant 
opening had NO noticeable effect on marketing or pricing hogs from my finishing barns 
(Opinion F), B) the addition of the Maple Leaf plant caused higher hog prices in the 
region (Opinion B).  Using Opinion F and Opinion B as dependent variables assisted in 
completing the objectives of the study.   
Using an ordered logit model, similar to equation 11, the probability of each level 
of agreement of each dependent variable was explained by a series of respondent’s 
finishing barn characteristics and perceptions.  The two ordered logit models for this 
study are 
(19) 
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KTMapleLeafMSizeDistanceOpinionF j
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(20) 
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+++++
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where Opinion F and Opinion B are as previously defined, αj is a set of 8 intercepts that 
are needed in an ordered logit model, e is an error term, and all others are defined in table 
14.  The distance, size, MapleLeafMKT, and CashMKT variables are continuous variables 
and calculated in the same manner as the ConAgra study.  The main difference in these 
variables from the ConAgra to Maple Leaf model is the year involved in the variables.  
Managers were asked the size of their operation in 2000.  They were asked for the 
percentage of hogs sold to Maple Leaf and on the cash market during the year after the 
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plant opening, 2000.  In the ConAgra study, the variables used were for the year prior to 
the plant opening.  The prior year was used for the ConAgra study because it is assumed 
that a manager’s market interaction and its corresponding impacts would be most 
prevalent in the year leading up to the closing.  With the Maple Leaf study, a manager’s 
involvement in the market would most likely influence their perceptions.   
 The impacts of the independent variables are expected to be similar to the 
ConAgra study.  The distance of a manager’s finishing barns from Brandon, would 
influence their perceived impacts.  Finishing barns that were close to opening plant might 
have more of an impact than producers on the fringes of the market.  It is expected that 
producers that are farther away from Brandon will be less likely to think that there was a 
market impact and prices were higher.   
 Size could also be important.  Smaller finishing barns might not have been able to 
adjust to the market changes.  The larger firms might be able to adjust their marketing or 
production to meet the standards so that they could sell their hogs to Maple Leaf.  Larger 
producers are expected to be more likely to think prices increased because of their ability 
to adjust to capture a greater margin.   
 The percentage of hogs that were sold to Maple Leaf during the year after the 
closing might determine how they felt about the market.  If managers wanted to sell hogs 
to Maple Leaf they would be required to meet their requirements, which might have 
affected manager’s perceptions.  Producers that sold more of their hogs to Maple Leaf are 
expected to more likely think there was a market impact and prices increased.   
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 The percentage of hogs sold on the cash market would impact a manager’s 
vulnerability to price changes.  Producers that sold more of their hogs on the cash market 
are expected to be more likely to think the market changed and prices increased.   
 A manager’s response to Opinion A, H, and K might affect they way they would 
respond to the dependent variables.  The expectations of the opinion variables are the 
same.  If a producer thinks that there were more buyers, less of a capacity problem, 
and/or the loss of a competitive advantage they are expected to also agree that there was a 
market impact and higher prices followed.   
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Table 14. Maple Leaf. Ordered Logit Model, Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variables Variable Definition Mean 
Opinion F Response to the plant opening had NO 
noticeable effect on marketing or pricing 
hogs from my finishing barns (1=strongly 
disagree to 9=strongly agree) 
5.01 
(3.11) 
Opinion B Response to the addition of the Maple Leaf 
Foods plant caused higher hog prices in the 
region (1=strongly disagree to 9=strongly 
agree) 
2.84 
(2.46) 
Independent 
Variables 
Variable Definition Mean 
Distance Number of kilometers their finishing barn(s) 
are located from Brandon, Manitoba 
126.00 
(55.15) 
Size Number of slaughter hogs marketed from 
their finishing barns in 2000 
2346.15 
(3117.10) 
MapleLeafMKT The % of hogs sold to Maple Leaf Foods in 
2000 
24.13 
(36.65) 
CashMKT The % of hogs sold on the cash market in 
2000 (includes live weight and dressed 
weight sales) 
32.38 
(41.53) 
Opinion A Response to the number of buyers regularly 
bidding for cash market hogs from my 
feedlot increased (1=strongly disagree to 
9=strongly agree) 
2.34 
(2.04) 
Opinion H Response to hog slaughter capacity in 
Manitoba became less of a problem 
(1=strongly disagree to 9=strongly agree) 
5.09 
(2.88) 
Opinion K Response to other packers lost their 
competitive advantage from having one 
additional plant in the region (1=strongly 
disagree to 9=strongly agree) 
5.50 
(2.69) 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
PRIMARY DATA RESULTS 
 
 
 This chapter presents the results from analyzing the primary data (survey data).  
First, the results of both surveys are discussed.  The distribution of the size, direction 
from the plant, and distance of the respondents are covered.  How the survey participants 
changed sales to packers and marketing methods after the plant events are shown.  Next, 
the responses to managers’ perceptions about the market impacts (question 5, in both 
surveys) are analyzed.  Finally, the results from the ordered logit model are discussed.  
These results may give a slightly different view of the market and should aid in 
understanding the impacts.   
 
ConAgra Survey Results 
 The response from feedlot managers to the ConAgra survey was better than 
expected.  As previously mentioned, 186 surveys were mailed to fed cattle producers 
throughout the Great Plains.  A total of 100 managers completed the survey.  This was a 
response rate of 53.8%, which is high considering the survey and participants.   
 A copy of the ConAgra survey with number of respondents to each question 
(typed in bold) can be found in Appendix II.  The first three questions dealt with the 
geographical location and size of the feedlots.  These three factors may influence the type 
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and intensity of impacts absorbed from the plant closing.  The respondents were diverse 
in their size and location.   
 
Distance, Direction, and Size 
 The manager’s feedlot distance from Garden City ranged from less than 50 miles 
to more than 200 miles.  Twenty-three of the respondents are within 50 miles of the plant.  
From the total respondents, twenty-eight are between 100 and 149 miles of Garden City, 
while thirteen of the participants are more than 200 miles away.  Manager’s direction 
from Garden City varied, but there is more concentration to the south.  There were fifty-
five respondents that are located southwest, south, or southeast of Garden City.  The 
majority are located southwest of the plant (31).  Fifteen of the feedlots are east, while 
twelve are located northwest of the plant.  The size of the feedlots also had a good 
distribution.  The sizes ranged from less than 5,000 to more than 100,000 head marketed 
in 2001.  Twenty-four of the participants market between 5,000 and 19,999 head, while 
twenty-five marketed between 20,000 and 49,999 head during that year.  The largest 
group of respondents (28) marketed between 50,000 and 99,999 head during 2001.  The 
remaining participants were in the two extreme categories.   
 An additional means to examine the distribution of survey respondents is to 
compare the size of marketing to distance or direction from Garden City.  Figure 5, 
shows the size of feedlots and their direction from Garden City.  Overall there is variation 
among sizes and directions.  However, it shows that more of the larger feedlots that 
participated are southwest to southeast of the plant.  Figure 6, compares the size of 
feedlots and their distance from Garden City.   
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NW 
Less than 5,000 3 
5,000-19,999 4 
20,000-49,999 5 
50,000-99,999 1 
N 
Less than 5,000 2 
5,000-19,999 1 
50,000-99,999 4 
100,00 or more 1 NE 
Less than 5,000 1 
5,000-19,999 3 
20,000-49,999 1 
50,000-99,999 2 
 
W 
Less than 5,000 1 
20,000-49,999 1 
100,00 or more 1 
 
E 
Less than 5,000 1 
5,000-19,999 5 
20,000-49,999 4 
50,000-99,999 3 
100,00 or more 2 
 
 SW 
5,000-19,999 6 
20,000-49,999 10 
50,000-99,999 7 
100,00 or more 8 
S 
5,000-19,999 3 
20,000-49,999 1 
50,000-99,999 6 
100,00 or more 3 
 
SE 
Less than 5,000 1 
5,000-19,999 2 
20,000-49,999 3 
50,000-99,999 5 
 
 
Figure 5. ConAgra. Size and Direction of Survey Participants 
Source: Microsoft MapPoint 
 
 
200 or more miles 
Less than 5,000 4 
5,000-19,999 4 
20,000-49,999 3 
50,000-99,999 1 
100,000 or more 1 
 100-149 miles 
Less than 5,000 1 
5,000-19,999 9 
20,000-49,999 5 
50,000-99,999 8 
100,000 or more 5 
 
Less than 50 miles 
Less than 5,000 2 
5,000-19,999 2 
20,000-49,999 6 
50,000-99,999 9 
100,000 or more 4 
 
50-99 miles 
Less than 5,000 1 
5,000-19,999 1 
20,000-49,999 5 
50,000-99,999 3 
100,000 or more 4 
 
150-199 miles 
Less than 5,000 1 
5,000-19,999 8 
20,000-49,999 6 
50,000-99,999 7 
100,000 or more 1 
 
Figure 6. ConAgra.  Size and Distance of Survey Participants 
Source: Microsoft MapPoint 
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Sales to Packers 
 Feedlot managers changed the percentage of cattle sold to each packer from 2000 
to 2001 (survey question 3).  During the year leading up to the plant closing3, thirty-eight 
respondents sold less than 20% of their cattle to ConAgra.  At the same time, ten 
managers sold more than 80% of their cattle to ConAgra.  As could be expected with the 
loss of a large plant, during 2001 ConAgra’s market share decreased.  In 2001, fifty-four 
feedlots sold less than 20%, while only six sold more than 80% of their fed cattle to 
ConAgra.  Overall, managers increased the percentage of their cattle sold to Excel 
(Cargill Meat Solutions).  In 2000, forty-nine feedlots marketed less than 40%, while 
twelve marketed more than 60% of their cattle to Excel.  At the end of 2001, forty-six 
feedlots marketed less than 40%, and sixteen marketed more than 60% to Excel.  IBP 
(Tyson Foods) experienced similar changes.  From 2000 to 2001, the number of feedlot 
managers that marketed less than 40% of their cattle to IBP fell from sixty-two to fifty-
four.  Over the same time period, the number of managers that sold more then 60% of 
their cattle to IBP increased from fourteen to nineteen.  The fourth largest packer, 
Farmland National Beef (U.S. Premium Beef), followed the path of Excel and IBP.  From 
2000 to 2001, the number of feedlots that sold less than 40% of their cattle to National 
Beef fell from forty-seven to forty-two.  The number of feedlots that sold more than 60% 
of their cattle increased from nineteen to twenty-one.   
 
 
 
                                               
3
 The Garden City/ConAgra plant caught fire at the end of the year, December 25, 2000. 
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Marketing Methods 
 The method feedlot managers used to market their cattle changed over the two 
years.  In 2000, nineteen managers sold less than 40% of their cattle on the cash market, 
while fifty-five sold more than 60% using this method.  At the end of the next year, 
twenty-eight sold less than 40% and forty-four sold more than 60% on the cash market.  
An alternative to selling cattle on the cash market is to use a contract, alliance, or 
marketing agreement.  The number of managers selling less than 40% of their cattle with 
some type of agreement was forty-two in 2000.  At the end of 2001, the 40% and fewer 
group included thirty-four feedlots.  The number of feedlots selling more than 60% of 
their cattle with an agreement went from thirty-three in 2000, to forty-four in 2001.  It 
appears that the majority of feedlot managers decreased the percentage of cattle sold on 
the cash market by the end of 2001.  This corresponds to an increase in the percentage of 
cattle sold with a contract, alliance, or marketing agreement by the end of 2001.   
 
Manager Perceptions 
 The fifth question asks producers a series of questions about the market impacts 
after the ConAgra plant burned.  They responded on a scale of 1 to 9 if they strongly 
disagree to strongly agree.  The number of responses at each level to each question is 
shown with histograms, figures 7 though 22.  The average response can be found (typed 
in bold) in the copy of the survey, Appendix I.  The level of agreement or disagreement 
varied between questions.  With some questions, producers on average are uncertain or 
have no opinion.  This discussion will focus on the questions that generated some level of 
disagreement or agreement and not on questions that producers are neutral on.   
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 The average response to the question if the plant closing influenced the number of 
bidders for an individual’s cattle (part A) is 4.95.  Graphing the responses, figure 7, 
shows an even split between both extremes, 23 responses for strongly disagree and 
strongly agree.  Closing the plant did not affect the number of cattle buyers at each 
feedlot in the same manner.  While the effect on the number of bidders varied, producers 
tend to believe the packers were not more interested in their cattle.  The average response 
for part F is 4.08, managers slightly disagree with the statement that packers became 
more interested in cattle, figure 12.   
 The number of bidders and packer interest may or may not influence competition 
and/or price.  However, a majority of producers felt that the event caused lower fed cattle 
price, figure 8.  The average response for part B was 6.18.  This is confirmed when 
managers were asked if the event had no noticeable impact on pricing or marketing (part 
O), figure 21.  Most tended to disagree with this statement, that had an average of 4.07.   
 Producers slightly disagreed that the event caused cattle from their feedlot to be 
shipped to a closer packer (part D), figure 10.  With an average of 4.63, producers are 
close to being split on this question.  A feedlot’s cattle may have been shipped to a packer 
farther away, but the capacity in the area became an issue.  Producers were asked if cattle 
slaughter capacity in western Kansas became more of a problem (part I), figure 15.  The 
average response was 7.06, with 38 people strongly agreeing with this statement.   
 It is perceived that the plant closing caused the other packers to have a 
psychological advantage in the market.  The average response from producers is 7.22 to 
part M, figure 19.  Over 80% of the participants agreed at some level to this question, 
with 40 producers strongly agreeing.  The results from this question are similar to 
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questions G and H.  The average response to part G is 6.17.  A greater number of 
producers agreed that the closing allowed the other packers to know which ones were in 
the cash market, figure 13.  The average response to part H is 6.36.  Producers tended to 
agree that fewer packers helped the remaining packers know the number of cattle 
committed to other packers.  These three questions show that producers believe that 
packers in the region experienced several benefits from the loss of the plant. 
 Producers also believed that the event increased the effects of captive supplies 
(part E), figure 11.  The average response is 6.19 to this question.  More managers agreed 
that the plant closing increased the effects of captive supplies. 
 The remaining questions (parts C, J, K, L, N, and P) had responses where the 
majority of producers were uncertain or had no opinion on the subject.  These are shown 
graphically in figures 9, 16, 17, 18, 20, and 22.  Overall, feedlot managers tended to think 
the plant closing decreased prices for fed cattle, caused slaughter capacity problems, and 
gave packers some sort of advantage in the market.  The correlations between questions 
are presented in table 29, Appendix II.   
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Figure 7. ConAgra A. The number of buyers regularly bidding for cash market 
cattle from my feedlot decreased. 
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Figure 8. ConAgra B. The loss of the ConAgra plant caused lower fed cattle prices 
in the region. 
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Figure 9. ConAgra C. Other packers were more interested in purchasing my cattle 
on a formula basis. 
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Figure 10. ConAgra D. Cattle from my feedlot were more frequently shipped to a 
closer packer. 
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Figure 11. ConAgra E. The effects from captive supplies increased. 
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Figure 12. ConAgra F. Other packers were more interested in contracting cattle 
from my feedlot. 
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Figure 13. ConAgra G. Fewer plants made it easier for packers to know which ones 
were in the cash market. 
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Figure 14. ConAgra H. Fewer plants made it easier for packers to know how many 
cattle were committed to each packer. 
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Figure 15. ConAgra I. Fed cattle slaughter capacity in western Kansas became more 
of a problem. 
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Figure 16. ConAgra J. Feedlots closer to Garden City were less affected than those 
farther away. 
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Figure 17. ConAgra K. Other packers were more interested in negotiating base 
prices on grids. 
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Figure 18. ConAgra L. Fewer plants increased the frequency of special agreements 
by packers with feedlots. 
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Figure 19. ConAgra M. Other packers gained a psychological advantage from 
having one fewer plant in the region. 
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Figure 20. ConAgra N. Feedlots having marketing agreements with ConAgra 
switched them to another packer. 
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Figure 21. ConAgra O. The plant closing had no noticeable effect on marketing or 
pricing fed cattle from my feedlot. 
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Figure 22. ConAgra P. Feedlots having marketing agreements with ConAgra 
dropped the agreement in favor of the cash market. 
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 The final question of the survey was an open-ended question asking managers 
what the most noticeable change was after the plant burned.  As could be expected with 
this type of question, the responses varied.  It would be difficult to report these answers.  
However, the most common response will be summarized.  A majority of those 
responding to this question felt the event decreased the aggressiveness of the ConAgra 
cattle buyers.  This along with the drop in slaughter capacity had a depressing effect on 
cattle prices.   
 
Maple Leaf Survey Results 
 The response to the Maple Leaf study was not as high as desired.  Part of this 
could be attributed to the lack of a second mailing.  A second mailing was done for the 
ConAgra study, but could not be completed for the Maple Leaf study due to the costs 
involved.  From the 273 surveys that were mailed to Canadian hog produces, only 80 
useable surveys were returned.  This is a response rate of 29.3%, which is comparable to 
other surveys conducted in the livestock industry.   
 A copy of the Maple Leaf survey with number of respondents to each question 
(typed in bold) can be found in Appendix II.  The first three questions dealt with the 
geographical location and size of the finishing barns.  These three factors may influence 
the type and intensity of impacts absorbed from the plant opening.   
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Distance, Direction, and Size 
 Managers within 400 km of Brandon were surveyed.  However, the maximum 
distances from Brandon of all the respondents were in the 240 to 319 km category (three 
hog producers).  No survey participant is located more than 320 km from Brandon.  
Thirteen respondents are less than 80 km, and the same number are between 160 and 239 
km of the plant.  The largest groups of participants in this question, fifty-one, are located 
between 80 and 159 km.  The distribution of hog producers is skewed towards barns 
closer to Brandon.  This may lead to slightly more biased results, but the variation is still 
enough to allow for analysis.   
 Finishing barn managers that choose to participate in the survey are located in all 
directions of Brandon.  The tendencies are for barns to be located from the south to the 
east.  The majority of survey participants (thirty-seven) are located southeast of Brandon.  
Six producers are located south of the plant, while seven are east of Brandon.  Some of 
the respondents are north of Brandon, with twelve northwest and eleven located 
northeast.  This distribution should also suffice for this study. 
 The size of the barns of managers participating tended to be smaller.  In 2000, 
fifty-six respondents said they marketed less than 1,999 hogs from their barns that year.  
Only seventeen said they marketed between 2,000 and 9,999 head during 2000.  The 
largest category, more than 10,000 head, accounted for five of the survey participants.  
The 80 producers that completed the survey tended to be smaller in size, closer to 
Brandon and located south to east of the plant.   
 A method to examine the distribution of survey respondents is to compare the size 
of marketing to distance or direction from Brandon.  Figure 23, shows the size of 
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finishing barns and their direction from Brandon.  Overall there is variation among sizes 
and directions.  However, it shows that more of the larger finishing barns that participated 
are northeast to southeast of the plant.  Figure 24, compares the size of finishing barns 
and their distance from Brandon.   
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NW 
Less than 500 5 
500-1,999 6 
2,000-4,999 0 
5,000-9,999 0 
10,00 or more 1 
N 
Less than 500 0 
500-1,999 3 
2,000-4,999 0 
5,000-9,999 0 
10,00 or more 0 
NE 
Less than 500 1 
500-1,999 7 
2,000-4,999 2 
5,000-9,999 0 
10,00 or more 1 
E 
Less than 500 1 
500-1,999 2 
2,000-4,999 2 
5,000-9,999 1 
10,00 or more 1 
 
SE 
Less than 500 10 
500-1,999 17 
2,000-4,999 7 
5,000-9,999 2 
10,00 or more 1 
S 
Less than 500 1 
500-1,999 1 
2,000-4,999 2 
5,000-9,999 0 
10,00 or more 1 
 
SW 
Less than 500 2 
500-1,999 0 
2,000-4,999 0 
5,000-9,999 0 
10,00 or more 0 
 
W 
Less than 500 1 
500-1,999 0 
2,000-4,999 0 
5,000-9,999 0 
10,00 or more 0 
 
 
Figure 23. Maple Leaf.  Size and Direction of Survey Participants 
Source: Microsoft MapPoint 
Less than 80 km 
Less than 500 6 
500-1,999 2 
2,000-4,999 3 
5,000-9,999 1 
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Figure 24. Maple Leaf.  Size and Distance of Survey Participants 
Source: Microsoft MapPoint 
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Sales to Packers 
 Maple Leaf opening a large plant influenced the percentage of hogs that producers 
sold to different packers.  The survey asked producers to indicate the percentage of hogs 
sold to four packers, other Canadian packers, or U.S. packers in 1999 and 2000 (question 
3).  During the year of the plant opening4 eight producers sold less than 40% and two sold 
more than 60% of their hogs to Maple Leaf.  In the next year, nine sold less than 40% and 
eighteen sold more than 60% to Maple Leaf.  Thus, the plant opening increased Maple 
Leaf’s market share in western Manitoba.  Schneider and Springhill Farms appeared to 
lose some of the market in 2000.  In 1999, thirty-nine producers sold more than 60% to 
Schneider and twenty sold more than 60% to Springhill Farms.  At the end of the next 
year this number had dropped to twenty-five producers for Schneider and nineteen 
producers for Springhill Farms.  Best Brand Meats (Forgan) and other Canadian packers 
only experienced slight changes over the two years.  The U.S. packers saw similar 
changes.  The number of producers that sold more than 60% of their hogs to U.S. packers 
went from four to five during the two years.  Overall, Maple Leaf saw an increase in the 
number and percentage of hogs going to their plant.  At this same time, Schneider and 
Springhill Farms saw fewer producers and a lower percentage of manager’s hogs after the 
event.   
 
Marketing Methods 
 After the plant opening there was little change in the marketing method used by 
hog producers.  Producers seemed to increase their use of contracts or marketing 
                                               
4
 The Brandon/Maple Leaf plant opened on August 30, 1999. 
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agreements compared to the cash or spot market.  Thirty-five producers said they 
marketed over 60% of their hogs on the cash market in 1999.  At the end of the next year, 
only twenty-eight said they marketed more than 60% on this market.  The number of 
managers marketing more than 60% of their hogs with a contract or marketing agreement 
went from thirty-nine to forty-seven.  From 1999 to 2000 producers seemed to decrease 
the percentage of hogs on the cash market, while increasing the percentage sold with 
some sort of agreement.   
 
Manager Perceptions 
 Similar to the ConAgra study, the fifth question of the Maple Leaf survey has 
several parts.  Participants were asked, on a scale from 1 to 9, if they disagree or agree 
with a statement.  If a producer was unsure or did not have an opinion they marked 5.  
The questions that had a majority of responses that centered around uncertain/no opinion 
will not be discussed.  The numbers of responses to each part are shown graphically in 
figures 25 through 37.  The average response can be found (typed in bold) in the copy of 
the survey, Appendix I.   
 Producers were asked if the plant opening caused higher prices in the region (part 
B).  The majority of respondents disagreed with this statement, with 39 strongly 
disagreeing with this statement, figure 26.  The average response to this question is 2.84.  
While producers believe that higher prices did not occur in the region, there is some 
discrepancy when asked if there were any changes to pricing and marketing of their hogs 
(part F).  The average response is neutral (5.01), but 19 producers strongly disagreed and 
18 producers strongly agreed, figure 30.  With the responses to these questions, the 
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majority of managers either believe that the event caused lower prices or there was no 
noticeable effect.   
 When asked if the plant opening caused more bidding on the cash market for hogs 
from their barns (part A), the average response was 2.34.  Producers overwhelming 
disagreed with this statement, with 51 strongly disagreeing, figure 25.  Managers also felt 
that other packers were not more interested in their hogs (part E), figure 29.  The average 
response to this question is 3.84.  Hog producers did not see an increase in the number of 
bidders and did not believe other packers became more interested in their hogs. 
 Producers were asked if their hogs were shipped to a closer packer in part C.  On 
average producers response was 3.95.  They tended to disagree with this statement, with 
21 strongly disagreeing, figure 27.  While the distance to a packer did not seem to 
decrease, producers are divided when asked about the effects on slaughter capacity (part 
H).  The average response was 5.09.  However, 15 strongly disagreed and 10 strongly 
agreed that slaughter capacity in Manitoba became less of a problem.  The plant opening 
did not decrease the distance to a packer, but the effects on slaughter capacity vary 
between producers. 
 When asked if other packers lost their competitive advantage from the 
introduction of the Maple Leaf plant (part K), the average response was 5.50.  The 
majority of producers agreed with this statement, figure 35.  Producers believed that the 
other packers lost their competitive advantage and did not believe that it became harder to 
know how many hogs were committed to each packer (part G).  Managers disagreed with 
this statement (figure 31), which had an average response of 4.00.   
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 Managers were also asked if the plant opening was a catalyst for hog producers to 
expand their operations (part J).  With an average of 5.31, there is a slight agreement with 
this statement.  However, 16 producers strongly disagreed and 12 strongly agreed, figure 
34.  There appears to be a division in producers if the plant opening caused expansion in 
hog operations.   
 The remaining questions (Figures 28, 33, 36, and 37) received responses where 
the majority of producers were uncertain or had no opinion.  Overall, producers think the 
Maple Leaf plant opening depressed hog prices, other packers may not have been more 
interested in their hogs, other packers lost their competitive advantage, and their hogs 
were not shipped to a closer packer.  The correlations between questions are presented in 
table 30, Appendix II.   
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Figure 25. Maple Leaf A. The number of buyers bidding for cash market hogs from 
my finishing barns increased.   
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Figure 26. Maple Leaf B. The addition of the Maple Leaf Foods plant caused higher 
hog prices in the region.   
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Figure 27. Maple Leaf C. Hogs from my finishing barns were more frequently 
shipped to a closer packer.   
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Figure 28. Maple Leaf D. The opening of the Maple Leaf Foods plant decreased the 
number of finished hogs shipped to the United States.   
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Figure 29. Maple Leaf E. Other packers were more interested in contracting hogs 
from my finishing barns. 
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Figure 30. Maple Leaf F. The plant opening had no noticeable effect on marketing 
or pricing hogs from my finishing barns.   
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Figure 31. Maple Leaf G. More plants made it more difficult for packers to know 
how many hogs were committed to each packer.   
 117 
15
7 7
1
14
3
9
14
10
0
5
10
15
20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Strongly Disagree                Uncertain/No Opinion                 Strongly Agree
N
um
be
r 
o
f R
e
sp
on
se
s
 
Figure 32. Maple Leaf H. Hog slaughter capacity in Manitoba became less of a 
problem.   
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Figure 33. Maple Leaf I. Finishing barns closer to Brandon were more affected than 
those farther away.   
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Figure 34. Maple Leaf J. Hog producers expanded their hog operations due to the 
opening of the Maple Leaf Foods plant in Brandon.   
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Figure 35. Maple Leaf K. Other packers lost their competitive advantage from 
having one additional plant in the region.   
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Figure 36. Maple Leaf L. Finishing barns having marketing agreements with 
another packer switched them to Maple Leaf Foods.   
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Figure 37. Maple Leaf M. Opening the Maple Leaf Foods plant reduced feeder pig 
exports to the United States. 
 119 
 The final question of the survey asked hog producers what was the most 
noticeable change to their operations after the plant opening.  With this type of open-
ended question, the responses varied widely.  Some producers have a strong resentment 
to Maple Leaf, while others were satisfied with the addition of a plant in western 
Manitoba.  The positive responses included producers that believed prices increased and 
the Manitoba hog industry became less dependent on the U.S. hog packing industry.   
 The negative responses were in regards to the rules and regulations instated on 
grids by Maple Leaf.  Some producers also felt that bidders became less aggressive.  The 
lack of aggressiveness in the market could be from the fact that Maple Leaf Foods owns 
Elite Swine and Landmark.  Elite Swine is the largest hog producer in Canada.  While the 
percentage of Elite Swine entering the Brandon plant is unknown, if the estimated yearly 
Elite Swine production of 1 million hogs were processed at Brandon, this would be about 
40% of its yearly slaughter.  Landmark contracts hogs with producers.  While Maple Leaf 
Foods does not own the Landmark hogs themselves, it is estimated that 50% of the hogs 
entering the plant are contracted through Landmark.  The combination of these factors 
might have caused producers to not see large price increases with the additional plant.   
 Surveying producers several years after the plant opening affects the results.  If 
producers were surveyed in 2000 and 2001, right after the plant opening, their 
perceptions might have been different.  Waiting several years allowed the more recent 
actions of Maple Leaf Foods to influence manager’s attitudes and perceptions of the 
company and their position in the porkpacking industry.   
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ConAgra Ordered Logit Results 
 Using the ordered logit model discussed in Chapter 5, the producers market 
perceptions were modeled with feedlot characteristics and manager’s opinions (equations 
17 and 18).  The results of these models are shown in tables 16 through 21.  Due to the 
structure, ordered logit models tend to have problems with multicollinearity.  Both 
models were tested and while some multicollinearity was found, it was not at levels 
requiring model adjustments.  The numbers of respondents to the control variables 
(distance, size, % sold to ConAgra, and % sold on the cash market) are presented in table 
15.   
 The impacts on the dependent variables from the addition and/or deletion of the 
four independent opinion variables (Opinion A, E, I, and M) are expressed in tables 16 
and 17.  Ordered logit models for each dependent variable were estimated in several 
ways: without any opinion variables, with each opinion separately, and with all the 
opinion variables.   
 Interpreting the parameter estimates shown in table 16 is difficult.  The parameter 
estimates do not have the same interpretation as linear regressions.  The estimates show 
the change in the natural log of the cumulative probabilities of the dependent variable.  
While value is difficult to interpret and may not be useful, the significance is relevant.  
The distance that a feedlot manager is from Garden City influences their opinion that the 
plant closing had no noticeable effect.  This was true with all the models.  The percentage 
of cattle sold to ConAgra, as well as the percentage of cattle sold on the cash market, 
during the year prior to the plant closing were significant in all models.  When the 
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independent opinion variables were used by themselves, they were significant in all 
cases.  However, when all four are used, A, I, and M were significant.   
The likelihood ratio can be used to measure the fit of the model.  Care must be 
taken when comparing these values.  Similar to a R2 value, adding independent variables 
will increase the likelihood ratio.  Thus comparison between likelihood ratios must be 
done between models with comparable independent variables.  With Opinion O as the 
dependent variable, the likelihood ratio is 39.2 with no additional independent variables 
(table 16).  Adding one of the opinion variables increases the ratio to the fifties.  Using all 
four opinion variables, the likelihood ratio is at the highest level of 72.28.   
The second model asked if the plant closing caused lower fed cattle prices in the 
region (Opinion B).  This model used the same independent variables.  It was estimated 
using none of the independent opinion variables, with each one separately, and all 
variables (table 17).  As with the other model, the parameter significance is more 
important than the sign.  The distance parameter is significant in all models, except when 
all the variables are in the model.  The Size and ConAgraMKT variables are not 
significant in any model.  The CashMKT parameter is only significant in the model with 
no opinion variables.  The opinion variables are significant in the models with just one of 
these variables.  When all of them are used in the model, only Opinion A, Opinion E, and 
Opinion I are significant.   
 The likelihood ratios with Opinion B are lower than the other model.  The ratio 
with no additional variables is 17.3.  These ratios increase when including one of the four 
opinion variables and ranges from 32 to 47.  These ratios are smaller than the ones 
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calculated in table 16.  The likelihood ratio when all the opinion variables are added is 
71.8, which is comparable to the other model.   
 The odds ratios for both models are presented in tables 18 and 19.  The models 
are arranged so that they predict the odds of being in a lower category.  The odds ratios 
show the odds of an individual being in a lower dependent variable category for each 1 
unit increase in the independent variable.  Most of the ratios are almost 1.  This would 
mean that the odds of being in a lower category do not change much with an increase in 
the independent variable.  The odds ratios for each of the models, with and without the 
opinion variables are in tables 18 and 19.  A few of the ratios when including all the 
opinion variables will be discussed.  For Opinion M, for every 1 unit increase in this 
variable, the odds of being in a lower category of Opinion O would increase the odds of 
being in a lower category by 1.22.  In the other model, for every 1 unit increase in 
Opinion M the odds of being in a lower category of Opinion B would increases 0.855.   
 The marginal probabilities of each independent variable were calculated using 
equation 16.  This value shows how the probability of a particular agreement level will 
change as the independent variable increases from its mean.  The mean values for each 
variable were used to calculated marginal probabilities (means can be found in tables 13 
and 14).  The marginal probabilities of the model with Opinion O as the dependent 
variable are presented in table 20.  In Opinion A, producers were asked if the number of 
buyers decreased.  The marginal probabilities are positive for this independent variable 
when the disagreement equals 1, 2, or 3.  The remaining marginal probabilities are 
negative.  This means as the level of agreement that number of buyers decreased, the 
probability that producers disagreed there was no impact (Opinion I) increased and the 
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probability that producers agreed there was no impact decreased.  This also is the case 
with the question regarding the effects of captive supplies increased (Opinion E).  As the 
level of agreement that captive supplies became more of a problem, the probability that 
producers disagreed that the closing had no impact increased and the probability that they 
agreed decreased.  Producers were questioned if slaughter capacity became more of a 
problem in Opinion I.  This variable had positive marginal probabilities over the lower 
ranges.  As the level of agreement with Opinion I increased the probability that producers 
disagreed that the closing had no impact increased and the probability that they agreed 
decreased.  The fourth opinion (Opinion M) question asked producers if they thought the 
closing gave the remaining packers a psychological advantage.  As the level of agreement 
that packers had an advantage increased, the probability that producers disagreed with 
Opinion O increased and the probability that they agreed decreased.   
 The marginal probabilities for the distance variable are negative with levels of 
disagreement and positive for levels of agreement to Opinion O.  This means as the 
distance of feedlots from Garden City increases, the level of disagreement that there was 
no impact decreases and the level of agreement of no impact increases.  Producers closer 
to Garden City were more likely to think that the plant closing did impact the market, 
than managers that were farther away.  The marginal probabilities for the size parameter 
are almost zero.  Thus, no interpretation can be made on the influence of size on the level 
of agreement to Opinion O.  If the percentage of cattle sold to ConAgra in 2000 increases 
from the mean the probability that producers disagreed that the plant closing had no 
impact increases and the probability of agreement decreases.  This means that producers 
that sold more cattle to ConAgra are more likely to think the closing affected the market.  
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This is also the case with the cash market variable.  If the percentage of cattle sold on the 
cash market increases, the probability that producers disagreed there was no impact 
increases and the probability that they agreed decreases.  This means that if producers 
sold more cattle on the cash market, they were more likely to think the closing impacted 
the market.   
 The marginal probabilities with Opinion B as the dependent variable are presented 
in table 21.  If a producer had a higher level of agreement with the statement that the 
number of buyers decreased, the probability that they disagreed that the prices dropped 
decreased and the probability that they agreed increased.  This means if they felt the 
number of buyers decreased, they would also tend to agree that prices decreased.  The 
same is the case with Opinion E, I, and M.  If producers’ level of agreement to those 
statements increases, the probability of disagreement that the price dropped decreases and 
the probability that they agreed increases.  With the distance variable, as the distance 
from Garden City increases, the probability that producers disagreed with Opinion B 
increased and the probability of agreement decreased.  Feedlots closer to Garden City felt 
the closure decreased prices more than feedlot managers who were farther away.  The 
Size, ConAgra, and Cash variables are almost zero and no interpretation can be made. 
 The ordered logit models developed for the ConAgra study show several 
important perceptions of cattle feeders.  Managers that felt the closure had a negative 
impact on various market factors, for example captive supplies and slaughter capacity, 
and they also thought the closure decreased prices.  Secondly, the farther a producer was 
from Garden City the less likely he/she was to agree that the closing affected the market 
and depressed prices.  Producers that sold more cattle to ConAgra were also more likely 
 125 
to agree that impacts occurred.  Finally, the more a producer relied on the cash market the 
more likely he/she was to think that negative impacts occurred.  These were expected 
because if a producer was selling a large percentage of cattle to ConAgra and/or on the 
cash market the more susceptible they would be to changes affecting a ConAgra plant.  
While these factors help to explain the levels of agreement of potential impacts, most 
feedlot managers felt that the closing did impact the fed cattle market and drove down 
prices.   
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Table 15. ConAgra. Number of Responses to Independent Control Variables 
Question Category Number of Responses 
Distance (miles) Less than 50 23 
 50 to 99 14 
 100 to 149 28 
 150 to 199 22 
 200 or more 13 
Size (head) Less than 5,000 8 
 5,000 to 19,999 24 
 20,000 to 49,999 25 
 50,000 to 99,999 28 
 100,000 or more 15 
ConAgraMKT 
% sold to ConAgra before 
Less than 20% 38 
 
20% to 39% 24 
 40% to 59% 8 
 60% to 79% 2 
 80% or more 10 
CashMKT 
% sold Cash Market before 
Less than 20% 9 
 20% to 39% 10 
 40% to 59% 10 
 60% to 79% 12 
 80% or more 43 
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Table 16. ConAgra Logit Independent Variables Results. Opinion O 
 Models with the addition of the following variables 
Independent Variable None A E I M A,E,I,M 
Distance -0.013** 
(0.003) 
-0.01** 
(0.003) 
-0.01** 
(0.003) 
-0.009** 
(0.003) 
-0.011** 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
Size 0.000004 
(0.000005) 
0.000006 
(0.000005) 
0.000004 
(0.000005) 
0.000005 
(0.000005) 
0.000004 
(0.000005) 
0.000006 
(0.000005) 
ConAgraMKT 
% sold to ConAgra before 
0.022** 
(0.008) 
0.024** 
(0.008) 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
CashMKT 
% sold Cash Market before 
0.02** 
(0.005) 
0.02** 
(0.006) 
0.0164** 
(0.006) 
0.018** 
(0.006) 
0.018** 
(0.006) 
0.016** 
(0.006) 
Opinion A 
--- 
0.269** 
(0.065) 
--- --- --- 
0.169** 
(0.068) 
Opinion E 
--- --- 
0.296** 
(0.076) 
--- --- 
0.128 
(0.086) 
Opinion I 
--- --- --- 
0.387** 
(0.098) 
--- 
0.206** 
(0.110) 
Opinion M 
--- --- --- --- 
0.353** 
(0.095) 
0.201** 
(0.101) 
Likelihood Ratio 39.20 57.23 52.84 55.00 53.72 72.28 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Significance levels are **=0.05, *=0.10. 
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Table 17. ConAgra Logit Independent Variables Results. Opinion B 
 Models with the addition of the following variables 
Independent Variable None A E I M A,E,I,M 
Distance 0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
Size -0.0000003 
(0.000005) 
-0.000002 
(0.000005) 
0.000002 
(0.000005) 
-0.0000005 
(0.000005) 
-0.00000001 
(0.000005) 
0.000001 
(0.000005) 
ConAgraMKT 
% sold to ConAgra before 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
0.0005 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
0.00002 
(0.007) 
CashMKT 
% sold  Cash Market before 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.0008 
(0.005) 
Opinion A 
--- 
-0.292** 
(0.065) 
--- --- --- 
-0.212** 
(0.068) 
Opinion E 
--- --- 
-0.461** 
(0.083) 
--- --- 
-0.310** 
(0.088) 
Opinion I 
--- --- --- 
-0.521** 
(0.104) 
--- 
-0.277** 
(0.113) 
Opinion M 
--- --- --- --- 
-0.356** 
(0.094) 
-0.156 
(0.101) 
Likelihood Ratio 17.32 38.46 46.99 45.25 32.36 71.82 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Significance levels are **=0.05, *=0.10. 
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Table 18. ConAgra Odds Ratio Estimates. O Dependent Variable 
 Models with the addition of the following variables 
Effect None A E I M A,E,I,M 
Distance 0.989 0.990 0.989 0.991 0.989 0.992 
Size 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ConAgraMKT 1.022 1.024 1.018 1.017 1.018 1.016 
CashMKT 1.020 1.020 1.017 1.018 1.018 1.016 
Opinion A --- 1.309 --- --- --- 1.185 
Opinion E --- --- 1.345 --- --- 1.136 
Opinion I --- --- --- 1.472 --- 1.228 
Opinion M --- --- --- --- 1.423 1.223 
 
Table 19. ConAgra Odds Ratio Estimates. B Dependent Variable 
 Models with the addition of the following variables 
Effect None A E I M A,E,I,M 
Distance 1.009 1.007 1.009 1.006 1.008 1.005 
Size 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ConAgraMKT 0.992 0.990 0.999 1.001 0.995 1.000 
CashMKT 0.991 0.992 0.998 0.995 0.994 0.999 
Opinion A --- 0.747 --- --- --- 0.809 
Opinion E --- --- 0.631 --- --- 0.733 
Opinion I --- --- --- 0.594 --- 0.758 
Opinion M --- --- --- --- 0.701 0.855 
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Table 20. ConAgra. Opinion O Results and Marginal Probabilities 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error P-Value 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
intercept 1 -6.6559 1.2218 0.0001          
intercept 2 -5.8127 1.1884 0.0001          
intercept 3 -5.0430 1.1580 0.0001          
intercept 4 -4.3607 1.1325 0.0001          
intercept 5 -3.7961 1.1127 0.0006          
intercept 6 -3.4507 1.1013 0.0017          
intercept 7 -2.7212 1.0800 0.0117          
intercept 8 -2.1052 1.0697 0.0491 Marginal Probabilities 
Opinion A 0.1694 0.0676 0.0122 0.0258 0.0127 0.0037 -0.0063 -0.0088 -0.0055 -0.0093 -0.0051 -0.0071 
Opinion E 0.1277 0.0862 0.1385 0.0194 0.0096 0.0028 -0.0047 -0.0067 -0.0041 -0.0070 -0.0039 -0.0054 
Opinion I 0.2055 0.1099 0.0615 0.0313 0.0154 0.0044 -0.0076 -0.0107 -0.0066 -0.0113 -0.0062 -0.0086 
Opinion M 0.2014 0.1013 0.0467 0.0306 0.0151 0.0043 -0.0075 -0.0105 -0.0065 -0.0111 -0.0061 -0.0084 
Distance -0.0081 0.0031 0.0100 -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 
Size 0.0000 0.0000 0.2243 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ConAgra 0.0156 0.0075 0.0383 0.0024 0.0012 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0007 
CashMKT 0.0159 0.0056 0.0047 0.0024 0.0012 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0007 
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Table 21. ConAgra. Opinion B and Marginal Probabilities 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error P-Value 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
intercept 1 1.9082 0.3783 0.0001          
intercept 2 2.4823 0.3814 0.0001          
intercept 3 2.8377 0.3852 0.0001          
intercept 4 2.9530 0.3866 0.0001          
intercept 5 4.8598 0.4170 0.0001          
intercept 6 5.5491 0.4256 0.0001          
intercept 7 6.5384 0.4380 0.0001          
intercept 8 7.1853 0.4456 0.0001 Marginal Probabilities 
Opinion A -0.2120 0.0239 0.0001 -0.0058 -0.0040 -0.0036 -0.0014 -0.0337 -0.0044 0.0128 0.0129 0.0272 
Opinion E -0.3104 0.0312 0.0001 -0.0084 -0.0059 -0.0053 -0.0020 -0.0494 -0.0064 0.0187 0.0190 0.0398 
Opinion I -0.2766 0.0400 0.0001 -0.0075 -0.0053 -0.0047 -0.0018 -0.0440 -0.0057 0.0167 0.0169 0.0355 
Opinion M -0.1562 0.0355 0.0001 -0.0042 -0.0030 -0.0027 -0.0010 -0.0249 -0.0032 0.0094 0.0095 0.0200 
Distance 0.0048 0.0011 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0008 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0006 
Size 0.0000 0.0000 0.4369 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ConAgra 0.0000 0.0026 0.9946 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
CashMKT -0.0008 0.0019 0.6713 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
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Maple Leaf Ordered Logit Results 
Using the ordered logit model discussed in Chapter 5, hog producers’ market 
perceptions were modeled with finishing barn characteristics and manager’s opinions 
(equations 19 and 20).  The results of these models are shown in tables 23 through 28.  
Due to the structure, ordered logit models tend to have problems with multicollinearity.  
Both models were tested and while some multicollinearity was found, it was not at levels 
requiring model adjustments.  The numbers of respondents to the control variables 
(distance, size, % sold to Maple Leaf, and % sold on the cash market) are presented in 
table 22.   
 The impacts on the dependent variables from the addition and/or deletion of the 
three independent opinion variables (Opinion A, H, and K) are expressed in tables 23 and 
24.  Ordered logit models for each dependent variable were estimated in several ways: 
without any opinion variables, with each opinion separately, and with all the opinion 
variables.   
 The first model asked producers if the addition of the Maple Leaf plant caused 
higher prices in the region, Opinion B.  The significance of the parameters from running 
the various models is shown in table 23.  As previously discussed, significance is the 
most important factor, while the parameter estimate is difficult to interpret.  The Distance 
parameter was important in all models.  The Size, MapleLeafMKT, and CashMKT 
parameters were not significant in any case.  When one of the opinion variables was 
added to the model, Opinion A and Opinion H were significant.  Finally, when all the 
parameters were added, only Distance, Opinion A, and Opinion H were important in the 
model.   
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 The likelihood ratios for this model were small.  This is expected because few of 
the parameters are significant.  The ratios range from 8 with no opinion variables to 38 
with all of the opinion variables.   
 The second model, Opinion F, asked producers if the opening had no noticeable 
impacts on the market.  The parameter estimates and significance are presented in table 
24.  The variables in this model did little to explain hog producers’ agreement or 
disagreement to Opinion F.  The Opinion K variable was significant when it was added to 
the model.  It was also the only significant parameter when all the opinion variables were 
added.  The likelihood ratios are the smallest in this model than any other.  The ratios 
range from 1.8 to 4.7.  When compared to the other models, they are the significantly 
smaller.  Thus, these variables do little to explain producers’ perceptions.   
 The odds ratios for these models are in tables 25 and 26.  Most of the ratios in this 
case are also close to 1.  Thus it is difficult to make interpretations of great significance.  
For example, when all the opinion variables are included in the Opinion F model, for 
every 1 unit increase in Opinion K the odds of being a lower category of the dependent 
variable are 1.149.   
 The marginal probabilities of each independent variable were calculated using 
equation 16.  This value shows how the probability of a particular agreement level will 
change as the independent variable increases from its mean.  The marginal probabilities 
of the model with Opinion B as the dependent variable are presented in table 27.  The 
marginal probabilities with Opinion B need to be interpreted carefully.  In most cases the 
marginal probability at a disagreement level of 1 have either a positive or negative sign, 
while the remaining levels possess the opposite sign.  This is of concern because a level 
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of 2 or 3 can still be considered disagreement.  One would expect the sign to change at 
some level of uncertainty.  A possible explanation in this case could be the limited 
number of survey participants and the fact that producers’ responses may be influenced 
by events occurring several years after the opening.   
In Opinion A, producers were asked if the number of buyers increased.  The 
marginal probability for this variable is negative for a disagreement level of 1 and 
positive in the other levels.  As more producers agree that the number of buyers in the 
market increased, the probability that they disagreed that prices were higher would 
decrease and the probability that they would agree would increase.  This would mean that 
if a producer agreed that the number of buyers increased, they would also tend to agree 
that prices increased.  Whether or not slaughter capacity in Manitoba became less of a 
problem was the focus of Opinion H.  The marginal probabilities show that if a 
producer’s level of agreement with Opinion H increased, their level of disagreement 
would decrease and their level of agreement to higher prices would increase.  If 
producers agreed that slaughter capacity was less of a problem, they would be more 
likely to agree that the opening caused higher prices.  If packers lost their competitive 
advantage from the addition of the Maple Leaf plant was asked in Opinion K.  These 
probabilities show that as the level of agreement to Opinion K increased, the probability 
that producers would disagree to higher prices would increase while the probability of 
agreement would decrease.  As producers tend to agree that other packers lost their 
advantage they are more likely think that the market did not have higher prices.   
 The marginal probabilities of the distance variables show that as the distance from 
Brandon increased, the probability that producers would disagree that prices were higher 
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decreased and the probability that producers would agree increased.  Producers closer to 
Brandon would tend to disagree that prices were higher, while those farther away would 
think prices were higher.  The marginal probabilities of the Size variables are almost zero 
and no interpretation can be made.  The remaining marginal probabilities demonstrate 
that as producers sold more hogs to Maple Leaf and on the cash market during the year 
after the opening, the probability that they would disagree that prices were higher would 
increase and the probability of agreement would decreases.  Producers that sold a larger 
percentage of hogs to Maple Leaf and on the cash market tend to think the opening did 
not cause higher prices.  This is not the expected result.  It was expected that as producers 
sold more hogs to Maple Leaf, they would think there were higher prices in the region.   
 The second model asked if the opening had no noticeable effect on prices or 
marketing.  The Opinion A and Opinion K had positive marginal probabilities over levels 
of disagreement and negative values in levels of agreement (table 28).  This would mean 
that as level of agreement that there were more buyers and that the other packers lost their 
advantage increased, the probability that producers would disagree to no noticeable effect 
would increase and the probability of agreement would decrease.  Thus, producers that 
thought that more buyers were in the market and that packers lost their competitive 
advantage would be more likely to think that prices were not higher.  Producers that 
agreed that slaughter capacity became less of a problem would be more likely to agree 
that there was no noticeable effect from the plant opening.   
 The marginal probabilities for the Distance parameter show that as distance from 
Brandon increases, the probability of disagreement increases and the probability of 
agreement decreases.  This would mean that producers that were farther away from the 
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plant would tend to think that there was a noticeable effect on the market.  Producers that 
sold a large percentage of hogs to Maple Leaf would be more likely to think that there 
was no noticeable effect on marketing or pricing of hogs.  Producers who sold a large 
percentage on the cash market would me more likely to think there was a noticeable 
effect on marketing and pricing.   
 The results from the two models show some conflicting conclusions.  This can be 
partly attributed to the low likelihood ratios and lack of significant variables.  Producers 
that responded to this survey may not have considered the market impacts that occurred 
in the months immediately after the opening.  In the years after the opening Maple Leaf 
acquired several other packers in the market.  This may explain some of the negative 
attitudes towards the company and why some producers felt the market experienced 
depressed prices.  Most hog producers, responding to this survey, thought Maple Leaf’s 
entering the porkpacking market had impacts on the market and pricing of hogs.  They 
also tended to think that after the opening prices decreased, instead of price increase as 
was expected.   
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Table 22. Maple Leaf. Number of Responses to Independent Control Variables 
Question Category Number of Responses 
Distance (kilometers) Less than 80 13 
 80 to 159 51 
 160 to 239 13 
 240 to 319 3 
 320 to 399 0 
 400 or more 0 
Size (head) Less than 500 21 
 500 to 1,999 35 
 2,000 to 4,999 14 
 5,000 to 9,999 3 
 10,000 or more 5 
MapleLeafMKT 
% sold to Maple Leaf after 
Less than 20% 6 
 
20% to 39% 3 
 40% to 59% 4 
 60% to 79% 2 
 80% or more 16 
CashMKT 
% sold Cash Market after 
Less than 20% 2 
 20% to 39% 1 
 40% to 59% 2 
 60% to 79% 4 
 80% or more 24 
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Table 23. Maple Leaf Logit Model Independent Variables Results. Opinion B 
 Models with the addition of the following variables 
Independent Variable None A H K A, H, K 
Distance -0.0084* 
(0.004) 
-0.0074* 
(0.004) 
-0.0078* 
(0.004) 
-0.0084* 
(0.004) 
-0.0075* 
(0.005) 
Size -0.0001 
(0.00007) 
-0.00004 
(0.00007) 
-0.0001 
(0.00007) 
-0.0001 
(0.00007) 
-0.00005 
(0.00007) 
MapleLeafMKT 
% sold to Maple Leaf after 
-0.0016 
(0.006) 
-0.0035 
(0.006) 
0.0057 
(0.007) 
-0.0017 
(0.006) 
0.0028 
(0.007) 
CashMKT 
% sold Cash Market after 
0.0032 
(0.005) 
0.0052 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.0032 
(0.005) 
0.0036 
(0.006) 
Opinion A 
--- 
-0.4537** 
(0.114) 
--- --- 
-0.413** 
(0.118) 
Opinion H 
--- --- 
-0.335** 
(0.091) 
--- 
-0.319** 
(0.095) 
Opinion K 
--- --- --- 
0.012 
(0.084) 
0.099 
(0.095) 
Likelihood Ratio 8.40 25.57 23.24 8.4163 37.94 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Significance levels are **=0.05, *=0.10. 
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Table 24. Maple Leaf Logit Model Independent Variables Results. Opinion F 
 Models with the addition of the following variables 
Independent Variable None A H K A, H, K 
Distance 0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.0009 
(0.004) 
0.0009 
(0.004) 
Size 0.00007 
(0.00007) 
0.00006 
(0.00007) 
0.00007 
(0.00007) 
0.00007 
(0.00007) 
0.00007 
(0.00007) 
MapleLeafMKT 
% sold to Maple Leaf after 
-0.022 
(0.006) 
-0.021 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
CashMKT 
% sold Cash Market after 
0.0034 
(0.005) 
0.0033 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.0036 
(0.005) 
Opinion A 
--- 
0.021 
(0.101) 
--- --- 
0.006 
(0.104) 
Opinion H 
--- --- 
0.025 
(0.074) 
--- 
-0.004 
(0.076) 
Opinion K 
--- --- --- 
0.139* 
(0.080) 
0.139* 
(0.081) 
Likelihood Ratio 1.88 1.93 1.98 4.70 4.70 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Significance levels are **=0.05, *=0.10. 
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Table 25 Maple Leaf Odds Ratio Estimates. B Dependent Variable 
 Models with the addition of the following variables 
Effect None A H K A, H, K 
Distance 0.992 0.993 0.992 0.992 0.993 
Size 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MapleLeafMKT 0.998 0.997 1.006 0.998 1.003 
CashMKTr 1.003 1.005 1.001 1.003 1.004 
Opinion A --- 0.635 --- --- 0.662 
Opinion H --- --- 0.715 --- 0.727 
Opinion K --- --- --- 1.012 1.104 
 
 
Table 26 Maple Leaf Odds Ratio Estimates. F Dependent Variable 
 Models with the addition of the following variables 
Effect None A H K A, H, K 
Distance 1.002 1.002 1.002 1.001 1.001 
Size 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
MapleLeafMKT 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.996 0.996 
CashMKTr 1.003 1.003 1.004 1.004 1.004 
Opinion A --- 1.021 --- --- 1.006 
Opinion H --- --- 1.025 --- 0.996 
Opinion K --- --- --- 1.149 1.149 
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Table 27. Maple Leaf. Opinion B Results and Marginal Probabilities 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
P-
Value 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
intercept 1 2.8582 0.8854 0.0012          
intercept 2 3.8888 0.9410 0.0001          
intercept 3 4.4450 0.9751 0.0001          
intercept 4 4.5490 0.9816 0.0001          
intercept 5 4.9991 1.0104 0.0001          
intercept 6 5.5128 1.0446 0.0001          
intercept 7 6.6744 1.1397 0.0001          
intercept 8 8.3506 1.4630 0.0001 Marginal Probabilities 
Opinion A -0.4130 0.1176 0.0004 -0.1031 0.0207 0.0217 0.0040 0.0158 0.0141 0.0175 0.0075 0.0018 
Opinion H -0.3188 0.0949 0.0008 -0.0796 0.0160 0.0168 0.0031 0.0122 0.0109 0.0135 0.0058 0.0014 
Opinion K 0.0993 0.0946 0.2941 0.0248 -0.0050 -0.0052 -0.0010 -0.0038 -0.0034 -0.0042 -0.0018 -0.0004 
Distance -0.0075 0.0045 0.0969 -0.0019 0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 
Size -0.0001 0.0001 0.4969 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maple Leaf 0.0028 0.0069 0.6820 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 
CashMKT 0.0036 0.0058 0.5355 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0000 
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Table 28. Maple Leaf. Opinion F Results and Marginal Probabilities 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Std. 
Error 
P-
Value 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
intercept 1 -2.3311 0.7540 0.0020          
intercept 2 -2.1220 0.7465 0.0045          
intercept 3 -1.6400 0.7321 0.0251          
intercept 4 -1.4225 0.7266 0.0503          
intercept 5 -0.7807 0.7141 0.2742          
intercept 6 -0.6095 0.7120 0.3919          
intercept 7 -0.4914 0.7109 0.4894          
intercept 8 0.1718 0.7115 0.8092 Marginal Probabilities 
Opinion A 0.0059 0.1041 0.9552 0.0010 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0010 
Opinion H -0.0037 0.0756 0.9611 -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0006 
Opinion K 0.1389 0.0809 0.0858 0.0238 0.0028 0.0054 0.0016 0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0078 -0.0243 
Distance 0.0009 0.0040 0.8210 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 
Size 0.0001 0.0001 0.3187 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
Maple Leaf -0.0040 0.0061 0.5083 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0007 
CashMKT 0.0036 0.0051 0.4788 0.0006 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0006 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This chapter presents a summary and conclusions from studying the ConAgra 
plant closing and the Maple Leaf Foods plant opening.  This study occurred during a 
period of high concentration and consolidation in the meatpacking industry.  The 4 firm 
concentration ratio is at historically high levels.  With this, the remaining firms are 
combining or closing their doors.  The closure of the ConAgra plant increased the already 
high levels of concentration.  The Maple Leaf Foods plant opening helped relieve some 
of the present concentration.  These issues have caused some concern related to market 
efficiency and price transparency.  Producers in the U.S. and Canada have been more 
dependent on each other.  Livestock trade between the two countries has become more 
prevalent, making the meatpacking industry influential to all producers.  Given these 
concerns, this research found what happens to livestock markets when plants open or 
close.  Specifically, what happens to the fed cattle market when a ConAgra plant closed 
and to the hog market when a Maple Leaf plant opened?  The amount of price change 
was measured and the duration of the effects were calculated.   
 This chapter is divided into three sections.  First, the ConAgra study results are 
discussed.  The market impacts in Kansas and surrounding states are summarized.  
Conclusions concerning the objectives of the study are reached.  The second section 
concerns the Maple Leaf Foods plant opening.  Hog market impacts in Manitoba and 
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surrounding areas are discussed.  The objectives of this study are discussed.  Finally, a 
summary of the both plant event cases and the potential concerns for the future of the 
livestock and meat industries are presented.   
 
ConAgra Study 
 The ConAgra plant in Garden City burned at the end of December 2000.  The 
specific market impacts were analyzed using price differences, partial adjustment, and 
ordered logit models.  The price differences and partial adjustment models were not only 
analyzed for the Kansas fed cattle market, but for the markets in surrounding states.  
While the impacts are not perfectly consistent across every state market, the results do 
show a drop in prices from the loss of the packer.  However, this drop only occurred for a 
short time.   
 The developed price differences model was similar to one used by Hayenga, 
Deiter, and Montoya.  The mean price differences in the 55 weeks prior to and the 55 
weeks after the closing changed.  The difference between the Kansas market and 
Nebraska, Colorado, and Iowa markets decreased.  With the case of the Kansas versus 
Nebraska or Iowa the difference became negative.  This would mean that the Nebraska 
price (which is the same price used in the Iowa model) was larger than the Kansas price 
during the 55 weeks after the closing.  The average slaughter difference between Kansas 
and the other states decreased between the two periods.  This is expected with the loss of 
a large plant in Kansas.  The average weekly slaughter, in Kansas, decreased in the period 
after the closure.  This would make the slaughter difference decrease.   
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 The price differences model produced some interesting results.  The model 
included a dummy variable for the weeks after the closing.  The parameter estimate 
indicates how much the price difference changes in the 55 weeks after.  For the Colorado 
model, the value was $-0.19, but was not significant.  For the Nebraska and Iowa model, 
the price difference decreased $-0.37 and $-0.49 respectively.  Price differences between 
Kansas and Texas increased $0.30 during the 55 weeks after the closing.   
 The model also included a set of 6 two week variables for the weeks after the 
closing.  Week 1 and 2 estimate was significant and positive for the Texas model.  This 
would mean that the price difference increased during those two weeks.  The Nebraska 
model had one significant variable for weeks 5 and 6, which had a positive value.  With 
only two significant variables, this model failed to determine the length of the market 
effects.  It was expected, that after the closure, price would at first decrease and then 
gradually return to previous levels.   
 A partial adjustment model was also used to determine if price impacts occurred, 
and if so, the duration of such impacts.  The Kansas, Nebraska, Texas, Colorado, and 
Iowa/Minnesota markets were analyzed using this model.  This model used fed steer 
prices, from the mentioned markets, as the dependent variables.  In all the markets, the 
mean price for fed steers increased $2 to $3 from the first 55 weeks to the 55 weeks after 
the closing.  The mean weekly slaughter in Kansas, Colorado, and Texas, decreased over 
the two periods. While the mean Nebraska slaughter remained constant and the 
Iowa/Minnesota slaughter saw a slight increase between the two 55 week periods.  The 
mean reported value of boxed beef increased about $6 in the weeks after the closing.  
Reported byproduct value also increased $0.5.  At the same time, the mean weight of 
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slaughter cattle decreased 8 lbs in the 55 weeks after the closing.  This is an expected 
pattern with increases in prices.  If the reported value of boxed beef and byproducts are 
increasing with decreasing slaughter, prices paid for fed cattle should increase and 
weights should drop.   
 The boxed beef value has a significant impact on fed steer prices in all markets.  
For every $1 increase in boxed beef, fed steers prices increased from $0.13 to $0.31.  
Byproduct values also influenced fed steer prices in all markets, except Kansas.  The 
plant closing variable in this case was only significant in the Texas market, with a value 
of $-0.92.  This value conflicts with the value found in the price difference model, which 
had a positive value.   
 The advantage of a partial adjustment model is it can be used to determine how 
long it took prices to return to previously comparable levels.  In this study, the number of 
weeks it took for 95% of the effects to elapse was calculated.  Unfortunately, an estimate 
of the duration in the Kansas market cannot be calculated.  The lag price estimate was 
negative, which makes the market duration -28 weeks.  Reasoning for this could not be 
found.  The duration of the impacts in the Texas, Colorado, Nebraska, and 
Iowa/Minnesota markets was 3.7 to 5.9 weeks.   
 Surveying feedlot managers in areas surrounding Garden City helped to confirm 
the results of the secondary data analysis.  Most producers did think the closing affected 
the market and depressed prices.  Most also felt that the other packers in the market had a 
psychological advantage, slaughter capacity become more of a problem, and the effects 
from captive supplies increased.   
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 Modeling the survey data using an ordered logit model showed some correlations.  
Producers that felt that the effect of captive supplies increased and/or slaughter capacity 
became more of a problem were more likely to think that prices dropped.  It was 
determined that the farther a producer was from Garden City , the less likely he/she 
would be to think that there was a market effect and prices decreased.  This is important 
to the spatial aspects of the market.  Producers closer to Garden City perceived more 
damage to the market than those on the outer fringes.  The farther out managers are, the 
more likely that other packers in different markets could compete for their cattle.  
Producers that sold more of their cattle to ConAgra and/or on the cash market were more 
likely to think prices decreased.  Managers in these situations would be more vulnerable 
to the sudden market change.  Producers selling to the Garden City plant would have to 
ship their cattle elsewhere or find an alternative packer.  The loss of the large plant made 
it more difficult to process all the fed cattle.  Producers selling a large percentage on the 
cash market would be more susceptible to any price swings that occurred from the plant 
closing.   
 Did the ConAgra plant closing influence the market and prices?  If so, how long 
did these effects last?  The simple answers to these questions are yes and only a few 
weeks.  Prices did decrease if you compare the Kansas market to Nebraska, Colorado, 
and Iowa/Minnesota.  The duration of these effects were only a few weeks.  The duration 
on the Kansas market cannot be directly determined.  Surveying producers concluded that 
prices decreased and the market adjusted.   
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Maple Leaf Study 
 The Maple Leaf Foods plant in Brandon, Manitoba opened at the end of August 
1999.  The impacts to the hog markets in Canada and the northern United States were 
analyzed using price differences, partial adjustment, and ordered logit models.  Impacts 
from the opening seem to be more consistent across markets than the ConAgra study.  
The results show that after the plant opening slaughter hog prices did increase.  The 
duration of these impacts were short lived.  However, the market appears to take a little 
longer to adjust than in the beefpacking case.   
 The price differences model was conducted, comparing the Manitoba market to 
three Canadian and three U.S. markets.  The mean price differences increased from $3 to 
$10 in all the models, between the two periods.  The Manitoba versus Ontario average 
price difference was negative in the 55 weeks prior to the opening, and in the second 55 
weeks the price difference became positive.  This means that prior to the plant opening; 
the average Ontario price was greater than the Manitoba price.  After the opening the 
average Manitoba price was larger.  The slaughter differences between the two periods 
increased from 10 to 40 thousand head between the periods, in all models.  This would 
mean the average weekly slaughter in Manitoba was larger in the second period, when 
compared to the first.  An increase in the slaughter difference would be expected with the 
opening of a large plant in Manitoba.   
 The results of the model are consistent across different regions.  The plant 
opening parameter estimate, intended to capture changes in prices, ranged from $4 to 
$10.  This parameter was significant in all models, except the Manitoba versus 
Saskatchewan model.  The parameter shows that the price difference increased in the 
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period after the opening.  The two week dummy variables were significant in some cases.  
The parameters for weeks 1-2, 5-6, and 9-10 were significant and negative in Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, Sioux Falls, and Iowa markets.  The negative sign would indicate that 
after the initial price difference increase, it was slowly decreasing to previous levels.   
 Partial adjustment models were used to determine if price changes occurred and 
their duration.  The average prices for hogs increased about $30 to $50 between the two 
periods.  All of this increase cannot be directly attributed to the plant opening.  Part of the 
increase is due to the hog market climbing out of record low prices in late 1998.  Average 
slaughter in Manitoba and Ontario increased.  The increase in Manitoba was expected 
with the plant opening.  Average slaughter decreased in the other markets between the 
two periods.  The reported cutout value increased about $40 between the two periods.  
Again, some of this could be attributed to the market recovery from 1998.  The average 
weight only increased 1 kg between the two periods.  The average byproduct value saw a 
slight increase over the two periods, $1.  With cutout prices increasing, it would be 
expected that the hog prices would increase.  The increase in weight is not the normal 
expectation.  However, it is possible that producers were purposely holding hogs to 
higher weights.  In the case of a rising market, this would allow them to sell more weight 
for higher prices.   
 The results of the partial adjustment model point out some interesting trends.  The 
parameter estimate for the cutout value is significant in all models.  For every $1 increase 
in the cutout value, the hog price increased from $0.20 to $0.80.  No apparent pattern 
could be found with the weight, slaughter, and byproduct variables.  The plant opening 
variable was significant in all models except the Ontario model.  Hog prices in Manitoba 
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increased $11.30 after the opening.  The price in Alberta and Saskatchewan increased $5 
and $7 respectively, in the 55 weeks after the opening.  The hog prices in the three U.S. 
markets increased from $6 to $8 during the year after the opening.   
 The advantage of the partial adjustment model is its ability to estimate the 
duration of market impacts.  Similar to the other model, an estimate was calculated for 
the number of weeks it took for 95% of the effects to elapse.  This would mean that only 
5% of the impacts are left in the market at the calculated week.  The duration in the 
Manitoba market only lasted 3 weeks.  Effects in Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta 
lasted only 5 or 6 weeks.  The effects on the Iowa and Sioux Falls markets were 11 and 
24 weeks, respectively.  The calculation of the market impacts on the St. Paul market was 
59 weeks.  This is a longer time period than other studies.  There does not appear to be 
any apparent reasoning for this market to have the greatest length of impacts.   
 Surveying producers around Brandon created some conflicting viewpoints of the 
impacts from the plant opening.  The majority of producers think that the plant opening 
did not increase the number of buyers in the market.  They also think the opening did not 
cause higher prices for their hogs.  However, they seem to be split when asked if the plant 
opening had no noticeable effect on marketing or pricing.   
 The survey data were analyzed using an ordered logit model.  This allows for the 
comparison of producers’ agreement or disagreement to several different questions.  
Producers that think the number of buyers in the market increased would tend to think 
that prices increased.  Producers that tended to think that slaughter capacity in Manitoba 
became less of a problem would be more likely to think prices increased.  The survey 
participants that felt that the other packers lost their competitive advantage due to the 
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opening would tend to think hog prices dropped.  The distance producers were from 
Brandon influenced how they felt about the market impacts.  Producers that were farther 
away from Brandon were more likely to think prices increased and there was more of a 
noticeable market effect.  Participants that sold more of their hogs to Maple Leaf were 
more likely to think prices did not increase.  This was not the expected result.  If the 
addition of the Maple Leaf plant did increase the aggressiveness of bidding, producers 
selling to them should see price increase. Also, producers that had more hogs in the cash 
market would be in a better position to capture any sudden price increase.  This may be 
caused from the negative view of Maple Leaf’s acquisitions of several hog plants a 
couple of years after their opening.   
 Did the Maple Leaf plant opening influence the market and prices?  If so, how 
long did these effects last?  The simple answers to these questions are yes and only a few 
weeks.  Prices did increase in all the Canadian and U.S. markets studied.  However, part 
of this increase has to be attributed to the market recovery.  The duration of these impacts 
lasted only a few weeks.  The primary data collected from the survey presented a slightly 
different picture.  Producers felt the Maple Leaf plant opening did not increase 
competition and prices.  These beliefs may be the result of the timing of the survey.  
Conducting the survey several years after the opening might have caused different results 
than if conducted closer to the plant opening date.   
 
Conclusions 
 While the opening and closing had impacts on the market, the state of excess 
capacity in the markets influenced the outcome.  The closing of the ConAgra plant 
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affected the market demand for fed cattle.  The decrease in market demand did decrease 
fed cattle prices in the region.  However, the excess capacity, that was present at the time, 
helped to lessen such impacts.  The excess capacity allowed the remaining packers to 
process additional cattle.  The Maple Leaf plant opening also had an affect on the market.  
The lack of excess capacity in both the U.S. and Canadian pork processor, allowed the 
new plant to relieve some of the pressure on the market.   
 The spatial aspects of the slaughter hog and fed cattle market played a role in the 
impacts.  While the specific impacts to the Kansas market could not be determined, there 
were impacts on the price differences.  The closing did influence the markets in 
Colorado, Texas, Nebraska, and Iowa.  The opening did increase prices in Manitoba and 
the surrounding markets.  In this case, it appears that more of the impacts occurred in 
Manitoba and the closer markets.  The farther a market was from Brandon, the less 
apparent were the impacts.  The spatial aspect was also confirmed by surveying 
producers.  The ConAgra case showed that most producers felt that the farther they were 
from the plant the less likely they would be to experience a price decrease.  Producers in 
the Maple Leaf study thought the farther managers were from Brandon the more likely 
they would experience a price increase.   
 In the weeks following the ConAgra plant closing, fed cattle prices did decrease.  
The primary data collected from the surveys also demonstrated this point.  According to 
the secondary data analysis after the Maple Leaf Foods plant opened, slaughter hog prices 
increased.  However, the primary data showed that producers felt prices did not increase.  
Maple Leaf’s acquired Schneider’s processing plants a few years after the opening.  
Maple Leaf also had has a portion of the hogs they need contracted through companies 
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they own.  Producers’ beliefs may be influenced by these issues, and not a reflection of 
the market conditions in 1999 and 2000.   
 With the current levels of concentration and consolidation, the opening and 
closing of plants is a concern to some.  When the large plants opened and closed the 
market did react.  This reaction consisted of lower prices in the ConAgra case, thus a 
reason for concern, and higher prices in the Maple Leaf case.  However, these situations 
were short-lived.  The current fed cattle and slaughter hog market had sufficient levels of 
price transparency to adjust prices back to previous levels in a matter of weeks.   
 The ConAgra plant has helped to show that part of the reason for high levels of 
concentration is related to efficiency.  The Maple Leaf plant has shown that in the right 
situation, there is room for expansion in slaughter industry.  Policy makers and market 
participants should realize that while the industry is oligopsonistic in nature, the market 
reacted as expected in the case of these two plant events.  The lack of long-term price 
impacts on both markets from the opening and closing of large plants demonstrates that 
the market was able to adjust.   
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Average Monthly, FOB Live, 1100-1300 lb, 35-65% Choice, 
Fed Steer Prices, 12/11/99-1/12/02
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Figure 38. Average Monthly Fed Cattle Prices 
 
Average Monthly Slaughter Barrow and Gilt Prices, 
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Figure 39. Average Monthly Barrow and Gilt Prices 
*US prices are in live weight, Canadian prices are dressed 
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Figure 40. Kansas-Colorado Price Difference 
Kansas-Colorado, FI, Fed Steer and Heifer Slaughter Difference 
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Figure 41. Kansas-Colorado Slaughter Difference 
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Kansas-Nebraska, 1100-1300 lb, 35-65% Choice, Fed Steer Price Difference
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Figure 42. Kansas-Nebraska Price Difference 
Kansas-Nebraska, FI, Fed Steer and Heifer Slaughter Difference 
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Figure 43. Kansas-Nebraska Slaughter Difference 
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Kansas-Texas, 1100-1300 lb, 35-65% Choice, Fed Steer Price Difference 
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Figure 44. Kansas-Texas Price Difference 
Kansas-Texas, FI, Fed Steer and Heifer Slaughter Difference 
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Figure 45. Kansas-Texas Slaughter Difference 
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Kansas-IA/MN, FI, Fed Steer and Heifer Slaughter Difference 
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Figure 46. Kansas-IA/MN Slaughter Difference 
Boxed Beef Average Price, 600-700 lb Carcasses
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Figure 47. Average Boxed Beef Price 
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Average Steer Byproduct Price
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Figure 48. Average Steer ByProduct Price 
Average Weight, 35-65% Choice Steers 
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Figure 49. Average Steer Weight 
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Manitoba-Alberta, Barrow and Gilt Price Difference 
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Figure 50. Manitoba-Alberta Price Difference 
Manitoba-Alberta, FI Barrow and Gilt Slaughter Difference 
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Figure 51. Manitoba-Alberta Slaughter Difference 
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Manitoba-Saskatchewan, Barrow and Gilt Price Difference 
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Figure 52. Manitoba-Saskatchewan Price Difference 
Manitoba-Saskatchewan, FI Barrow and Gilt Slaughter Difference 
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Figure 53. Manitoba-Saskatchewan Slaughter Difference 
 167 
Manitoba-Ontario, Barrow and Gilt Price Difference 
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Figure 54. Manitoba-Ontario Price Difference 
Manitoba-Ontario, FI Barrow and Gilt Slaughter Difference 
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Figure 55. Manitoba-Ontario Slaughter Difference 
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Manitoba-St. Paul, Barrow and Gilt Price Difference 
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Figure 56. Manitoba-St. Paul Price Difference 
Manitoba-Minnesota, FI Barrow and Gilt Slaughter Difference 
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Figure 57. Manitoba-Minnesota Slaughter Difference 
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Manitoba-Sioux Falls, Barrow and Gilt Price Difference 
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Figure 58. Manitoba-Sioux Falls Price Difference 
Manitoba-South Dakota, FI Barrow and Gilt Slaughter Difference 
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Figure 59. Manitoba-South Dakota Slaughter Difference 
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Manitoba-Iowa/Minnesota, Barrow and Gilt Price Difference 
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Figure 60. Manitoba-IA/MN Price Difference 
Manitoba-Iowa, FI Barrow and Gilt Slaughter Difference 
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Figure 61. Manitoba-Iowa Slaughter Difference 
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Average U.S. Pork Cutout Price
8/15/98-9/16/00
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
8/
15
/1
99
8
9/
15
/1
99
8
10
/1
5/
19
98
11
/1
5/
19
98
12
/1
5/
19
98
1/
15
/1
99
9
2/
15
/1
99
9
3/
15
/1
99
9
4/
15
/1
99
9
5/
15
/1
99
9
6/
15
/1
99
9
7/
15
/1
99
9
8/
15
/1
99
9
9/
15
/1
99
9
10
/1
5/
19
99
11
/1
5/
19
99
12
/1
5/
19
99
1/
15
/2
00
0
2/
15
/2
00
0
3/
15
/2
00
0
4/
15
/2
00
0
5/
15
/2
00
0
6/
15
/2
00
0
7/
15
/2
00
0
8/
15
/2
00
0
9/
15
/2
00
0
Week
Pr
ic
e
 
($C
AN
/1
00
 
kg
s)
Plant Open
 
Figure 62. U.S. Pork Cutout Price 
Average U.S. Barrow and Gilt Byproduct Price
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Figure 63. U.S. Hog ByProduct Price 
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Average Weight, U.S. Barrows and Gilts
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Figure 64. U.S. Barrow and Gilt Weight 
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Confidential Confidential 
ConAgra Plant Closing Impacts 
 
Please answer the following questions. Your best estimates are acceptable.  
 
1. a. How many miles is the feedlot you manage from Garden City, Kansas? (Check one) 
Less than 50   □ 23               50-99   □ 14  100-149  □ 28 
     150-199     □ 22       200 or more   □ 13 
 
    b. What general direction is the feedlot you manage from Garden City, Kansas? (Circle one) 
NW 12 N 8 NE 7 
W 3  E 15 
SW 31  S 13 SE 11 
2.  How many fed cattle were marketed in 2001 from this feedlot? (Check one) 
  Less than 5,000 head  □ 8  5,000-19,999    □ 24 
  20,000-49,999   □ 25  50,000-99,999   □ 28 
100,000 or more   □ 15  
 
3.  Check the appropriate box to indicate which packers bought fed cattle marketed from this 
feedlot the year before and after the ConAgra plant closing?  Cattle shipments could be to any 
plants owned by the listed packer.  
Estimated percent of marketings 
Prior to the ConAgra plant closing (2000) 
      Less than 20%       20-39%     40-59%         60-79%    80% or more 
ConAgra □38 □24 □8 □2 □10 
Excel □31 □18 □19 □4 □8 
IBP □38 □24 □7 □6 □8 
Farmland National Beef □23 □24 □11 □5 □14 
 
Following the ConAgra plant closing (2001) 
       Less than 20%      20-39%      40-59%   60-79%   80% or more 
ConAgra □54 □11 □1 □1 □6 
Excel □25 □21 □19 □7 □9 
IBP □28 □26 □11 □9 □10 
Farmland National Beef □19 □23 □16 □9 □12 
 
4.  Check the appropriate blanks to indicate how fed cattle marketed from this feedlot were sold 
the year before and after the ConAgra plant closing? 
Estimated percent of marketings 
Prior to the ConAgra plant closing (2000) 
       Less than 20%      20-39%     40-59%  60-79%    80% or more 
Cash Market □9 □10 □10 □12 □43 
Contract, Alliance, or 
Marketing Agreement □30 □12 □10 □8 □25 
 
Following the ConAgra plant closing (2001) 
      Less than 20%       20-39%     40-59%  60-79%    80% or more 
Cash Market □11 □17 □10 □11 □33 
Contract, Alliance, or 
Marketing Agreement □24 □10 □10 □16 □28 
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5.  On a scale of 1 to 9, rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following items? 
If you are uncertain or do not have an opinion about an item, please answer with 5.  
The following scale is to assist you. 
 
               1            2            3            4              5             6             7             8             9 
Strongly Disagree                           Uncertain/ No opinion                             Strongly Agree 
              Mark 
After the ConAgra plant burned, …                      1 to 9 
a. the number of buyers regularly bidding for cash market cattle from my feedlot 
decreased 
b. the loss of the ConAgra plant caused lower fed cattle prices in the region 
c. other packers were more interested in purchasing my cattle on a formula basis 
d. cattle from my feedlot were more frequently shipped to a closer packer  
e. the effects from captive supplies increased 
f. other packers were more interested in contracting cattle from my feedlot 
g. fewer plants made it easier for packers to know which ones were in the cash 
market 
h. fewer plants made it easier for packers to know how many cattle were 
committed to each packer 
i. fed cattle slaughter capacity in western Kansas became more of a problem 
j. feedlots closer to Garden City were less affected than those farther away 
k. other packers were more interested in negotiating base prices on grids 
l. fewer plants increased the frequency of special agreements by packers with 
feedlots 
m. other packers gained a psychological advantage from having one fewer plant 
     in the region 
n. feedlots having marketing agreements with ConAgra switched them to 
    another packer 
o. the plant closing had no noticeable effect on marketing or pricing fed cattle 
    from my feedlot 
p. feedlots having marketing agreements with ConAgra dropped the agreement in 
favor of the cash market  
 
6. What was the most noticeable change (if any) to you after the ConAgra plant burned? 
            
             
 
Thank you for your assistance. 
Please return your completed survey to: 
 
Clement Ward 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
515 Ag. Hall, Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, OK  74078 
 
a. 
4.95 
b. 6.18 
c. 4.46 
d. 4.63 
e. 6.19 
f. 4.08 
g. 6.17 
h. 6.36 
i. 7.06 
j. 4.78 
k. 4.81 
l. 5.74 
m. 
7.22 
n. 5.79 
o. 
4.07 
p. 4.44 
Average 
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July 2, 2003 
 
 
 
Dear Mr. __ 
 
 
 
As you recall, the ConAgra beef processing plant in Garden City, Kansas caught fire on 
December 25, 2000, and was later permanently closed.  How the marketplace adjusts to such 
events is a concern to some and simply of interest to others.  We are interested in the market 
impacts (if any) from the plant closing.  Enclosed is a short questionnaire we would like you to 
complete and return to us in the return envelope we have provided you.  If you prefer, you can fax 
your completed questionnaire to us at (405) 744-8210.  If faxing, please remember to send both 
sides of the questionnaire. 
 
The questionnaire is designed to determine the market impacts you think occurred following the 
closing of the plant, and how it affected your feedlot and the regional fed cattle market.  Pretests 
indicate the questionnaire should take no more than 10-15 minutes to complete.  Your responses 
to the questionnaire will be kept confidential and will not be identified with you or your 
feedlot when the results of the survey are reported.  
 
We believe the results of this survey will help us understand markets and market adjustments to 
significant events or shocks.  If you have any questions or concerns about this questionnaire, 
please do not hesitate to contact one of us at (405) 744-9834, or by email (hornung@okstate.edu 
or ceward@okstate.edu ). 
 
Thank you very much for your time.  If you would like a copy of the survey summary, simply put 
a business card in the envelope along with your completed questionnaire or write your name and 
address on the questionnaire and we will send you a summary when it is finished. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Jon Hornung      Clement Ward 
Research Assistant     Professor and Extension Economist 
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Table 29. ConAgra. Correlations of Survey Opinion Questions 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 
A 1.00 0.49 0.53 0.21 0.28 0.25 0.35 0.32 0.38 -0.08 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.20 -0.44 -0.07 
B  1.00 0.34 0.20 0.57 0.17 0.49 0.50 0.56 -0.18 0.29 0.47 0.44 0.19 -0.61 -0.22 
C   1.00 0.32 0.33 0.38 0.44 0.45 0.19 0.09 0.44 0.40 0.24 0.16 -0.25 0.01 
D    1.00 0.20 0.31 0.20 0.20 0.03 0.19 0.43 0.34 0.18 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 
E     1.00 0.30 0.51 0.50 0.52 -0.03 0.35 0.44 0.41 0.17 -0.45 -0.16 
F      1.00 0.33 0.26 0.17 0.06 0.45 0.40 0.19 0.14 -0.20 0.02 
G       1.00 0.78 0.46 -0.03 0.41 0.51 0.48 0.17 -0.35 -0.15 
H        1.00 0.51 -0.05 0.34 0.43 0.44 0.21 -0.35 -0.13 
I         1.00 -0.19 0.27 0.35 0.40 0.28 -0.50 -0.24 
J          1.00 0.25 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.19 
K           1.00 0.50 0.15 0.13 -0.06 0.01 
L            1.00 0.46 0.12 -0.42 -0.03 
M             1.00 0.15 -0.46 -0.09 
N              1.00 -0.19 -0.11 
O               1.00 0.13 
P                1.00 
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Confidential Confidential 
Maple Leaf Plant Opening Impacts 
 
Please answer the following questions. Your best estimates are acceptable.  
 
1. a. How many kilometers are the finishing barns you manage from Brandon, Manitoba? (Check 
one) 
Less than 80   □  13              80-159   □ 51  160-239  □ 13 
     240-319     □ 3             320-399   □ 0                 400 or more  □ 0 
 
    b. What general direction are the finishing barns you manage from Brandon, Manitoba? (Circle 
one) 
NW 12       N 3         NE 11 
W 1   Brandon          E 7 
SW 2      S 6        SE 37 
2.  How many hogs were marketed in 2000 from the finishing barns you manage? (Check one) 
  Less than 500 head  □ 21  500-1,999    □ 35 
  2,000-4,999   □ 14  5,000-9,999   □ 3 
10,000 or more   □ 5 
 
3.  Check the appropriate box to indicate which packers bought hogs marketed from your 
finishing barns the year before and after the Maple Leaf Foods plant opening?  Hog shipments 
could be to any plants owned by the listed packer.  
Estimated percent of marketings 
Prior to the Maple Leaf Foods plant opening (1999) 
      Less than 20%      20-39%   40-59%          60-79%      80% or more 
Maple Leaf Foods □6 □2 □1 □0 □2 
Schneider □1 □4 □4 □6 □33 
Springhill Farms □8 □5 □4 □1 □19 
Best Brand Meats (Forgan) □3 □0 □1 □0 □0 
Other Canadian packer □3 □0 □0 □0 □1 
A U.S. packer □8 □3 □2 □0 □4 
 
Following the Maple Leaf Foods plant opening (2000) 
       Less than 20%       20-39%    40-59%   60-79%   80% or more 
Maple Leaf Foods □6 □3 □4 □2 □16 
Schneider □6 □2 □3 □5 □20 
Springhill Farms □8 □2 □4 □6 □13 
Best Brand Meats (Forgan) □4 □1 □0 □0 □0 
Other Canadian Packer □4 □0 □0 □1 □0 
A U.S.packer □5 □1 □2 □1 □4 
 
4.  Check the appropriate blanks to indicate how hogs marketed from your finishing barns were 
sold the year before and after the Maple Leaf Foods plant opening? 
Estimated percent of marketings 
Prior to the Maple Leaf Foods plant opening (1999) 
       Less than 20%      20-39%     40-59%  60-79%    80% or more 
Cash or Spot Market □0 □0 □3 □3 □32 
Contract or Marketing 
Agreement □3 □2 □4 □0 □39 
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Following the Maple Leaf Foods plant opening (2000) 
       Less than 20%       20-39%      40-59%  60-79%    80% or more 
Cash or Spot Market □2 □1 □2 □4 □24 
Contract or Marketing 
Agreement □3 □3 □3 □3 □43 
 
5.  On a scale of 1 to 9, rate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following items? 
If you are uncertain or do not have an opinion about an item, please answer with 
5.  The following scale is to assist you. 
 
               1            2            3            4              5             6             7             8             9 
Strongly Disagree                           Uncertain/ No opinion                             Strongly Agree 
              Mark 
After the Maple Leaf Foods plant opened, …                    1 to 9 
a. the number of buyers regularly bidding for cash market hogs from my finishing 
barns increased 
b. the addition of the Maple Leaf Foods plant caused higher hog prices in the 
region 
c. hogs from my finishing barns were more frequently shipped to a closer packer  
d. the opening of the Maple Leaf Foods plant decreased the number of finished 
hogs shipped to the United States 
e. other packers were more interested in contracting hogs from my finishing barns 
f. the plant opening had no noticeable effect on marketing or pricing hogs 
    from my finishing barns 
g. more plants made it more difficult for packers to know how many hogs were 
committed to each packer 
h. hog slaughter capacity in Manitoba became less of a problem 
i. finishing barns closer to Brandon were more affected than those farther away 
j. hog producers expanded their hog operations due to the opening of the Maple 
Leaf Foods plant in Brandon 
k. other packers lost their competitive advantage from having one additional plant 
in the region 
l. finishing barns having marketing agreements with another packer switched 
them to Maple Leaf Foods 
m. opening the Maple Leaf Foods plant reduced feeder pig exports to the United 
States 
 
6. What was the most noticeable change (if any) to you after the Maple Leaf Foods plant opened? 
            
             
 
Thank you for your assistance.  Please return your completed survey to: 
 Jared Carlberg, Department of Agribusiness and Agricultural Economics 
 353-66 Dafoe Road, University of Manitoba 
 Winnipeg, MB R3T 2N2 
 
a. 
2.34 
b. 2.84 
c. 3.95 
d. 5.13 
e. 3.84 
f. 5.01 
g. 4.00 
h. 5.09 
i. 4.71 
j. 5.31 
k. 5.50 
l. 4.90 
m. 
4.43 
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October 10, 2003 
 
 
 
Dear Pork Producer: 
 
 
 
How the marketplace adjusts to major structural changes, such as packing plant closings and 
openings, is a concern and of interest to some.  We are interested in the market impacts (if any) 
from opening the Maple Leaf Foods hog processing plant in Brandon in August 1999.  Enclosed 
is a short questionnaire we would like you to complete and return in the return envelope we have 
provided. 
 
The questionnaire is designed to determine the market impacts you think occurred following the 
opening of the plant, and how it affected the finishing barns you manage and the regional 
slaughter hog market.  The survey pretest indicated the questionnaire should take no more than 
10-15 minutes to complete.  Your responses to the questionnaire will be kept confidential and 
will not be identified with you or your farm/firm when the results of the survey are 
reported.  
 
We believe the results of this survey will help us understand markets and market adjustments to 
significant events or shocks.  If you have any questions or concerns about this questionnaire, 
please do not hesitate to contact one of us at (405) 744-9834, or by email (hornung@okstate.edu 
or ceward@okstate.edu ). 
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Jonathan Hornung     Clement Ward 
Research Assistant     Professor and Extension Economist 
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September 25, 2003 
 
 
Dear Manitoba Hog Producer: 
 
RE:  Survey of the Impact of Maple Leaf Foods Brandon Plant Opening  
 
The Oklahoma State University, Department of Agricultural Economics in conjunction with the 
University of Manitoba, Department of Agribusiness and Agricultural Economics is conducting a 
survey of Manitoba Pork Producers.   The study is examining the market dynamics from the 
opening and closing of meat packing plants.  One of the case studies being looked at is the impact 
of the 1999 opening of the Maple Leaf Foods processing plant in Brandon, Manitoba.    
 
This letter is included in the survey package to inform you of Manitoba Pork Council’s 
involvement and support for the attached producer survey and of our care in ensuring that 
confidentiality of producer contact information is being strictly maintained and protected.  In this 
regard, only Pork Council staff is doing the addressing and mailing of the survey to you and other 
producers.  We encourage you to complete the survey.   Please do not include your name or return 
address on the completed survey form or enclosed self addressed stamped return envelope. 
 
The results of the survey will be of interest to Manitoba Pork Council and to you.   To maintain 
confidentiality, Manitoba Pork Council will send you a copy of the survey summary upon 
receiving it from the University researchers.  There is no need to contact the University directly. 
  
Thank you for your time.   Call me at (204) 235-2309 should you have any questions. 
  
       
Yours truly, 
       
      Peter Mah 
      Director,  
Community Relations & Sustainable 
Development  
 
Manitoba Pork Council 
28 Terracon Place 
Winnipeg, Manitoba 
Canada, R2J 4G7 
Phone  204.237.7447 
Fax  204.237.9831 
www.manitobapork.com 
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Table 30. Maple Leaf. Correlations of Survey Opinion Questions 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M 
A 1.00 0.48 -0.01 0.20 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.27 0.12 0.35 0.23 0.11 0.29 
B  1.00 -0.02 0.21 0.03 -0.06 0.09 0.46 0.13 0.30 0.05 0.13 0.28 
C   1.00 -0.06 0.29 -0.15 -0.06 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.19 0.03 
D    1.00 0.10 -0.10 0.18 0.60 0.16 0.24 0.31 0.26 0.54 
E     1.00 0.03 0.23 0.14 0.16 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.06 
F      1.00 0.21 0.04 0.06 -0.07 -0.05 0.15 0.05 
G       1.00 0.27 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.07 
H        1.00 0.28 0.23 0.26 0.18 0.50 
I         1.00 0.37 0.15 0.29 0.26 
J          1.00 0.12 0.28 0.12 
K           1.00 0.55 0.35 
L            1.00 0.35 
M             1.00 
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